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Preface
This publication is the first report from the Nordic research project Changing
Contexts for Mediating Public Concern in the Assessment of Technoscience. Public
Responses to Genetic Technologies in the Nordic Countries (COMPASS). The pro-
ject is headed by Margareta Bertilsson, Copenhagen University, Department of
Sociology, Denmark. The other partners are: Andrew Jamison, Aalborg Univer-
sity, Institute for Social Development and Planning, Denmark; Jesper Lassen,
The Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Centre for Bioethics and
Risk Assessment, Denmark; Marja Häyrinen-Alestalo and Karoliina Snell, Hel-
sinki University, Department of Sociology, Finland; Egil Kallerud and Vera
Schwach, Norwegian Institute for Studies in Research and Higher Education,
Norway; Thomas Achen, Linköping University, Department of Environmental
Science, Sweden; and Mark Elam, Gothenburg University, Department of Soci-
ology, Sweden. The project is funded for a three year period (2002–2004) by the
Joint Committee for Nordic Research Councils for the Humanities and the So-
cial Sciences (NOS-HS).
This report documents the first exploratory steps towards an articulated
comparative account of approaches and experiences in the Nordic countries
concerning the political, economic, social and cultural responses to global, Eu-
ropean and Nordic efforts in the appropriation and mediation of modern bio-
technology. The national narratives included in this report will subsequently be
supplemented with specific case studies on nationally important biotechnology
issues, in order to provide windows with higher resolution on the project’s key
research questions. This will in all provide material for a final effort of synthesis,
through which a framework will be sought for the comparative characterisation
of social processes of appropriation of genetic technologies in these Nordic
countries.
Oslo, March 2004
Petter Aasen
Director
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Introduction: Towards a Biotech 
Society – Nordic Perspectives
Marja Häyrinen-Alestalo & Egil Kallerud
Modern biotechnology as a source of societal 
destabilisation
Biotechnology exhibits a generic and hybrid mode of knowledge production
through which scientific advancements have opened applications in fields ran-
ging from pharmaceuticals, medical diagnostics and therapy to agriculture,
food production, aquaculture, forestry and environmental protection. Modern
biotechnology is based on the methods to introduce, delete or exchange particu-
lar traits in an organism either by inserting genes from another organism or by
otherwise altering its structure. The rapidly advancing knowledge base with
links to living organisms and ecosystems has produced new scientific discipli-
nes such as genomics and bioinformatics and novel applications such as gene
testing and regeneration of human organs and tissues (Inter-departmental
Group on Modern Biotechnology 2000). The methodological development has
dramatically expanded the technical-manipulative capabilities of bioscience,
raising questions of the emergence of new asymmetries between nature and cul-
ture/society. Therefore, aside from the hybrid knowledge base of these sciences
there are hybrid realms that challenge the division of nature and society on
which the theories of modernisation have been based (Bertilsson 2003).
According to Lau, the new generic technologies may have destabilising ef-
fects on the social and legal order (Bertilsson 2000: 9). During the last twenty ye-
ars the main focus has been on information and communication technologies
and on theories that explain the development of the new socio-economic order
as an outcome of a knowledge-based, networked economy (e.g. Castells 1996;
European Commission 2003). The networks are in turn seen to be functional
when the formal national actors, such as the state, industries and the science sy-
stem, work for common purposes. Even though there are claims that the new
social order will also encompass the emergence of a networked democracy and
growing citizen participation (Castells 2001), destabilisation primarily stands
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for increasing turbulence between the frames of national policy and the needs
of global markets (Häyrinen-Alestalo 1999).
Today new forms of governance and citizenship have been called for to di-
minish uneven developments between economic, social and cultural structures
of society. To be responsive to these demands, the networked economy should
broaden its view of public participation. The social and cultural dimensions are
also weak and limited in many ways. In the current political debate the discour-
se of openness, transparency, participation and dialogue is pervasive. The strat-
egies for active citizenship have, however, been primarily launched by the Eu-
ropean Union and several individual nation-states in order to remobilise public
interest in government policy and to rebuild citizen trust in this respect. There-
fore there are tensions and ambiguities that fuse with the political ambitions to
make biotechnology the «next wave of the knowledge-based economy» (Euro-
pean Commission 2002: 3).
Furthermore, the increasing destabilisation in the case of biotechnology
points to a tension between the welfare promises of the biotech society and the
uncertainties, risks and responsibilities that challenge the legitimacy of biosci-
ence and its uses. Similar uncertainties and risks have become evident already
in environmental issues (Jamison 2001). Both fields contain both the promise
of positive potentials and the possibilities of unpredictable and negative conse-
quences. Sand (2002) has pointed to the need of regulation and control mech-
anisms that may make the justification process more future-oriented. As a rule,
the control mechanisms have been used by the super-and nation-states together
with international commercial and professional organisations to support mar-
ket regulation and free competition, to harmonize the respective laws, to reduce
risk, as well as to protect free individual choice, distributive justice and human
health (CIOMS 2002; European Group on Ethics in Science and Technologies
2000).
Despite the growth of specialised scientific knowledge available for use in
risk evaluation, the knowledge base of bioscience has a high degree of comple-
xity. On the other hand there can be only degrees or different forms of risk, and
the zero risk and full safety are not possible (Byrne 2002). Being also sensitive to
commercial and public concern specialised bioscience knowledge is continu-
ously changing and therefore non-stabilised. Non-stabilisation in turn indicates
that the government organisations tend to act strategically and with precaution
rather than legalistically and according to specific rules.
Moreover, the expanding manipulative capabilities of biotechnology lay bare
tensions and contradictions between the norms of objectivity and truth-value of
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science, its ethical standards and the moral conceptions of right and wrong
(Häyrinen-Alestalo 2003). In fact, the growing public concern and distrust in
the achievements of biotechnology demonstrates processes that are characte-
ristic of disorganised knowledge (Bertilsson 2002). Disorganised knowledge is
an outcome of a decentralisation process during which the pressure to open the
scientific and political systems to public engagement becomes visible and com-
peting forms of understanding call for a new dialogue between scientists and the
wider public.
In many respects, the problems of disorganised knowledge have already been
identified in the case of green knowledge, where the diversification of the know-
ledge making processes and the need for participatory forms of action in dealing
with environmental issues is much in evidence (Jamison 2001). Both disorgani-
sed and green knowledge question the pragmatic and deterministic ideas of
market regulation and the old models of governance. Especially in relation to
new genetic technologies a shift «from government to governance», responding
to the demand for horizontal modes of communication and structures of power
and for new forums of public consultation and response mediation, is clearly
called for. Public consultation does not, however, necessarily provide means for
solving ethical problems. Bertilsson (2003) points out, in reference to Rose, how
modified nature enables further interventions into individual bodily disposi-
tions. Therefore the division of responsibilities moves closer to the ethics and
morality of individual choice, and the relationship between individual and col-
lective decisions becomes complicated and difficult to govern.
Due to the risks of the consequences of biotechnological applications and to
the difficulty of making the right moral choices, the consultations with the pub-
lic can no longer be considered as belonging to the category of rational action
in the frame of the deficit model (Levidow & Marris 2001). Modern citizen ac-
tivism or scientific citizenship often takes place in forms that cannot easily be
contained within established procedures and forums of public consultation.
Thus the definition and management of the new public spaces are difficult. The
case of green knowledge provides ample empirical evidence that it is in fact pos-
sible to institutionalise politically mobilising activities as a part of formal polit-
ical process, at the risk, however, that the oppositional and visionary elements
of public concern will be lost (Jamison 2001; 2003). Even though new hybrid
identities in the form of networkers, translators, facilitators and brokers can be
identified in the case of sustainable development, the full extent of representa-
tions, competences and expertise that will emerge in the case of biotechnology
is as yet unclear.
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The knowledge-based economy as a Nordic 
effort
The project «Changing Contexts for Mediating Public Concern in the Assess-
ment of Technoscience» (COMPASS) is the undertaking by a group of re-
searchers from four Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Norway and Swe-
den. The project aims at studying modifications and destabilisations in the so-
cial and political structures in these countries, in response to the new forms of
public awareness and mediation of interests that have emerged through the
multifarious processes of socio-political appropriation of modern biotechnol-
ogy. In the following country reports, some key characteristics are described,
concerning the specific forms of participation and agency that have emerged
within the specific social, economic, political and cultural contexts of the indi-
vidual countries. For each country, narratives of national profiles are provided
in an attempt to draw out some key links between institutional structures, pol-
itical cultures, development of industry, key sites of action and forms of actor
representations. While all four countries may be seen to adhere to the so-called
Nordic model of democracy and of the welfare state, the narratives provided
here are as much about very different, even highly divergent, trajectories of de-
velopment and strategic political choices. In fact, they reflect differences in so-
cio-economic structures, national systems of innovation and in priority setting
in science and technology policy.
Today the framing of these policies is in the respective countries influenced
by the grand narrative of the knowledge-based economy that pervades policy
discourse on the role of science and technology in the new global economic or-
der. This narrative has been articulated and strongly promoted by such cross-
national players as the OECD and the European Union (OECD 2001; 2002; Eu-
ropean Commission 1998; 2003). The idea of the knowledge-based economy
has also been taken up by most of the member countries. In the view of the EU,
«the transition towards a knowledge-based economy involves a fundamental
structural change … all the challenges facing Europe need to be reconsidered in
the light of this new paradigm» (European Commission 2003). It is characte-
ristic of this kind of argumentation that the new technologies are in the core of
modern knowledge production and application.
The knowledge-based economy has provided a framework for new rankings
between the «leading» and «lagging» nations and regions. The rankings indicate
that the Nordic countries in general, and Finland and Sweden in particular,
have become forerunners that are «on the right track» based on key indicators
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of investments in the national knowledge-based economies (European Com-
mission 2003: 23ff). As such, the Nordic countries lend support to the articula-
tion and promotion of these narratives. In the case of biotechnology Denmark,
Sweden and Finland have been found to be the leading EU performers, Sweden
having a leading position in biotechnology publications, the number of dedi-
cated biotechnology firms and the public knowledge about biotechnology. Den-
mark in turn is the top performing country in terms of USPTO patents and drug
approvals (European Trend Chart on Innovation 2002: 4). On the other hand,
a study of the actual national enactment or implementation in the Nordic coun-
tries provides an entry for a critical assessment and possible deconstruction of
the idea of the knowledge-based economy.
Even though all Nordic countries have managed to maintain the core struc-
ture of the welfare state (Benner 2003), the experience of Finland demonstrates
a more rapid growth of neo-liberal policy and more extensive cuttings of the
welfare services than in the other Nordic countries. The increasing unbalance
between the investments to the knowledge-based economy and to the public
services indicates a need to discuss and re-evaluate the effects of one-dimensio-
nal strategies. A new cross-national movement is paying attention to a more
multi-dimensional and complex framework than before. Among others the EU
has not only picked up this discourse as the framework for its policy to develop
Europe into «the most competitive region of the world by 2010». It has also ex-
tended and reframed its argumentation to strengthen the knowledge-based so-
ciety (European Commission 2003: 3).
The recovery of the knowledge-based society not only entails that broad con-
cerns, such as health, social cohesion and sustainable development (ibid: 9–10;
15–17), should be integrated in political orientation. Also public legitimacy and
support for science and the new tech-based policies are seen to a high degree to
be dependent on the government sensitivity to public concern, the elements of
which are accountability, transparency and democratic representation. As the
cases of genetically modified food and mad cow disease indicate, public support
can no longer be taken for granted. By rejecting GM food, European citizens are
also able to affect potential markets. In this respect the four Nordic countries
have adopted both similar and dissimilar strategies.
In all of these countries sustainable development has become a crosscutting
policy goal having also stabilised the role of public participation in environmen-
tal issues. At the same time many institutional structures have been established
due to global demands and agreements. In Denmark several storylines of public
concern in environmental issues can be identified that are also useful in analys-
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ing the participatory forms of representation in biotechnology issues. In fact,
the Danish model serves as an example of lay technology assessment to develop
participatory science and technology policies. The governments in Finland and
Sweden have in turn tended to trust on political consensus and on the formal
representative forms of democracy. In Sweden the definitions of the know-
ledge-based economy are, however, closer to the knowledge-based society than
in Finland. Thus the main discourses of concern with genetic technologies (Las-
sen & Jamison 2003) are reflected in and amplified by the main policy fram-
ework within which policies for the promotion and regulation of biotechnology
are articulated and implemented.
The Nordic efforts to introduce multidimensional framings may add to the
centrality of the Nordic experiences. Biotechnology as the second key compo-
nent of the knowledge-based economy points also to many destabilising and
controversial issues to which the respective countries may be seen as forerun-
ners, as sites of experimentation and innovation, both in the terms of competi-
tiveness through investment in knowledge and in those of governance, cohesion
and ethics.
Biotechnology restructuring Nordic industries
In the visions of the knowledge-based economy several pressures have been set
for the transformations in the national industrial structures. In the first place,
there is the demand for the promotion of the new tech-intensive sectors. The
policy makers have started to speak of specific ICT and biotechnology clusters
whose impacts on economic growth are supposed to be the most optimal. From
the viewpoint of the new tech-oriented cluster policy, large differences in the in-
dustrial structures of the four Nordic countries imply that the commercial and
industrial opportunities opened up by modern biotechnology are related to dif-
ferent industrial clusters.
Due to the strong pharmaceutical, electronic and transport (aviation) indus-
tries, Sweden has ranked high on the modernisation scale for a long time. The
well-established position of the pharmaceutical industry and medical R&D in
Sweden provide also a strong basis for exploiting the industrial opportunities of
biotechnology. As a result of systematic and generous public investments in
ICT, biotechnology and materials technology, Finland has made an exceptio-
nally rapid entrance into the global markets in the 1990s. The Finnish success
story may, however, also be seen to reflect the fragility of both the ICT and bio-
tech clusters. The former has had difficulties to keep its competitive status in the
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global markets during the last three years. The latter indicates the weak points
in the theory of the knowledge-based economy. Even the rapidly growing public
and private investments in biotechnology research have not guaranteed econo-
mic breakthroughs to Finnish biotechnology products in the global markets
(Helsingin Sanomat 2003). In this case also the issues of non-marketable and et-
hically suspicious products have become visible, though public discussion of
these issues cannot be noted.
The introduction of biotechnology as an integral element of the knowledge-
based economy tends to simplify many elements of modern disorganisation. As
the primary goal is in the new tech-driven economic growth, structural changes
are also needed in the science system. Both in Finland and Sweden biotechno-
logical research has integrated universities into bio-centres. The concept of the
innovation system that is more widely used in Finland than in Sweden has also
tended to rebuild the role of the state as a mediator of socio-economic interests.
In Denmark the formal political system has been more sensitive to various
forms of disorganisation.
While Finland and Sweden are held forth as the pioneers of the knowledge-
based economy, Denmark and Norway present different patterns, partly due to
the dominant position in their economies of primary and raw materials-based
industries, in particular agriculture for Denmark and petroleum and fisheries/
aquaculture for Norway. Being far less R&D intensive industries than the ICT,
pharmaceutical and (air) transport industries, the overall knowledge intensity
of the Danish and Norwegian economy is far lower than that of Finland and
Sweden. While biotechnology presents promising opportunities for some of the
industries, it also represents uncertainties and dangers for them. Accordingly,
the Danish agro-food industry is both an important export industry and capable
for motivating public discussion of modern genetic manipulations, such as with
genetically modified food. Therefore the Danish mechanisms of government
control are also more responsive to public concern than elsewhere in Scandina-
via.
The key Danish agricultural and pharmaceutical companies exhibit innova-
tive approaches in terms of taking public concern into account in their R&D
and marketing strategies. In terms of the indicators of investment in the know-
ledge-based economy, Norway exhibits the distinctive profile of the «lagging»
and hesitant latecomer. Pressures from industrial and R&D interests to imitate
the Finnish model and to promote more liberal investments in biotechnology
are mounting with some apparent successes. Still they are kept in check by well-
established, restrictive regulatory policies.
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The social contract on biotechnology in the 
Nordic countries
The picture drawn by the knowledge-based economy changes, however, when
the economic growth-driven representations are replaced by richer accounts, in
particular when the dynamics and developments within the political, social and
cultural spheres are added. Already some technology barometers tend to indi-
cate a higher position for Denmark when the indicators relevant for the so-cal-
led knowledge-value society are taken into account (Naumanen 2003). The re-
sults of the European Trend Chart on Innovation (2002: 4–5) show that on the
basis of the composite Best Performance Index of biotechnology innovation
Denmark scores 60, Sweden 57, Finland 42 and Norway 29.
The new models of governance tend to extend interventionist tendencies to
citizens and to emphasise shared responsibilities of a more individualistic style.
In the case of new technologies they point to deliberation and dialogue to recon-
struct public acceptance and trust of science-driven innovations. At the same ti-
me, in terms of political ideology there have been rising neo-liberal ideas of the
sovereignty of the markets, making the problem of shared responsibilities com-
plicated (Häyrinen-Alestalo 2001; Hagendijk & Kallerud 2002). Market de-
mocracy tends to diminish the political and social value of the state. In a market
driven society public welfare services have also increasingly been regarded as
dysfunctional. The tension between the welfare state and the neo-liberal ideolo-
gy is visible especially in Finland that has won many international competitions
on the basis of selected competitiveness factors of the economy. In spite of this
success, the public mistrust has been increasingly focussed on the national go-
vernment that has radically cut expenses from welfare services and has also been
incapable of solving the serious problem of unemployment. These kinds of pol-
itical turbulences have also become evident in Sweden and Denmark, but in a
minor scale and much later than in Finland.
The ongoing processes may be seen to imply an undermining of the traditi-
onal Nordic welfare state model and a change in the ideals of equal opportuni-
ties, in so far as earlier principles of equalisation of the opportunity comprised
ideas of government intervention, participation through representation and
shared responsibilities. Both in Norway and Finland, equalisation of the oppor-
tunity has also had a strong regional dimension, which is presently under pres-
sure in particular in Finland due to a rapid concentration of knowledge-based
ICT and biotechnology centres and highly qualified labour force into a few
growth pole areas. The new government being a coalition of the Centre and So-
 Introduction: Towards a Biotech Society – Nordic Perspectives    15
cial Democratic parties has, however, adopted a defensive approach by laun-
ching a programme for the creation of new competence centres all over the
country.
In Sweden and Finland the welfare state was primarily a Social Democratic
project with a political consensus of a strong interventionist state. The political
system has followed a corporatist strategy that has been mostly exclusive con-
centrating power to experts, bureaucrats and politicians. Therefore only a limi-
ted space has been provided to spontaneous citizen activity. The political system
in turn in Denmark has been influenced by a mixture of several new social mo-
vements comprising communes in Christiania, academic Marxism, leftist par-
ties and active feminist and environmental movements. They have given more
space for public representation and emphasised wider citizen participation. In
Denmark public debates about science and technology started to develop alrea-
dy in the 1970s. In the long run the forms of participatory democracy have not,
however, managed to strengthen their true mediating function. Even though
both risk and ethical discourse of the effects of biotechnology began in Den-
mark earlier than in the three other countries, the respective activities have not
been radical and it is difficult to find direct impacts of these activities on bio-
technology policy.
In Norway, the initial, but fairly weak attempts to launch a targeted invest-
ment in biotechnology R&D, were soon pushed back as strong concerns with et-
hical implications of the medical uses of biotechnology set the dominant agenda
of biotechnology policy debate in the Parliament and in party politics. Instituti-
onal innovations within a political culture exhibiting characteristics of inclusive
corporatism have provided a framework for a somewhat late but vivid debate on
biotechnology issues, predominantly in terms of ethical, rather than risk, con-
cerns. This debate has also provided a basis for one of the most restrictive pol-
icies for regulating biotechnology in Europe. In the context of strong, petro-
leum-based economy, the biotechnology debate takes place in Norway under
conditions of less economic pressure and urgency than in other Nordic coun-
tries. While this provides cause for concern in terms of stalled movement to-
wards the knowledge-based economy it may also, due to the uneven develop-
ments of R&D, as well as political and cultural aspects of biotechnology, provide
more favourable conditions for applying the more cautious approaches. They
are dictated by policies that emphasise both risk and ethical concerns.
In all Nordic countries, environmental issues have triggered political and ci-
tizen activism, and there are expectations that biotechnology will make the pro-
cesses of environmental protection and sustainable development more efficient.
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There is also some kind of consensus about the issues of health, and the hopes
for cheaper, safer and more ethical production of new drugs and medical ser-
vices are notable. The conceptions of the biomedical treatments differ, however,
across the countries.
In Finland collective solidarity is still focussed on the issues of equal oppor-
tunities. Even though there is a growing conflict with market governance, citi-
zens tend to have a positive view of the beneficial achievements of all new tech-
nologies. For example the majority of pregnant women accept the idea of ha-
ving access to genetic screening (Jallinoja 2002). In Sweden, and in many
respects also in Finland, two overlapping tendencies have had an impact on the
weak inclusion of active citizenship. First, modern social progress has been con-
sidered as identical to the growth of technological innovations. Second, in spite
of the already high level of education, people have been considered as needing
specific education and information of new technology-based activities. There-
fore also the discussion of shared responsibilities in biotechnology has been
weak in both countries.
Regulation and types of interest mediation
The generic character of biotechnological applications refers to global level de-
velopments and social realities. According to Martinelli (2003) there are global
flows that direct attention to new forms of normative order and consensus,
international public space and transnational civil society. Therefore, the na-
tional governments are increasingly inserted into an interconnected social or-
der where collective policy problems of economic, ecological and social security
are discussed and agreements of multilateral treaties for the common regulation
are made. The rapidly advancing applications of biotechnology have strengthe-
ned discussion of the global means of regulatory mechanisms and of the need to
institutionalise global, regional and multilateral systems of governance.
Martinelli believes that supranational bodies can contribute to global demo-
cratic governance by creating mechanisms of collaboration in policy arenas, by
introducing new instruments of human rights enforcements and by pooling re-
sources for achieving common goals. Global governance requires, however,
some preliminary definition of democracy in the situation where the growth of
injustice is one of the key critical arguments against globalisation. Moreover,
examples such as mad cow disease point to new processes of globalisation that
are no longer hindered by time and distance and are risks to national security.
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It is characteristic of this kind of «bioinvasion» that the lines between animal
and human risks become blurred (Business Week 2000).
Due to the risks and ethical problems of the applications of biotechnology,
international organizations, such as the Council of Europe, UNESCO, WHO,
ILO and the European Union have estimated potential risks and prepared legal
processes for their minimisation. During this process technology assessment
has moved toward risk assessment and the aims of control and protection have
become increasingly visible. The formal international authorities have also star-
ted to speak of a precautionary principle and to point to cases where scientific
evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and where the possible risks
to health or the environment are unacceptable (Byrne 2000). Moreover, bio-
technology has had an impact on the renovation of the standards of medical ap-
plications emphasising respect for all human beings, the protection of health,
privacy and rights, the ethical obligation to maximise benefits and to minimise
harms and the importance of ethical review committees (CIOMS 1982/1993/
2002). All these legal processes and risk assessments are global by their imple-
mentation and are therefore also valid for the Nordic countries. Such concerns
relate mostly to professional ethical standards, and the mediation of informa-
tion occurs through the professional channels. The problem is that there is a de-
cline in public confidence in regulatory bodies and scientific expertise also in
the Nordic countries, even though it is more evident in Denmark than in Fin-
land, Norway and Sweden.
Aside from other supranational authorities, the EU has made an effort to
strengthen its «global» functions by speaking of the common objectives as well
as of effective coordination and control in the case of genetic modifications. The
control measures have been more restrictive in Europe than in the US. Though
the primary aim is for both sides to guarantee the competitiveness of the bio-
technology sector, the EU has been more responsive to public concern of food
safety and to citizen capacities as consumers. Due to its restrictive regulation,
the EU has served as a mediator of control mechanisms that take their credibil-
ity of scientific assessment. These mechanisms are supposed to be independent
and transparent (Byrne 2000). The goal of mediation has been, however, mostly
educational and deliberate: to provide information for the consumers to make
an informed choice. Respective legislation serves also as a means to neutralise
destabilisation due to emotions and «insufficient reason». In a way the formal
regulatory actions have responded to critical discourse and an attempt has been
made to maintain control over wider antagonist discourses.
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Even though Norway is not a EU member state like Denmark, Finland and
Sweden, all four Nordic countries have accepted the view that the EU directives
are applicable and binding to them. There are, however, national variations in
the timing and scope of regulatory actions. The Norwegian Parliament adopted
in the 1990s the most restrictive controlling regime to biotechnology and has
used the formal political system of democratic representation as a source of crit-
ical mediation. This regime reflects ethical and moral values where everyone is
valued with a high respect for human dignity, human rights and personal inte-
grity. The respective laws also make references to risks, social utility and sustai-
nability.
In Denmark several story-lines of the assessment of genetic technology can
be identified ending in the late 1990s at an ethical or cultural story-line that
comprised the first law on genetic technology and the environment in the world
and attempts to promote consensual approaches to public concern and assess-
ment. The mediation of interests has been implemented somewhere in between
the formal regulatory actions and informal and discursive, first critical and later
on more consensual, forums. Finland has been a latecomer in biotechnology re-
gulatory action, where the respective laws have been passed and the regulatory
frameworks institutionalised only after joining the EU in the middle of the
1990s. In Finland the goal to be the top knowledge-based economy on the basis
of the ICT and biotechnology clusters have simplified government and public
conceptions of the dimensions of regulatory framework. Moreover, the general
trust in the good intentions of technology have minimised the need for an an-
tagonist discourse. The mediation of interests increasingly reflects ethical con-
cerns; however, moral values are limited and suppressed by national values of
economic effectiveness.
Finally, Sweden seems to be a combination of government-sponsored acti-
vism and corporate-sponsored resistance. There is a consensus that ethics is
needed in the legal regulation of biotechnology. It has been, however, unclear
what status ethical norms should enjoy and from what sources they should be
derived. At the same time there exist conflicting political interpretations of how
comprehensive and all encompassing the legal regulation should be. As in Fin-
land, the Swedish biotechnology regulation tends to emphasise the innovation
system as a virtue in its own right and to see market mechanism as morally neu-
tral. In Sweden there have been, however, stronger strivings to improve the ac-
countability of biotechnology through the improvement of the public under-
standing of science and technology than in Finland. In both countries also the
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institutions in the regulation of biotechnology have had difficulties in interpre-
ting the concept of the public and civil society.
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Assessing Genetic Technologies in 
Denmark
Andrew Jamison and Jesper Lassen
Historical background
The assessment of genetic technology in Denmark can be seen to have gone
through three main phases since the 1970s, roughly corresponding to the differ-
ent stages of technological development1. In each phase, there have been so-
mewhat different issues and actors involved, and there have been some rather
significant changes in what might be called the story-lines of assessment (see fi-
gure one).
Genetic technology was first taken up as a topic for debate in Denmark pri-
marily by critical scientists and science students. It was particularly the group
around the journal, Naturkampen (Nature Struggle) that first brought genetic
engineering to public attention. As elsewhere, the technology was discussed in
this first phase in terms of the underlying «theoretical» implications, both in re-
lation to biology, as well as in relation to political and economic theory. As in
other countries, issues of scientific responsibility and laboratory safety were also
taken up as a kind of «import» item from the United States.
Genetic technology became more controversial in the period of develop-
ment, primarily in relation to eventual environmental consequences of field tri-
als. Public debate was stimulated by plans of the De Danske Sukkerfabrikker
(the Danish sugar company, later Danisco) to develop and carry out field trials
with GM sugar beets. The influence of a strong environmental presence in the
Parliament (the so-called green majority) also meant that the early development
efforts werfe subjected to a range of «technology assessment» activities. Mem-
bers of the environmental organization, NOAH, were particularly active in pub-
lic education and political lobbying for stricter forms of legal regulation. The
1 A more detailed discussion of the historical background is given in Erling Jelsøe, et al, «Denmark” in
John Durant et al, eds, Biotechnology in the Public Sphere, Science Museum (London), 1998; The chang-
ing modes of assessment are discussed in Jesper Lassen, "Changing modes of biotechnology assessment
in Denmark,” in Miettinen (ed.): Biotechnology and public understanding of science, Publications of the
Academy of Finland 3/1999, Edita, Helsinki, 1999.
24    NIFU Rapport 2/2004
Danish parliament passed a law on genetic technology and the environment in
1986 – the first such law in the world – which included a ban on deliberate re-
leases, although the government could make exceptions in special cases.
There was a rather widespread public debate about GMOs in the 1980s, as
part of an institutionalisation of technology assessment, at both the universities
(particularly the technological universities, where units for technology assess-
ment were established in both Aalborg and Copenhagen) as well as at the state
level (where, among other things, the Danish Board of Technology was created).
There were special funds allocated within the Biotechnological Research Pro-
gramme, which was initiated in 1987, for information activities about the new
genetic technologies, and there were many meetings, publications, as well as lar-
ger research projects (such as Pegasus at the Danish Technological University,
which was a broad assessment of the economic, social and environmental con-
sequences of biotechnology)2.
These activities were largely organized according to what might be termed a
consensual approach to public assessment. The general idea was to see to it that
as many different interests and interest groups as possible were represented in
Figure 1. The Storylines of Assessment
ca 1975–1984: scientific story-line (research phase)
Discussions focused around the theoretical implications of genetic enginee-
ring, and were mostly carried out among scientists. In Denmark, a wing of 
the «radical science movement» was a key actor in this early phase.
ca 1985–1996: environmental, or impact, story-line (development phase)
Main issues were the control and regulation of field experiments and product 
development; main actors were environmental organizations and technology 
assessors (both in academia, civil society, and government). In Denmark 
genetic technology was discussed widely in the media and technology assess-
ment was institutionalized.
ca 1996 – : ethical, or cultural story-line (diffusion and marketing phase)
New discussions focus on ethical aspects, and issues of political accountabil-
ity. New actors include consumer organizations, philosophers, agriculture 
and industrial officials, as well as political parties and organizations.
2 See Andrew Jamison and Erik Baark, «Modes of Biotechnology Assessment in the USA, Japan and Den-
mark,” in Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 1990, nr 2
 Assessing Genetic Technologies in Denmark    25
the discussions, in order to give legitimacy for both the regulatory and support
policies of the different ministries (environment, research and industry).
Perhaps the most innovative Danish initiative from this period, and still one
of the main activities of the Board of Technology was, characteristically enough,
the arranging of so-called Consensus Conferences3. Consensus conferences are
a staged assessment activity, by which a group of lay people are given the opp-
ortunity to question selected experts and prepare a «citizen assessment» docu-
ment. As such consensus conferences can be seen as one among different deli-
berative instruments to allow the «public» to take part in technological decisi-
on-making.
The first consensus conference was carried out in 1987, and addressed gen-
etic technology in industry and agriculture. Despite a great deal of international
attention given to this and subsequent consensus conferences, their direct im-
pact on policy-making in Denmark, as in other countries, has been limited.
Their main contribution is probably in terms of the media attention they receive
and thus a certain influence over the discourses, or story-lines of public debate.
After the broad discussions of the 1980s, genetic technology became some-
thing of a «non-issue» in the first half of the 1990s. NOAH grew less active, as
the institutionalized technology assessors – at the universities and ministries –
more or less took over the role that NOAH had played in terms of educating, or
informing the public. In the food sector, Danisco continued their development
of GM sugar beets and the seed company Trifolium was working on GM fodder
turnips. Industries like Chr. Hansen and Novo Nordisk also continued their de-
velopment of enzymes, both for use in the food industry, as well as in relation
to medical applications of genetic technology. In 1996, a new phase ensued with
the coming of GM products from abroad to the Danish marketplace, and new
actors emerged, such as Greenpeace and Forbrugerrådet (The Consumers Asso-
ciation) which began to discuss genetic technology in terms of ethical and pol-
itical responsibility.
As the controversy was reopened in 1996, it became clear that the kinds of
assessment that had been developed in the past – public participation in the
form of e.g. consensus conferences, information campaigns and academic tech-
nology assessment – were no longer sufficient in addressing the concerns of at
least some important segments of the public. In the most recent phase, there has
been a growing complexity of the public attitudes to genetic technology, and the
3 Consensus conferences have since become an interesting case of «technology transfer” in relation to
public accountability and participation. Danish-style conferences have been held in a number of differ-
ent countries, particularly over the past five years.  
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emergence of what we have elsewhere termed a «cultural story-line»4. There
has, at the same time, been increased public funding of bio-ethical research as
well as an incipient understanding by many important actors – in business, go-
vernment and the universities – of the need for ethical and moral assessments
of new GM products. One result of this new understanding has been the estab-
lishment of the governmenttal BioTIK committee, as well as the Center for Bio-
ethics and Risk Assessment at the Danish Agricultural University.
Although ethic concerns in this way have come to be taken into account, and
new kinds of assessment have been established, the practical implications of
these developments remain to be seen. Neither Danish law nor EU regulations
take account of anything other than environmental and health risks.
Research and Development
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s a number of national research pro-
grammes have supported biotechnological research. At first these programmes
were minor investments in a potential technology, but by the mid 1980s, as the
technologies were able to demonstrate economic and technical potential in e.g.
the production of enzymes and other proteins, the state support became sub-
stantial. The parliamentary adaptation of the first major biotechnological re-
search and development programme in 1986 marks the first turning point in
public support of biotechnological research. From 1987 and onwards the public
funding increases in size and follow a set strategy. For an overview see figure 2.
4 Jesper Lassen and Andrew Jamison, ”Genetic Technologies Meet the Public: The Discourses of Con-
cern,” submitted to Science, Technology and Human Values, 2003.
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Figure 2: Major biotechnological research programs in Denmark
Period Ministry Focus
Budget-
mill DKK
1981–5 Industry To promote gene technology in the interests of Danish bu-
siness and society
Assessment: Support of technology assessment 10
1984–88 Education To strengthen basic research at universities within bio-
molecular techniques and to improve the training of rese-
archesAssessment: To build up public expertise in assess-
ments of safety issues related to applications of 
biotechnology by private enterprises 33
1986–87 Industry To support research institutions and private enterprises in 
promising activities within micro-organisms, enzyme and 
protein technologyAssessment: To support research into 
safety aspects of contained use of gene technology. 5
1985–89 Agricul-
ture
To establish biotechnological expertise at specific public 
research institutions and universities. This includes deve-
lopment and use of specific genetic techniques in relation 
to husbandry, plant breeding, food production and new 
uses of bio-mass.Assessment: None 27
1987–90 Education To increase the production of biotechnological PhD can-
didatesAssessment: None 70
1987–90 Education To support basic and applied research into biotechnology 
in the areas of biotechnological methods, fermentation 
technology, plants, animals, aquatic organisms, food pro-
duction environment and the prevention and control of 
diseases. Furthermore a main target was to stimulate re-
search in the private sector.Assessment: To increase know-
ledge about benefits and risks by supporting technology 
assessment activities. To inform the public about benefits 
and drawbacks of different applications of biotechnology. 500
1991–93 Research To continue the technical research from the first pro-
gramme and improve the industrial utilisation of the re-
sults. To establish biotechnological research centres on 
plants, the human genome, protein engineering, medicals, 
farm animals/fish, processes, peptides and ecology.Assess-
ment: To support research assessing impacts of biotech-
nology on society, technological development, nature and 
the individual. To support the dissemination of research 
results to the general public. 456
1994–97 Research Follow-up on the biotechnological research programmes; 
continued support of the established centresAssessment: 
None
50–70
per an-
num
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It is not surprising that the main interest and focus of public funding in the ye-
ars after 1987 was to advance the natural scientific knowledge, just as it was in
the preceding programmes. As an illustrative example the first research pro-
gramme5 allocated approximately 480 mill. DKK over four years expecting a
similar private funding of the research activities. Recognising that Denmark is
too small a country to cover all aspects of biotechnology, the idea was to build
capacities in areas where Danish industry already had a strong basis. The areas
identified by the parliament included agriculture, food production and contai-
ned uses – clearly referring to the economically significant agri-food, pharma-
ceutical and enzyme sectors. The focus of the programme was partly on the pro-
duction of PhDs and graduate students and partly on the establishment of a re-
search infrastructure concentrating efforts in fewer research centres addressing
issues like methods and processes, farm animal production, food production,
food production and the prevention of diseases.
This line was continued in the second research programme6, building, as it
was said, «on the best of the activities initiated under the former programme» and
(again) emphasizing the importance of the private sector, when specifying the
important role of businesses in organising and participating in the utilization of
1998–03 Food, Ag-
riculture 
and Fishe-
ries
To strengthen the use of molecular and cell biological me-
thods in food research, and to develop and implement the 
second-generation molecular biology in public and edu-
cational institutions.Assessment: «To elucidate people's at-
titudes and ethical questions regarding the development and 
use of biotechnology in the food area». To establish a dia-
logue the natural scientific research projects and the re-
sults of the results from the research into attitudes and 
ethical problems. 63
1999–01 Research To establish centres structured around expensive research 
instruments for shared use.Assessment: None 150
1999–02 Research To support younger post doc researches within the bi-
otechnological areaAssessment: To support the establish-
ment of interdisciplinary research within centres 
addressing ethical and legal aspects of biotechnology. 55
5 Undervisningsministeren , ”Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om iværksættelsen af et bioteknologisk for-
sknings- og udviklingsprogram”, Beslutningsforslag nr. B44. 13. November 1986.
6 Forskningsrådenes udvalg vdr. bioteknologi, ”Det nye program for bioteknologisk forskning og ud-
vikling”, 1990. And: Forskningsrådene, ”Det bioteknologiske forsknings- og udviklingsprogram 1991-
1995”, 1992.
Figure 2: Major biotechnological research programs in Denmark
Period Ministry Focus
Budget-
mill DKK
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the results. As the table shows, the consecutive programmes on biotechnology
has ensured annual public support of 50–150 mill. DKK for basic research, edu-
cation and (industrial) application ever since the first programme.
This focus of the research must be seen in the context of Denmark, lacking
rich natural resources apart from the agricultural land (and some North sea fos-
sil fuels), increasingly dependent on a production of products and services with
a high content of scientific knowledge. Hence the importance for the Danish go-
vernment to facilitate a research keeping abreast of the international technolo-
gical development. Consequently the so-called new biotechnologies were visu-
alised as (necessary) means to maintain a modern industrial production, as it is
stated by the minister for the environment in a parliamentary enquiry on bio-
technology in general in 1986: «Denmark has excellent possibilities for a position
among the leading nations in the world [when it comes to utilizing biotechnology],
to create a competitive production, to enter new markets and to earn much needed
foreign exchange and good jobs. We can of course not reject this possibility»7. Sup-
porting biotechnological research has a natural role in these framings of the is-
sue, almost making it a precondition for maintenance of the welfare state. Such
arguments draw heavily in the construction of biotechnology as an economic
necessity and consequently almost taking their economic accountability for
granted: they are indisputable sources of wealth and therefore economically ac-
countable.
The pure technical and natural scientific research was, however, not the only
aspect of biotechnology that was supported in the period until 1996. As describ-
ed previously, the critical debate grew alongside the increasing research and in-
dustrial. Reflecting this criticism, some of the research programmes included
aspects of technology assessment, safety research and information/ dialogue. At
several occasions the public concern is directly referred to as a reason for in-
cluding this perspective in the research programmes – like in description of the
second major programme, where it is said:
«Considering the anxiety entertained by the population concerning if the li-
mits to what is seen as desirable research are transgressed, it is important to
be open about research and inform about its methods and results. Further-
more continuous assessment of methods and results is important (…) includ-
ing broader technology assessments clarifying the impacts of the research
results on other aspects of the social life, including the economy. Furthermore
7 Christian Christensen in: ”Forespørgselsdebat nr. F18, 4. February 1986”
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the assessment must include ethical aspects of the research, seen from the
point of view of the individual, the nature and the environment in general.»8
The first major contribution to such technology assessment activities were allo-
cated in the first programme, but not with the tacit consent of the conservative
led minority government. During the Parliamentary debates on the propositi-
on, the red-green majority forced the government to allocate 20 mill. DKK to
information and technology assessment. Compared to funds for the natural sci-
entific research the amount for assessment and information here, like in other
programmes, was small, but they did secured the continuation of assessment ac-
tivities like those initiated by the Technology Council under the Ministry for In-
dustry in 1982, when they supported the Pegasus project carried out at the
Technical University. The establishment of the Parliamentary Board of Tech-
nology in 1986 (once again against the will of the government), and the Social
Scientific Research Council’s (SSF) technology-society initiative, increased the
focus on technology assessment – including assessment of biotechnology. All in
all the 1980s was characterised by the development of technology assessment as
a method and the accomplishment of a number of technology assessment activ-
ities dealing with of different aspects of biotechnology.
With the new phase of public debate after 1996, the new problems have also
been reflected in the public funding of biotechnological research. This was e.g.
stressed in the National Strategy for Biotechnological Research from 1998, whe-
re it was stated that: «The development of biotechnology must take place in a way
that reassures the public. This requires that ethical and legal aspects are systemat-
ically assessed and reviewed through independent research in close dialogue with
the biotechnological researchers and relating to the actual research»9 Despite these
intentions, the national strategy did not point to how this closer link between
assessment and biotechnological research should be put into praxis. Some sug-
gestions were, however present in some of the research programmes in the pe-
riod after 1996.
First of all the programmes took up the heavy focus on basic and applied re-
search but they also suggested new organisations of the assessment activities.
Within the programme National Staking on Biotechnology running from 1999
until 2002, priority was given to «…interdisciplinary research, as far as possible
based on collaboration with biotechnological research groups. The main aim of the
8 Udvalget Vedrørende Bioteknologi, ”Det bioteknologiske forsknings- og udviklingsprogram 1991-
1995”, Forskningsrådene, 1992
9 Forskningsministeriet, ”National delstrategi for bioteknologisk forskning”, Forskningsministeriet, 1998.
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activities is to produce knowledge and results that are to the benefit of public au-
thorities and business activities within the biotechnological area.»10 Similar lines
were laid out in the call from the Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries
for application in the programme «Biotechnology in Food Research». Here it
was stressed that the part of the programme supporting research into the attitu-
des and assumptions of consumers, should establish a dialogue to the biotech-
nological research projects supported under the programme11.
Partly based on the funds from these latter programmes, a research Centre
for Biotechnology and Risk Assessment (CeBRA) was established. CeBRA was
launched in 2000 to perform research into two biotechnological areas: geneti-
cally modified crops and genetically modified research animals12. For the first
time research into biotechnology as well as public perceptions and ethics taking
place at seven major Danish research institutions were joined in the same re-
search centre. Apart from issuing a newsletter («gene-ethics in praxis») and ar-
ranging joint workshops for the involved projects, it is required that a third of
the scientific articles from each project are result of interdisciplinary research.
The will to go beyond the biotechnological research was further demonstrated
as the institutions behind the centre after the end of the ministry funds decided
to support the centre for another five years.
The relation between the biological scientists and the public constitutes a ser-
ious problem for this and other activities to move the biotechnological research
in a more accountable direction. Recent research has thus demonstrated that
there is a significant scepticism towards the biotechnological scientific commu-
nity. In a survey in 1996, 71 % of the asked Danes tended to agree in the follow-
ing statement: «irrespective of the regulation, biotechnologists will do whatever
they like» 13. A reasonable hypothesis is that this extremely low level of acco-
untability partly can be explained by the unwillingness to let social science or
humanities seriously influence the biotechnological research agenda.
The biotech business
Among the fist industrial movers on the biotechnology arena in the early 1980s
were the companies Novo and Nordisk Gentofte. Novo as well as Nordisk Gen-
10 Forskningsstyrelsen, ”Støtte til bioteknologisk forskning”, 1998
11 Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries programme, «Biotechnology in Food Research. Invitation
of project applications”, 1997.
12 See: http://www.bioethics.kvl.dk/eindex.htm 
13 John Durant et al. (eds), ”Biotechnology in the public sphere, Science Museum, 1998. p.261.
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tofte had production of human insulin and other pharmaceuticals, and Novo,
by far the larger of the two, had in addition industrial enzymes for the food sec-
tor and for the washing powder industry as important areas of business. In 1984
Novo and Nordisk Gentofte almost simultaneously announced plans to develop
and apply genetically modified organisms in the production of insulin respecti-
vely human growth hormone. It is characteristic of this early phase of develop-
ment of gene technology in Denmark, that both companies surrounded their
concrete plans with a high level of secrecy. At that time, there was no compuls-
ory registration of research or other uses of gene technology in Denmark. In-
stead companies or researchers could, if the wished to, report their use of gen-
etic manipulation to «Registreringsudvalget», where the reports were kept sec-
ret to the public.14 This strategy of relative secrecy of the companies must be
seen in the light of the common understanding that gene technology in itself is
not different from other technologies, hence regulation should address the pro-
ducts, not the way they are produced15. Consequently there is also no need to
go public with plans to apply gene technology and stimulate a debate – the
secrecy may on the other hand also reflect a (at that time common) perception
that avoiding public debate is a useful strategy to ensure a peaceful business en-
vironment. The events surrounding Monsanto’s introduction of soya to the Eu-
ropean market in 1996 proved this latter strategy wrong.
The sudden announcement of concrete plans of application of genetechno-
logy in pharmaceutical production took most parties by surprise, probably be-
cause the relative secrecy had left members of the public as well as NGOs and
other actors on the political arena parties unaware of the advanced stage gene
technology. One outcome was that the announcements became triggers for the
first era of public debate of gene technology in Denmark. Another was that the
productions plans themselves became subject to intense public attention, for-
cing both companies to engage in a public dialogue at some level. One expres-
sion of this (new) engagement with the public was pamphlets explaining the es-
sentials of gene technology and presenting the companies interests. Other ex-
pressions were the organising or participation in public meetings where Novo
and/ or Nordisk Gentofte we confronted with opposing actors like NGOs or
neighbours.16
14 For a detailed account of the controversy over these first productions, see: Jesper Toft, "Kampen om gen-
erne", NOAHs Forlag, 1985.
15 See Pauli Kiel et al, ”Interviews med eksperter og repræsentanter for interessegrupper indenfor biote-
knologiområdet.”, 2. del, Projekt Pegasus Rapport nr. 5, Danmarks Tekniske Højskole, 1984. pp.78-83.
16 See Ole Terney, "Debatten om gensplejsning", Bio-Nyt Forlag, 1986; Jesper Toft op cit.
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It seems fair to say that from the starting point the dominant business stra-
tegy, as expressed by Novo and Nordisk Gentofte, was that since gene technol-
ogy should be treated like any other technology, it needed not to be accounted
for in any particular way. Just as the view was that no particular public acco-
untability was needed industries involved in gene technology, these industries
supported the view that a specific regulation was not needed. In the years fol-
lowing the introduction of the Act on gene technology and environment in
1986, the Association for Biotechnological Industries in Denmark («Forenini-
gen af Bioteknologiske Industrier i Danmark») counting companies like Novo,
Nordisk Gentofte, the breweries and sugar industry among its members, ac-
cordingly fought the – to their opinion – strict Danish regulations. One example
being a comparative analysis of the level of regulation of biotechnology in dif-
ferent countries, published in the hope of influencing the parliament17. The set
off from this analysis was the notion that biotechnological business in Denmark
was impeded by the strict regulation, placing Danish industries in poorer posi-
tion compared to their foreign competitors.
Around the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s things changed. Novo
and Nordisk Gentofte merged into Novo Nordisk and went public with the view
that regulation is not necessarily in contradiction to business interests. As such
Novo Nordisk goes against not only many of their Danish brothers in arms, but
also the continued trend in the European biotech industry arguing that regula-
tion is not in the interest of biotechnological industries. Defending this view, re-
presentatives of Novo Nordisk argued that there is no documentation for alle-
ged reduced competitiveness resulting from regulation. Instead the argument
was that on the one hand regulations provides a known and secure environment
for production and on the other hand that regulation is seen as a means to en-
sure public acceptance of biotechnology.18 The shift indicates that to proactive
industries, like Novo Nordisk, the public is not only perceived of in terms of
consumers to be dealt with on the market, but also as citizens who have a say,
eventually influencing the political processes and thereby the frames for doing
business. Hence public accountability becomes important to businesses like
Novo Nordisk, who in the following years develops a charter and a strategy for
their relations to the public and other stakeholders. The remainder of the secti-
on shall exemplify this trend where business attempts to handle ‘the problem of
17 See eg. Kirsten Fink & Ole Terney, "Sådan reguleres genteknologi. Praksis og erfaringer", Foreningen af
Bioteknologiske Industrier i Danmark, 1988. p.5.
18 See e.g. Morten Kvistgaard, «Impact of regulation on the development of biotechnology”, Environmen-
tal Project No. 322, Ministry of Environment and Energy, 1996. p.10-11.
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the public’ in a proactive way outside the market by presenting elements of
Novo Nordisk’s merger between economic accountability to the shareholders
and this new broader understanding of accountability.
Novo Nordisk is today partly divided into a number of industries, all now
members of different sections of the Novo Group which has an annual net turn-
over of approx. 26 mill DKK (~3.5 mill Euro). The pharmaceutical activities are
gathered in Novo Nordisk A/S whereas the enzyme business are placed in
Novozymes A/S. Gene technology is the important basis for many of the activ-
ities in the Novo Group, but for our purpose Novozymes is the most interesting,
since they cover the use of gene technological methods in the production of en-
zymes and other ingredients for food and feed production, besides their import-
ant production of technical enzymes for the wash powder industries.19 As it will
appear, Novozymes is, however, not totally independent since important fram-
es for production concerning e.g. values and strategies are decided in the Novo
Group. This framework includes three important elements of particular im-
portance for the accountability strategies of the Novo Group: the Charter, the
triple bottom line accountant system and the stakeholder dialogue.
Statements about common values and commitments are expressed in the
Charter, which constitutes the basic criteria or framework for all companies in
the Novo Group and their employees. The question of accountability is specifi-
cally addressed in one of the values in the Charter, where it says: «Each of us shall
be accountable – to the company, ourselves and society – for the quality of our ef-
forts, for contributing to our goals and for developing our culture and shared va-
lues».20 Such value commitments expand the understanding of what the em-
ployees and the company need to account for, far beyond the traditional econ-
omic obligations. While many companies would probably approve of similar
principles, and do their best to ensure that their sales ate not affected by critici-
zed (that is unaccountable) actions, fewer explicitly work with values as The
Novo Group attempt to do.
The idea that accountability also stretches beyond what is of importance for
market performance and production costs, can be illustrated by three commit-
ments included in the Charter, stressing commitment to be financial as well as
social and environmental responsible. Essential parts of these commitments in-
clude maintenance of openness about products and processes (to the extent
openness does not harm competition), and engagement in dialogue with stake-
holders and the ambition to live up to the International Chamber of Commer-
19 The following is partly based on an interview with Kirsten Stær, Novozymes, February 7, 2003.
20 The Novo Group, ”Charter for companies in the Novo Group”
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ce’s Business Charter for Sustainable Development as well as the UN declar-
ations on Human Rights and Biological Diversity.
The maintenance of social and environmental responsibility is important in
the construction of the public image of Novozymes. One important tool to en-
sure this is the so-called triple bottom line accounting system. This system has
over the last years been developed by the companies in the Novo Group as a tool
to measure and control the performance – and indeed report – not only econo-
mic aspects, but also environment, bioethical and social consequences of their
business. The ideas of accounting for environmental performance and identify
future environmental aims is by no means unique to Novo, but has over the past
decade been institutionalised in the public regulation, e.g. requiring certain in-
dustries to make annual green accounts21. By expanding this required task to
also include social issues, the companies in the Novo Group joins, however, a
smaller group of more innovative companies.
The basic idea in Novozymes’ environmental account is to describe environ-
mental status based on a number of indicators like consumption of resources,
release of wastewater solid waste, the accidental release of GMOs, number of
animals used for testing and the total contribution to environmental problems
like the depletion of the ozone layer, acidification and the global warming.
The social account is made up in a similar way, identifying a number of in-
dicators for social performance. These social indicators are all related to Novo
as a workplace and include e.g. the distribution between the two sexes in differ-
ent positions, average age of employees as well as the health and safety of em-
ployees.22
The reporting of social and environmental performance are both followed by
identification of long term and/or short term aims for the indicators, making
these accounts steering instruments in much the same way traditional accounts
are used to make budgets and set goals for economic performance. To validate
the quality of the selection of indicators and the calculation of the indicator va-
lues, Novozymes has in its most recent report included audition of also envir-
onmental and social accounts by the same auditors who audited the economic
accounts.
The third important tool for Novozymes in their efforts for accountability is
the dialogue with the surrounding society. Contrary to most other businesses,
21 Miljøministeriet, ”Bekendtgørelse om visse listevirksomheders pligt til at udarbejde grønt regnskab”
BEK nr 594 af 05/07/2002, Copenhagen, 2002.
22 Novozymes, ”The Novozyme report (Account and data)” http://www.novozymes.com/cgi-bin/bvis-
api.dll/ar2002/download.jsp 
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relations are not reduced to costumers and contractors in the production chain,
instead all actors who might have an interest are acknowledged as relevant sta-
keholders. Of particular interest in this context are the roundtable discussions
with NGOs. Within these discussions NGOs are invited to participate in a dia-
logues about the activities of Novozymes – the idea being that NGO can be a
source of inspiration for strategic decisions in the future.
The importance of accountability for gene technological firms was demon-
strated by the introduction of the first GM food products to the Danish market
by Monsanto in 1996. Although the actual presence of GM soya in the ship-
ments was marginal (2 %), the handling of the situation by Monsanto reinforced
the public understanding of an multinational business attempting to force GM
soya upon reluctant Danes and other Europeans against their will. By rejecting
segregation and only too late being willing to engage in a dialogue with the cri-
tics and concerned, Monsanto helped pave the way for the second era of contro-
versy over GM foods.23 There is little doubt that the continuous effort to ensure
and maintain public accountability by Novo Nordisk in the 1990s and the mem-
bers of the Novo Group in the last years also can be interpreted as a strategy to
avoid the involvement in future controversies of similar kind. That this strategy
seems to work is indicated by the results of a survey carried out by the Union of
Engineers in Denmark in 2000, where ethical and moral performance of 4 major
gene technological companies was addressed. In this survey Novo Nordisk
came in second, only exceeded by Carlsberg, a well-known contributor of major
funding of science and culture for centuries24. It is, however, still unsure to what
extent the strategy will preserve Novozymes and other companies in the Novo
Group as targets of future biotech controversies. This will on the one hand de-
pend on their ability to maintain the stakeholder dialogue at a level, where crit-
ical stakeholders feel that their participation in the dialogue makes a difference
– if not they may feel tempted to remove the critique and debate from the rela-
tively closed environment of the stakeholder dialogue and open a more public
arena for debate and criticism of gene technological activities. On the other
hand it will also depend on the ability of companies in the Novo Group to de-
velop methods to expand the social and ethical indicators in the triple bottom
line accounting system so that they in the future more specifically up take up
23 See Jesper Lassen et al, ”Testing times – the reception of Roundup Ready soya in Europe”, in Martin Bau-
er & George Gaskell (eds), Biotechnology. The Making of a Global Controversy, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge. Pp.279-312.
24 Institut for Konjunkturanalyse, ”Danskernes syn på bioteknologi. En analyse af det holdningsmæssige
landskab over for bioteknologi”, Nyhedsmagasinet Ingeniøren, 2000. p.101.
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some of the unquantifiable, particularly moral, concerns about gene technology
shared by large parts of the public.
The civic arena: non-governmental 
organizations
As in most other industrialized countries significant segments of the Danish
public, in the course of the 1960s and 1970s, expressed concern over the domi-
nant forms of technological development and their environmental «side ef-
fects». In the 1970s, this was primarily related to the development of nuclear
technology and the pollution and waste problems associated with industrial
production and agriculture25. As a result, a number of new environmental or-
ganizations came to be established in Denmark, and by the 1980s, some of them
started to interest themselves in genetic technology. As mentioned earlier, it was
critical scientists who first drew attention to the potential risks and benefits of
biotechnology. An actual debate did not develop until 1984, when Novo and
Nordisk Gentofte announced plans to develop gene technology in pharmaceu-
tical production. Together with the ongoing preparation of the regulation of
gene technology, this opened the way for the development of organised critique
in the NGOs.
In the following years NOAH became the most important environmental or-
ganization attempting to represent the concerns of the public. NOAH played
throughout the 1980s a role as public watchdog, critically partaking in the policy
processes in relation to both the development of a national legislative structure,
the EU regulation and the first applications for industrial production and deli-
berate release. With its decentralized structure and focus on «counter-expert-
ise» NOAH can be described as a mild form of participatory protest organisa-
tion26. Although many proponents of gene technology were critical of NOAH
in these years, the form of action was by no means radical in the sense that they
broke, or violated any laws. NOAH saw it as its most important task to inform
the public about these new technologies – and indeed did so by arranging and
25 For an overview see: Andrew Jamison et al, The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness. A
comparative study of the environmental movements in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherland, Edin-
burgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1990. pp. 66-120
26 For the distinction between public interest lobby, participatory protest organisation, professional protest
organisations and participatory pressure groups see: Mario Diani & Paolo Donati, Organisational
Change in Western European environmental groups: A framework for analysis", Environmental Politics
vol.8(1), 1999, pp13-34.
38    NIFU Rapport 2/2004
participating in many public meetings and continuous publication of books and
articles.
During the 1980s NOAH enjoyed a virtual monopoly, when it comes to an
organised critique of biotechnology. None of the other «new social movement»
organizations dealing with consumer, environmental, third world or other is-
sues where the question of gene technology was potentially important, were
particularly active – and most (if not all) had no policy about gene technology
policy at all. In terms of assessment, NOAH played thus an important role in
these first years of the controversy.
From the start NOAH, first of all having an identity as an environmental –
and to some extent a consumer – movement organization, was most active and
visible in relation to risk related concerns. They did, however, also raise con-
cerns outside risks to environment and health and translated e.g. a book dealing
with genetic technology in a third world perspective, and co-organised a con-
ference on gene technology and intellectual property. Although NOAH in this
way also voiced the economic critique and some of its aspects of power, justice
and exploitation they never had the success to move the core of the public de-
bate in the media and political processes away from the heavy focus on risks cle-
arly dominating the 1980s.
As the EU regulation is set up in 1990–91 and implemented in the Danish
regulation NOAHs disappeared slowly from the public arena, coinciding with a
general decline in level of controversy over gene technology in the first half of
the 1990s. This left open a space for other NGOs, first of all Greenpeace (estab-
lished in Denmark in 1982) and to some extent Forbrugerrådet (The Consumers
Association, FR) and Naturfredningsforeningen (the Society for the Conservati-
on of Nature, DN). After the reopening of the controversy, a number of organi-
sations joined Greenpeace, FR and DN in taking over after NOAH who now
slowly also was building up again. Most of these new organisations were small
single-issue organisations devoting their energy combating gene technology.
They included e.g. Oplysning om Genteknologi (Information about Gene tech-
nology, OOG) and Organisationen mod gensplejsede fødevarer) (the Organisa-
tion Against GM foods, OGF). Typically disappearing after a short period of ac-
tivity, or to the extent they existed over longer timer, virtually without any im-
pact on debate or politics. Among the new organisations was however one,
Danmarks Aktive Forbrugere (Active Consumers in Denmark, DAF) which pro-
ved to be viable and has together with Greenpeace been among the most influ-
ential and visible NGOs in the area in the years since 1996.
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It is however interesting to note that almost all NGOs have maintained the
risk focus of the 1980s. DAF as well as Greenpeace have identities as environ-
mental NGOs and as such they both placed their central focus on the environ-
mental risks. As a leading member of DAF, Jeppe Juul, puts it, «We are not the
Ethical Council, the National Church, nor the Jewish Community.» 27. As such,
cultural or ethical issues are not taken up by NGOs28. Economic concerns dea-
ling with issues of profitability and production, power and responsibility are co-
vered by a number of organisations. Exploitation of poorer developing coun-
tries is e.g. an issue taken up by the development organisation Mellemfolkeligt
Samvirke (MS). Wider consumer issues like concerns about consumers’ right to
choose on a free market or impacts on food prices that are typically issues dealt
with by the traditional consumers’ organisations.
What might be termed the discourse of cultural concern, that covers religi-
ous and moral aspects raising concerns over e.g. ethics or rights, is poorly co-
vered by NGOs. In a round of interviews with some of the most visible NGO,
none of these took up the issues of naturalness of GM plants or animals. Similar-
ly the dominant animal welfare NGO, Foreningen til Dyrenes Beskyttelse (the So-
ciety for the Protection of Animals, DB) has been strikingly silent in relation to
GM foods Annette Weber from DB elaborates this: «Dyrenes Beskyttelse has so
far not a set policy in relation to GM animals. But the issue has to be dealt with
under the action plans of other areas (…) and as a result gene technology will be
assessed weighing benefits against harm to the animals» 29
As a result of this utilitarian approach where usefulness is measured against
suffering, animal integrity of trespassing limits to nature seemingly does not
play any particular role.
The policy process: developing an ethical 
discourse
Form the very start for the Danish debate, biotechnology was discussed as an is-
sue raising safety as well as wider social and ethical questions. The concerns
were raised to the extent that Minister of the Interior in 1983 decided to set up
two committees to make accounts of the need for regulation of safety issues on
the one side and ethical issues on the other.
27 Jeppe Juul, Danmarks Aktive Forbrugere, Personal Interview
28 Lassen and Jamison, op cit.
29 Annette Weber, Foreningen til Dyrenes Beskyttelse, Personal interview 12. December 2000.
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Gensplejsningsudvalget (The Committee for Genetechnology) was set up to
suggest the organisation of public administration of the use of the new biotech-
nological processes with a specific focus on the risks to environment and hu-
mans. The mandate for the committee pointed out that ethical questions were
not to be an aspect of the account, but would be «taken up in a broader con-
text».30 Interpreting this mandate, the committee dedicated their overall focus
in the produced account to risks related to research and production using gene-
technology. In the account «Genteknologi og sikkerhed» (Gene Technology
and Safety) the committee concluded that three separate acts were needed to re-
gulate the risks of genetechnology: an act addressing research, an act addressing
uses in agricultural production and an act regulating the use of genetechnology
in products and production in general.
Parallel to the work in Gensplejsningsudvalget, the Udvalg om Etiske Probel-
mer ved Ægtransplantation, Kunstig Befrugtning og Foster Diagnostik (The Com-
mittee on Ethical Problems Regarding Transplantation, Artificial Insemination
and Diagnostics) was set up. Apart from investigating ethical problems of the
technologies mentioned in the title of the committee, the mandate also specifi-
cally instructed the committee to look into genetechnology («genesplicing»).31
Although the mandate did not specifically ask the committee to limit its assess-
ment of genetechnology to the area of human uses of genetechnology, genetech-
nology was presented within a human/medical frame, leading the committee to
interpret their mandate as limited to social and ethical aspects of genetechnolo-
gy and the mentioned new diagnostic methods to the extent they are used or
may be used on humans. Safety issues were accordingly not dealt with, but ex-
plicitly seen as belonging under the Gensplejsningsudvalget. Likewise ethical qu-
estions related to animals and plants were although these concerns were seen as
ethically relevant, seen as falling outside the mandate for the committee. In the
report «Fremskridtets Pris» (The Price of Progress) the committee concluded
that there was no need for a specific ethical regulation, but recommended in-
stead the establishment of an advisory ethical committee within the human
area.
As described here, the first initiatives from Danish authorities led not only to
a separation of applications but also a separation of which concerns should be
addressed in which contexts. In this way the different mandates and their inter-
30 Indenrigsministeriets Gensplejsningsudvalg, "Genteknologi & sikkerhed" Betænkning nr.1043, Inden-
rigministeriet, 1995.
31 Indenrigsministeriets Udvalg om Etiske Problemer ved Ægtransplantation, Kunstig Befrugtning og Fos-
terdiagnostik, "Fremskridtets pris", Indenrigsministeriet, 1984.
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pretation by the two committees can be seen as both an illustration of the two
dominant framings of the gene technological issue until the mid 1990s, but also
as an important structuring force behind the development of different fram-
ings.32 In the following years, a tendency to a spilt of the discussions, and indeed
the regulation, can be observed allowing for the development of two separate
discourses: On the one hand a human-ethical discourse where the focus was on
the ethical, and to some extent social questions pertaining to applications di-
rectly related to human uses. On the other hand a production-risk discourse,
where the focus was on the risks to environment and human health. Although
ethical questions regarding the use of animals and plants were recognised by
both committees, such questions were excluded from the accounts and thus also
largely from the following formal policy process and regulation. In addition qu-
estions of microorganisms and ethics was not even raised by the two committe-
es.
Hence public authorities and government sought to ensure the accountabi-
lity of genetechnology in two different ways depending on the area of applicati-
on. The political and regulatory structures constructed in the following years
took up this split accountability: In relation to human applications, accountabi-
lity of genetechnology was to be ensured by a combination of the Det Etiske Råd
(The Ethical Committee) set up in 1987 to advise public authorities33, and a
number of laws and other regulatory initiatives. For GM foods and other uses
of genetechnology in production, accountability was largely reduced to the qu-
estion of avoiding risks – the means first of all being the laws on gene technology
and environment and working environment34. Hence the accountability of GM
foods was – in the political processes at parliament – mainly seen in the context
of risks, whereas ethical and social issues were never seriously addressed. An ex-
ception from this picture was the Det Genteknologiske Råd (The Genetechnolo-
gical Council) established in 1987, having a mandate that included risk as well
as ethical issues. Ethical aspects became, however, never a key priority of the
council, probably due to the dominance of biotechnologists: six representatives
from biotechnology and industry were appointed and only one from human-
ities (a pastor). By example the council did not take up ethical question in its
32 Similar splits of the debate was observed in: Svend Andersen et al., "Bioteknologi og etik i den offentlige
debat - i USA, Tyskland og England", TeknologiNævnets Rapporter 1992/2, TeknologiNævnet, 1992.
33 Indenrigsministeriet, "Lov om oprettelse af et etisk råd og regulering af visse biomedicinske forsøg", Lov
nr. 353 af 3. juni 1987.
34 Miljøministeriet, ”Lov om miljø og genteknologi”, Lov nr. 288, 1986; and Arbejdsministeriet, ”Bekend-
tgørelse om genteknologi og arbejdsmiljø”. 1st September 1987.
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first judgement of the Danish situation in 1988, but only addressed limitation to
the research and industrial application35.
The somewhat ambivalent attitude towards GM foods (and other non-hu-
man applications of genetechnology) expressed in the writings from the two
committees was repeated in the parliamentary debates over genetechnology. A
telling example was an inquiry in 1986 to the Minister for the Environment, rai-
sed by Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialists Peoples Party, SF) concerning measures
taken to secure humans and environment36. Although the enquiry specifically
addressed risk issues, the opposition as well as the Minister stressed that there
were wider ethical concerns that needed to be addressed, as the Ministry put it:
«Finally it is my view that there is a need to consider also ethical aspects. The
Minister for the Interior has recently submitted a Bill banning certain expe-
riments using genetic manipulation on humans. Similar problems are raised
in relation to animals and plants. To me there is a major difference between
what science is capable of doing, and what we, keeping our basic philosophy
of life in mind, will accept»37
Just as it was the case in the accounts, ethical questions were put aside. The Mi-
nister promised to make the issues subject to public debate and consider how
ethical questions outside the human area could be addressed in coming acts.
Whereas the public debate was stimulated in the following years, ethical ques-
tions were never taken up in the regulation set up in 1986, or in the subsequent
revisions in 1989 and 1991.
During the 1990s ethical questions beyond the human area began to appear
in the wider political processes of genetechnology. The Ethical Council on Ani-
mal Ethics (Dyreetisk Råd), was e.g. established in 1991, given the task to over-
see ethical questions in relation to animals – although the focus was on animal
protection in a traditional sense, the council was also given the task to follow the
gene technological development38.
The core of the parliamentary inquiry in 1994 was however on technicalities
of labelling, legal issues and risks – there was still no developed ethical discussi-
on of GM food matters. Following the re-opening of the controversy in 1996
this picture did however change dramatically. A first sign of this was a debate in
35 Det Genteknologiske Råd, "Årsberetning 1987", Forskningsdirektoratet, 1988. p.5-8.
36 Forespørgsel nr. F18: Forespørgsel til miljøministeren. 4. February 1986.
37 Ibid.
38 Justitsministeriet, ”Dyreværnslov”, Lov nr. 386 af 6. juni 1991.
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Parliament coinciding with the unloading of the first GM soya in Denmark.
Here several speakers took up ethical questions as well specific questions in re-
lation to the consumers’ freedom of choice, the power of multinationals, the
third world and what benefits are considered legitimate. The most striking
example was a statement from the spokeswoman from Kristeligt Folkeparti (The
Christian Democrats), who elaborated on elements of an ethical assessment –
this speech, however, did not evoke any particular resonance among the other
parties. Although ethical questions were taken up focus remained on risks,
technicalities of regulation and the usefulness of GM foods39.
Whereas the soya controversy primarily served as an eye-opener for the ina-
bility of the existing regulatory structures to cope with the concerns of the pub-
lic, the announcement of the cloned sheep Dolly a few months later, added ma-
jor elements of ethics to the parliamentary debate. Now a central focus of the de-
bate of GM foods was the ethical questions, leading to the following
parliamentary decision:
«Considering that:
- the biotechnological development raises ethical and environmental ques-
tions concerning humans, animals and plants and that
- human cloning is forbidden in Denmark in research as well applied on hu-
mans
The Parliament urge the Government to:
- Ensure that animal cloning is limited to research
- Ensure experiments on full grown cloning is limited to the extent that no
fully developed /subjects are produced.
- Ensure that cloning of domestic animals is not taking place
(…)
Before end of 1997 (…) work to find a method ensuring that intervention
against developments offending the ethical norms of society can take place in
due time; and that a foundation for a renewed debate in the general public
as well as in Parliament of the ethical limitation to research, is created.» 40
Neither Dolly nor the GM soya was surprises in a scientific sense: GM food just
like the cloning techniques, been subject to intense research and development
39 Forespørgsel nr. F25, 12. December 1996.
40 Forespørgsel nr. F64, 22-23. May 1997. 
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activities in many countries for more than a decade. Regardless of this, they took
the public by surprise and hence also the Parliament and public authorities, who
had been working hard in the 1980s to construct frames ensuring the accounta-
bility of GM foods. In a way the events after 1996 clearly demonstrated the goal
of publicly accountable GM foods had not been reached, and it is in this light
the urge to create the basic framework of an ethical debate about limits to re-
search must be seen. In the area of GM foods, ethics thus diverged from risks in
the sense that risks at the national level had been subject to continuos assess-
ments, several accounts and parliamentary enquiries and scientific reports; and
internationally risk assessment was accepted as a scientific discipline. Unlike
this the ethics of GM foods had never had national attention nor developed into
an acknowledged scientific discipline noticed by the political processes. Many
had, as demonstrated above, stressed the importance ethical questions in relati-
on to GM foods, but so far the issue had been allocated to public debates and
meetings – it was never taken seriously and made subject to e.g. research activ-
ities, parliamentary enquiries or accounts. The period following the reopening
of the controversy in 1996, can largely be understood as period, where the fram-
eworks of a GM food-ethical discourse is under construction in the sense that a
vocabulary and taxonomy of ethical concerns related to GM foods is created by
public authorities and in Parliament.
In the past, ethical societal aspects of genetechnology had primarily been ta-
ken up by Teknologirådet (The Danish Board of Technology), but this changed
after 1996, as the issues were taken up in other contexts also. Among the most
important new domain of debate and discursive construction was Erhvervsmi-
nisteriet (The Ministry of Trade and Industry), who had previously only related
to the gene technologies from a strictly business oriented point of view. Among
the initiatives set up by the Minister was the so-called BioTIK group, a working
group with 11 members counting philosophers, biologists, theologians, medical
doctors and other academics who had been working in and around biotechnol-
ogy. The task of the working group was to produce a discussion paper that could
serve as the basis of a balanced debate and increase the understanding of the
public concern. By the end of 1997 the working group produced the report De
genteknologiske valg (The Genetechnological Choices)41; a report, discussing is-
sues (visions as well as problems) identified to be central for the decision ma-
king about gene technology. One outcome of the report was a suggestion of et-
hical criteria for development and application of genetechnology, for the first
41 BioTIK-gruppen, "De genteknologiske valg", Erhverveministeriet, 1997.
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time seriously integrating the different human and non-human applications
and including ethical, risks as well societal concerns.
In March 2000, the Minister presented a statement on ethics and gene tech-
nology to the parliament42. This statement, receiving general support among
the political parties, repeated the conclusions of the report from the working
group, and stated the policy the government wanted to pursue. This included
among other things 1) To work for an international convention on the inclusion
of ethical considerations in the regulation of biotechnology in plants and food.
2) To work for the inclusion of ethics in the in the regulation of gene technology,
in particular ensure the inclusion of ethics in the revision of the EU-directive on
deliberate releases. 3) To develop guidelines for ethical assessment of new bi-
otechnological methods. 4) To support debate and information.
One outcome of the statement was the establishment of the so-called BioTIK
secretariat under the Ministry for Trade and Industry in 2001. The secretariat
joined nine ministries working for realising the ambitions of the statement, that
is on the one hand the incorporation of ethical principles in the regulation of
and decision-making about biotechnology, and on the other hand the establish-
ment of a basis for public consultation and information. These attempts to twist
the policy process in a more ethical direction, have, however, not yet led to any
significant regulatory changes. The 2002 revision of the central law in regulati-
on GM foods, The Act on Genetechnology and Environment, does include pro-
visions for ethical considerations, but, following the line of the revised EU di-
rective for deliberate release, these are not mandatory.
In summary Danish assessment of genetic technology is still characterised by
a strong utilitarian, cost-benefit orientation, focusing on risks to health and en-
vironment versus economic benefits. Cultural and ethical stories have certainly
begun to be told, and even officially sponsored, but their influence on policy-
making and broader political and economic discussions remain marginal at
best.
42 The Danish Ministry of Trade and Industry, "The Danish government statement on ethics and genetic
engineering", The Danish Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2000.
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Marja Häyrinen-Alestalo and Karoliina Snell
Biotechnology as a national competetiveness 
factor
Since the late 1980s Finland has followed the strategy of the OECD by paying
more attention to «new promising technologies» (OECD 1988; Science and
Technology Policy Council 1987). A corporatist decision has been made con-
cerning the responsibility of the state to finance specific high-tech fields, such
as information and material technologies, and biotechnology. The increasing
interest of the government in new technologies has been related to the rise of
market-orientation and commercial ethos and to a change in the political ideo-
logy from the welfare state to the neo-liberal state (Alestalo 1997). The mem-
bership of the European Union in 1995 has made the neo-liberal preferences
even stronger. Due to a new corporatist agreement the transformation from the
politics of equal opportunities and community ethos to market competition,
market governance and market democracy has been rapid (Häyrinen-Alestalo
2001; 2002). As market orientation has been seen as a collective aspiration of all
policies to foster the international competitiveness of the economy, technology
policy has become highly selective with the primary focus on information and
telecommunication technologies (ICT). The rise of Nokia as a world market lea-
der in mobile phones has strengthened this orientation.
The chosen strategy has been a mixture of the ideas of the knowledge-based
society, new growth theory and the new economy (Stehr 1994; Grossman &
Helpman 1991; Castells 2001; European Commission 1998; OECD 2001; Tekes
2001; Science and Technology Policy Council 2003). In the strategy human ca-
pital and competencies are significant determinants of economic growth. There
is also a tendency to see new-tech products as having wide potential markets
and the most effective cost/benefit ratio.
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In the current Finnish political vocabulary the national innovation system
stands for economic expansion, collective representation and information
mediation (Science and Technology Policy Council 2003; Miettinen 2002). This
system is composed of networks between various producers of knowledge and
the criteria of their performance are similar for all of them. The criteria are de-
rived from the international markets and emphasise competition and effective-
ness (Allardt 1998; Häyrinen-Alestalo 1999). The citizens are invisible actors in
the national innovation system. They are mostly consumers and customers who
have local importance in front of the pressure for globalisation (Cabinet pro-
gramme 1995; Ministry of Finance 1996; Sitra 1998; Snell 2002).
Due to the success story of the Finnish ICT sector biotechnology has been for
a long time «an area of high potential benefit» (OECD 2001; OECD 2002; Euro-
pean Commission 2001). The ICT-driven international competitiveness has
also strengthened the tendency to see the generic importance of biotechnology
through the lenses of ICT and to regard the issues of social, ethical and moral
responsibilities as only secondary.
In the following we outline and analyse the changing context of Finnish bio-
technology and the main issues and actors present in the field. We use here for
the most part the term biotechnology, even though the term covers a large range
of scientific fields, industrial sectors and applications. This choice has been
made because in much of the basic material used in this report no differentiati-
on is made between gene technology and biotechnology. Aside from the docu-
ments and results of earlier research we also draw on personal interviews among
science and technology policy makers and biotechnology experts that we have
made in 2000–2003.
The new hope of technology policy
In 2000 the global economic environment became turbulent due to ICT-driven
economic uncertainty. Although Finnish policy makers have been unanimous
in their predictions of the short length of the economic instability, they have had
to revise the estimations of economic growth several times. Today they agree
that the ICT sector has not fulfilled all political promises.
With the falling validity of the new economy thesis, more and more weight
has been given to the market expectations of biotechnology. These hopes follow
the prospects of the European Commission (2002: 3) seeing «life sciences and
biotechnology to be, after information technology, the next wave of the know-
ledge-based economy, creating new opportunities for our societies and econ-
omies». Our interviews indicate, however, that in the view of the Finnish tech-
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nology policy makers, biotechnology has been called a promising field for too
long. They have started to ask what is the new new-tech after ICT and biotech-
nology. Still there is a strong trust on the commercial potential of biotechnol-
ogy. The National Technology Agency (Tekes) mentions the field as one of the key
technologies (Tekes 2001). There are also hopes that a new biotech Nokia can
be established. Still the idea of the generic nature of biotechnology is unclear.
The Biotechnology 2000 Working Group (2000) and the Evaluation Panel of
Biotechnology in Finland (Academy of Finland 2002) that were set up by the
Ministry of Education to consider the promotion of academic biotechnology re-
search and industrial applications have paid attention to the science-based pe-
culiarity of biotechnology and to the need to be patient when waiting for scient-
ific and commercial breakthroughs. In fact, in the shadow of ICT, biotechnol-
ogy has received political understanding of its long-term application process.
When the new economy thesis has shown its fragility, the questions of the econ-
omic value of this field have become louder. Strong market orientation has pre-
vented, however, the discussion of the rights and responsibilities of the state, in-
dustry and academic researchers. Today the European Commission (2002: 4)
speaks at the same time of the need «to examine measures required to utilise the
full potential of biotechnology and to strengthen the European biotechnology
sector’s competitiveness in order to match leading competitors» and of the need
«to ensure that those developments occur in a manner which is healthy and safe
for consumers and the environment, and consistent with common fundamental
values and ethical principles». Even though the Finnish policy makers are aware
of the latter demands, they are primarily keen to know how national competiti-
veness can be maintained by investing in biotechnology production.
The hardening attitude was also visible in the speech of the former Prime Mi-
nister Lipponen at the opening of Helsinki Biocentre 3 (Lipponen 2002). Aside
from pointing to the complex characteristics of biotechnology and to the need
to have an open discussion of these complexities and ethical problems, he pre-
sented normative expectations of the future commercial success. In his view the
state has supported research and technology programmes of biosciences and
biotechnology for over 20 years and it has the right to expect real evidence of the
effects of this funding. It is now time for this research to show its capability to
compete for new markets, knowledge-based innovations and for highly compe-
tent labour force. Our interviews indicate that this view is shared among many
technology policy makers.
By following the OECD strategy, the Finnish policy makers have identified
growth clusters for the development of the national economy. According to Te-
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kes, the strong clusters are ICT, forestry and metal industries, the rising key
clusters being bio-industry and knowledge-intensive services (Tekes 2002b: 2).
As a response to the growing demands for globalisation, the national focus is
also on the most «change-activating technologies». Aside from ICT and mater-
ial technology biotechnology is mentioned as being capable of responding to
this challenge. The identification of the key clusters is one way of searching for
a more stabile economic environment and of pursuing a selective policy. Accor-
ding to Tekes (2002a: 11) a cluster is composed of highly competent producers,
customers and competitors. An effective, specialised and competitive cluster
tends also to develop into a centre of competence. The value of the centre of
competence can in turn be estimated on the basis of its international market
share and of the growth of productivity, surplus value, and employment.
By regarding biotechnology as a «change-activating new-tech» Tekes has
made references to its rapidly expanding applications but has also started to pay
attention to the ethical issues. Accordingly, an increasing understanding of the
living organisms has created new conditions for the development of new medi-
cines, diagnostic methods, vaccines, chemistry, forestry and foodstuffs. The ge-
neric characteristics of biotechnology have improved the quality and effective-
ness of various materials and production processes in respect to sustainable de-
velopment. Due to high potential expansion of biotechnology and difficult
issues of ethics and values, wider applications should be based on jointly made
agreements of the future uses (Tekes 2002a: 6). Tekes provides, however, no
plan of the ways the common choices will be made and no proposal of the type
of actors who are going to take part in this process. When asked about the pos-
sible forums where the discussion of the effects of new technologies can take
place, the technology policy makers mostly refer to the formal groups of repre-
sentation even though they scrutinise the closed circles and normative structu-
res of decision-making. They also wonder who has the responsibility to make
the political choices and who could be the responsible partners.
In recent years biotechnology has been integrated as a sub-theme into several
technology programmes of Tekes, such as Innovation in Foods, Diagnostics
programmes, Drug programmes, Polymers for the Future and the Finnish Fo-
rest Cluster Research Programme. The New Biotechnology Programme was
initiated in 2002. Even though Tekes has good experiences of the programme-
based activities, their overestimated surplus value and diffuse policy relevance
has been criticised (Tuomaala 2001). The Evaluation Panel of Biotechnology in
Finland has also been troubled of the limited in-house expertise of Tekes in ma-
king the grant decisions (Academy of Finland 2002: 55). Moreover, our notions
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indicate that the issues of responsibility are mostly left open or they refer to the
intellectual property rights or to the right to publish the results freely. Among
the evaluation criteria of performance there are questions about the actual or
expected economic impact of the results or products. Due to the complexity of
the surplus value and market governance in biotechnology, it is often impossib-
le to identify real or latent markets. The sensitivity to moral and ethical issues
makes the customer choices also labile. Sometimes the products cannot provide
clear benefits for the producers or customers (Häyrinen-Alestalo 2001; 2002;
also Academy of Finland 2002).
The technology programmes of Tekes are based on the efforts to establish
networks to form centres of competence, a model taken from the EU. In the case
of biotechnology, academic producers of knowledge have been integrated into
the system by establishing biocentres. These centres are a combination of the
centres of excellence strategy of the Ministry of Education and the Academy of
Finland as well as of the centres of competence strategy of the Ministry of Trade
and Industry, Tekes and the relevant cities and industries. In comparison to the
centres of competence in ICT, the biocentres are more science-oriented. There-
fore it has been difficult to judge their commercial value and to link high-level
science to top rated market value (Pelkonen 2001; Häyrinen-Alestalo & Peltola
2003).
Recently Finnish technology policy makers have redefined the welfare clus-
ter and have started to discuss the conditions of its development. In the Tekes
terminology the development of welfare and the growth of the markets are ba-
sed on the choices of the citizens, on the changes in the living style and structure
of population, and on the social development of society (Tekes 2002a: 10). The
revised view of welfare services is dependent both on market functioning and
on customers' choices, where the chemical and biotech cluster provide new pos-
sibilities for the life-science industry. These industries are expected to serve
both the goals of welfare and the demands for globalisation and sustainable de-
velopment (Tekes 2002a: 21). In this way the collective and individual respon-
sibilities move towards market orientation and private competitive action.
Biotechnology in the scientific excellence policy
Due to the strong commercial ethos Finnish technology policy has become a su-
per-policy with impacts on the goals of science, university and education pol-
icies (Häyrinen-Alestalo 1999). Still there have been a few attempts to integrate
the activities between various policies, although there have been discussions of
the need to have horizontal means for information and interest mediation. In-
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flexible forms of communication have also prevented the development of hori-
zontal structures to include public concern and participation. Accordingly, the
Ministry of Education draws the guidelines for science, university and education
policy and the Academy of Finland is responsible for the financing of academic
research and doctoral education. The Ministry of Trade and Industry is the pri-
mary technology policy maker and Tekes takes the responsibility for allocating
public funding to technology development programmes and industrial re-
search.
Due to a rapid concentration of public expenditure to Tekes there has been
tensions between the science and technology systems, the representatives of the
former having accused the government of a systematic favouring of technology
projects and industries (Allardt 1987). The governments additional funding
program for 1997–1999 also raised criticism from the side of the Academy and
the universities accusing the goals as aimed «at making the national R&D sy-
stem to work more effectively for the national economy, business, industry and
employment» (Academy of Finland 2000), i.e. for the knowledge-based econ-
omy. Today the technology policy makers tend to speak of a harmonised inno-
vation system indicating a balanced funding for science and technology.
Even though the Academy of Finland has spoken of «scientific research and
universities in the national innovation system» (Academy of Finland 2000: 12–
14), its view of the knowledge-based society has been more science-driven than
that of Tekes. Mostly the Academy has stressed the long-term effects of scient-
ific activities on societal development and the need of «making the importance
of basic research known in the entire society and among policy makers in par-
ticular» (Academy of Finland 1993: 6).
During the last ten years, the promotion of biotechnology has been linked to
the general strategy of the Academy of Finland in five integrated actions:
First, the Academy has made an effort to strengthen the scientific quality of
Finnish academic research and its international recognition and visibility. In
this respect new international partnerships and agreements have been made. In
biotechnology, important agreements were made in the late 1980s with the Eu-
ropean Science Foundation, the European Molecular Biology Laboratory and
the European Molecular Biology Conferences. The membership in the EU in
1995 provided Finnish researchers with the possibility to apply for funding
from the EU's framework programmes. There have been 446 Finnish partici-
pants and 106 coordinators in the EU biotechnology projects between 1996–
2001 (Academy of Finland 2002).
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Second, to guarantee the high quality of the Academy funded research the
Academy has identified and funded centres of excellence. The first ten centres
of excellence in research were selected in 1994 and three big biotech units, i.e.
Biocentrum Helsinki, Biocenter Oulu and Biocity Turku, belonged to this
group. According to the National Strategy for the Centres of Excellence (1997:
22–27) the aim is to identify the highest national top having the capacity to
reach the highest international top. The centres of excellence are expected to at-
tract other top quality groups and networks as well as to do research in natio-
nally important research fields and to be capable of estimating future socio-
economic needs.
Third, the Academy of Finland has financed large research programmes that
are supposed to be capable of solving new socio-political problems. A growing
number of these programmes are joint projects with Tekes. One of the first big
research programmes of the Academy was the Development Programme for
Biotechnology and Molecular Biology in 1988–1992. One of the latest joint pro-
grammes of the Academy and Tekes is related to the intellectual property rights
in new-tech research applications. This issue has been considered to need spe-
cial attention due to the growing market expectations of biotechnology indus-
tries. It is characteristic of the Academy of Finland that it has been interested in
the issues of the intellectual property rights and ethics as a general problem of
the science system. In its reports no specific attention is paid to the risks and un-
certainties that are related to biotechnology or to public concern in this respect.
So the Academy has seen citizen participation and public concern as needing no
extra efforts.
Fourth, in order to promote the state and quality of Finnish science, the Mi-
nistry of Education and the Academy of Finland have requested peer reviews of
specific scientific fields. In this respect the European Molecular Biology Orga-
nisation (EMBO) Review Group made evaluation of Molecular Biology and
Biotechnology Research in Finland in 1996. The main purpose of the judgement
was to identify the successful and emerging research teams on the basis of past
performance and to present future plans in order to recognise future needs and
risks. The issues of commercial and industrial involvement were also mentio-
ned (EMBO 1996). The Evaluation Panel of Biotechnology in Finland (2002)
has also paid attention to the Academy’s activities in the promotion of biotech-
nology research.
Both review groups have referred to the rapid advancements of academic
biotechnology research in Finland. They have also found more success in the re-
spective industry than is being recognised. In the view of the groups the biotech
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centres in the key universities are of top international quality, even though the
evaluators have also noticed some weak groups in a couple of more peripheral
universities. In the view of the EMBO Group there are two contrasting trends in
the organisation of molecular biology and biotechnology in Finland: one is to
build up expertise in peripheral universities and the other is to develop centres
of excellence in some of the larger universities (EMBO 1996: 21). Between the
two evaluations a concentration process has been going in Finland the Helsinki
region predominating now both in ICT and biotechnology research.
Fifth, the Academy of Finland has on the initiative of the Ministry of Educa-
tion set up Graduate Schools aiming at improving the quality of postgraduate
training. From the very beginning these schools have been integrated to the
centres of excellence. According to the chosen strategy, top quality research
groups are innovative and good educators by the definition. A notable part of
the government additional funding has been allocated to this purpose. The aim
has been to dedicate new places to fields that are important to the development
of technology, the natural sciences and knowledge-intensive business (Acad-
emy of Finland 2000). Even though ICT and biotechnology have been favoured
already in the first selections of the doctoral schools, a kind of balance was ear-
lier maintained between these fields and other disciplines. The decisions from
2001 and 2002 indicate, however, a notable concentration in biotechnology.
When the humanities and social sciences have lost their share of the total school
places, biotechnology has been the winner in this respect.
The recent strategic approach of the Academy of Finland has been a mixture
of a growing but still relatively weak commercial ethos and a strong concentra-
tion programme of the scientific excellence. This approach has also concentra-
ted the issues of new responsibilities and risks of biotechnology into the hands
of the scientific elite. A search for new rankings of competence tends, however,
also to favour individual choices and to weaken a collective scrutiny of the rights
and responsibilities. This makes the elite vulnerable to growing public concern.
From a concentrated effort to dispersed research and 
biobusiness
New biotechnology is a diffuse field and its roots in Finland can be traced to va-
rious sources and industrial sectors. The Finnish biochemistry research and in-
dustry got started in the 1920s. The development of biochemistry is much cre-
dited to A. I. Virtanen, the only Finnish scientist to receive the Nobel price
(Alestalo 1979). Another important branch of industry that has long traditions
in Finland and has ties to biotechnology is industrial enzyme productions. The-
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re are also strong links to the medical sector and pharmaceuticals as well as dor-
mant connections the former number one industry of Finland, the forest in-
dustry.
When trying to define some kind of starting point for Finnish gene technol-
ogy research the year 1980 would be a good candidate. That year a group for
DNA-combination technology was established in Finland. The initiator and
one of the major financiers for the group was Sitra, the Finnish National Fund
for Research and Development, which is a public foundation that functions un-
der the Parliament. The aim was to introduce the new technology to Finland
and create a knowledge base for the research. It was a state lead effort that was
hoped to be of utility to many fields. The research group had members from
universities, VTT (Technical Research Centre of Finland) and the National
Public Health Institute (Kuusi 1991, 22). The research that centred on the bac-
teria bacillus resulted also in the establishment of the first Finnish biotechnol-
ogy company, Genesit. Seven large Finnish state corporations, representing a
wide range of fields (forest industry, pharmaceuticals, chemical industry, food
industry) held shares in the company, but it did not succeed. The closedown of
the company in 1991 has been put down to number of factors: the bacteria’s dis-
appointing performance to produce enzymes, rapidly ageing work processes,
over-emphasis on applicable results instead of basic research and emerged con-
tradictions between commercial and scientific interests (Kettunen 2002, 22; Ku-
usi 1991, 22–23).
Even though developing biotechnology R&D is still in many ways a state-
lead project, the private sector is increasing its share as a financier and as a re-
searcher. The public sector used € 24 million for biotechnology research in
2000. This was 4,8 % of the total research and development financing directed
to the public sector. The universities spent € 91 million on biotechnology re-
search which was 11,5 % of the total research expenditure. Industry’s invest-
ments in biotechnology research in 2000 were estimated to be € 223 million. Al-
together € 338 million was spent on biotechnology research in 2000 (Source:
Statistics Finland 2001). Half of the resources for the research and development
of biotechnology come from the state funding.
Universities and research institutes in the innovation 
framework
As biotechnology is a research intensive branch of technology, universities play
an important role in the research and development of the field. In the field of
gene technology the importance of universities as research institutions can be
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seen for example in the notifications made to the Board for Gene Technology.
Between 1995 – March 2002, the Board approved 204 different notifications
concerning the use and release of genetically modified organisms. University
units have made over half of these notifications.43
Biotechnology research is concentrated in five university cities: Helsinki,
Turku, Oulu, Kuopio and Tampere. The state has invested heavily to develop
biotechnology centres especially through the scientific excellence policy in these
five regions and the universities have been making the most of the biotechnol-
ogy boom. This is apparent in the utilisation of funding as well as in the strat-
egies of the universities and as a result several new institutes and research and
education programmes in biotechnology have been created. Biotechnology,
along with ICT, is seen as a means for the universities to introduce market ori-
entation into their activities (University of Helsinki 2003). Many different
mediating organisations have been established to aid the commercialisation
process but the universities are struggling with this new market-oriented role
(Pelkonen 2001).
The University of Helsinki has two biocentres with different profiles. Helsinki
Science Park hosts departments from three faculties and the separate Institute of
Biotechnology. In addition a new Faculty of Biosciences will be created in the
area in the beginning of 2004. The motivation for this is stated to be the growing
importance of biosciences and preparation for the potential growth of the field.
Although creating a specific faculty for biosciences is seen as a tool for promot-
ing the field, its effects on interdisciplinary research and education and thus
creating possible new technologies and applications has been criticised. The
other concentration, Biomedicum Helsinki is the centre for biomedical research
and teaching and is also a host to the Finnish Genome Center. The National Pub-
lic Health Institute is also a partner in Biomedicum. The National Public Health
Institute in itself has a number of projects in gene and biotechnology dealing for
example with multifactoral nationally common diseases and vaccinations. The
Helsinki University of Technology has also laboratories dealing with biotechnol-
ogy. These laboratories work in co-operation with closely located VTT (Techni-
cal Research Centre of Finland) that has a large biotechnology research unit.
Even though large part of the biotechnology research is concentrated in the
capital area, the «bio boom» started in Turku. BioCity Turku was the first bio-
centre to be established in Finland. It is a joint organisation of the University of
43 Every institution, research group or company that uses gene technology has to file an application with
the Board of Gene Technology which then processes these notifications. The figures here are calculated
from data received from the Board of Gene Technology. 
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Turku and the Åbo Akademi University, with the Turku University Hospital and
National Public Health Institute also taking part (See Kivinen & Varelius 2003).
The University of Kuopio has profiled itself in animal biotechnology, neurosci-
ence and health related biotechnology. Biotechnology research is concentrated
in A.I. Virtanen Institute. It is located in the Kuopio Science Park. Research and
education in biotechnology is also done at the University of Tampere. Fields of
specialisation in Tampere include medical biotechnology and health informa-
tics. The Medipolis Science Park was founded in Oulu alongside its successful
ITC science park. It hosts the Biocenter where biotechnology research is con-
centrated. Biotechnology is one of the three fields of emphasis in the university.
The areas of expertise in the Biocenter include collagen research and develop-
mental biology.
The innovation storyline is repeated at universities also through the creation
of biotechnology business programmes. The University of Oulu together with
its biocentre, the city of Oulu, Tekes, European Science Foundation and other
partners has also created a BioBusiness Programme, which is marketed as a re-
search-based new business development programme. The aim is to «develop
the business know-how of scientists and other key specialists and train them to
work successfully in a business environment» (BioBusiness Oulu 2002). The
Helsinki School of Economics joined the game by launching a Biotechnology
Management Program in 2002. The programme can be taken as an individual
module or it can be chosen as part of the university’s International MBA degree.
It is mainly targeted at people working in biotechnology with core courses in
venture capital in biotechnology, high-technology marketing and IPR manage-
ment.
Lately, the universities have started to pay more attention to ethical and so-
cietal issues related to biotechnology and research in general. Ethics and social
responsibility appear more often in the latest strategies. One notable reason for
this is the so-called third mission of universities that will be set in the new uni-
versity law. In addition to research and education the universities are supposed
to fulfil their societal function. In many cases this is interpreted as closer con-
nections with industry and more efficient utilisation of research results.
However, ethical and social issues are also incorporated in the third mission.
Education of the general public and active communication are emphasised, but
there are no references to bottom up communication – hearing the public in the
issues of science.
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Old industry and new business
Most of the biotechnology companies have their origins in university research
projects and half of them are located at biocentres or science parks (Hermans &
Luukkonen 2002). Depending on the source and definition, there are 90–120
companies in Finland that deal with biotechnology. Finnish Bioindustries – the
industrial association of biotechnology industry – has in its registers about one
hundred companies. The association was formed in 1997 by the initiative of lar-
ge already well-established companies who work in many fields, biotechnology
being only one of them. Small companies and university research units also
played a part, however, in the discussions concerning the role and formation of
the association. According to the association, out of the 90 companies in 2001
40 % are micro companies (under ten employees); 32 % are small enterprises
(10–50 employees); and middle sized (51–250) and large companies (over 250)
have a 14 % share (Source: Finnish Bioindustries). As these figures show, the
biotechnology sector is still so small that it has no capacity to contribute to the
much talked about change of industrial structure.
The most common field of biotechnology among the companies belonging
to the association is diagnostics (one fourth of the companies), followed by ser-
vices (just under one fourth) and pharmaceuticals (one sixth). However, the
pharmaceutical companies are in general older and much bigger both in terms
of annual turnover and in number of personnel. The older companies operate
in many fields and only parts of their functions are related to biotechnology. In
the interviews with various experts, the fields mentioned above and industrial
enzyme production were seen to be the core competencies of Finnish biotech-
nology. Biomaterials and biotechnology related to the environment were regar-
ded to be the rising fields in Finland. Most of the Tekes funding is however di-
rected to R&D in the fields of medicine and health. One reason is that there are
hardly any applications for funding R&D in the agricultural sector as industry
sees it as too risky. In general customer demand and concerns are taken serious-
ly and they direct the operations of companies. On the other hand the industry
would like to have state support in the sector for the «transition period», mea-
ning the opposition of GMO-foods. There is a strong belief that this kind of an
attitude is just a passing phenomenon.
Another potential field of application of biotechnology is the forest industry.
New enzyme biotechnology is relatively common in the forest industry com-
pared to other countries. The application of biotechnology in forestry, however,
is still very limited (Laestadius 2000). From the three important Finnish paper
and pulp producers Stora-Enso has announced that it refrains from commercial
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use of genetic engineering. However, it takes part in basic research in the field.
M-Real has stated that it is not using GMOs or transgenic technologies in its
products and is not doing research in the field. This is not because of lack of in-
terest, but because of the customers’ demand (Gädda 2002). In the statement of
UPM-Kymmene on the use of genetically modified organisms it is written that
«UPM-Kymmene will not use genetically modified wood raw material in its
products until the safety of both the production and use of such material has
been established by the authorities» (UPM-Kymmene 2000). The forest in-
dustry is however encouraging universities to do research on gene technology,
but without getting their own hands dirty. The industry is pushing the respon-
sibility for developing this new technology to research institutes and univer-
sities. While the industry seems to be responding to customer demands and
concerns the research side is not expected to do so.
In addition to purely market-driven customer orientation, many large and
international Finnish companies are following the global trend and developing
strategies of corporate social responsibility and ethical guidelines. For example
Teollisuus ja työnantajat (2002), the association of industry and employers, has
published guidelines for corporate societal responsibility that are said to include
tools for «self-evaluation and development of activities». The three pillars of so-
cietal responsibility are the economy, the environment and humans. The hu-
man side – social responsibility – consists of four major elements: the well being
of personnel; product safety and consumer protection; good methods of action
and co-operation in the network of enterprises; relationships with surrounding
communities and supporting activities of public utility.
The Finnish Bioindustries has developed ethical guidelines that all the mem-
ber companies and organisations have to agree to follow. The guidelines emp-
hasise open discussion, improving the quality of life, human dignity and bio-
logical diversity. Providing information and participating in public discussion
are listed as objectives but there are no references to developing bottom-up
communication. Usually only big international companies have developed
strategies of social or corporate responsibility and ethical guidelines. The small
companies are new and still in the process of trying to find suitable markets and
have not made similar attempts. Whether these strategies are only rhetorical or
have some consequences for the working patterns of the companies and their
surrounding environment remains to be seen.
From the small, new «pure» biotech companies only two have gone public
and are listed at the Helsinki Exchanges (HEX). These companies have been re-
garded as prime examples of success in Finnish biotechnology. BioTie Therapies
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(listed at HEX on 29.6.2000) is one of the first biotech companies in Finland, si-
tuated in Turku’s BioCity. It focuses on cell receptor research and its products
targeted to specific areas of inflammation, thrombosis and cancer. BioTie
underwent a merger in 2002 with Contral Pharma, another pharmaceutical
company and Carbion Oy. Contral Pharma specialised in research and develop-
ing treatment for alcoholism and dependency problems, and its competence
areas stretch beyond biotechnology. BioTie Therapies has been in the headlines
also because of a patent dispute it had and won against Orion, a large Finnish
pharmaceutical company. The CEO of BioTie believes that the year 2004 will
produce a zero-result, meaning that it would be the first year without loss. This
demonstrates the difficulties that small companies have in finding market seg-
ments to function in.
The operating area of Biohit (listed at HEX on 18.6.1999) is diagnostics. Bio-
hit develops, manufactures and markets liquid handling products and access-
ories as well as diagnostic test systems for use in research, health care and indus-
trial laboratories. Biohit has mainly international markets. In 2001, 96 % of the
annual turnover came from abroad. Like BioTie, Biohit’s finances are still on the
negative side. Another so called success story is Bionx Implants, a company that
produces surgical implants. It got started from the work of two Finnish re-
searchers. Today the manufacturing plant is still in Tampere, Finland, but the
company headquarters are in the USA and it has been listed on the Nasdaq. All
of the people interviewed emphasised the fact that there is no use in forming a
biotechnology company for only Finnish markets. Finland is too small and
companies have to think global in order to succeed.
The founding of new companies and their strategic development is aided by
number of public and private financial sources. An important venture capital
investor in biotechnology is Sitra. In 2001, biotechnology was the fifth most
funded field by Sitra (9,9 million €) (Sitra 2002). In the private sector there are
some venture capital firms that have profiled in new technologies. For example
BioFund (founded in 1997) is wholly dedicated to financing biotechnology and
life sciences. It has an investment portfolio of € 185 million from which half has
been directed to Finnish companies. BioFund’s primary investors are domestic
insurance companies, pension funds and foundations. Risk financing has been
one of the problems identified in the commercialisation of biotechnology re-
search. But it is said that recently the situation has improved.
While ethical and social issues are being incorporated in the strategies of lar-
ge companies as a result of customer orientation and internationalisation, small
companies face ethical issues in these processes of funding. Both public and pri-
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vate financiers go through strict evaluation of applications and they state that all
ethically dubious projects and companies will be automatically dismissed. The
evaluation processes are done by the experts in the field which means that social
implications and ethics of research and development are assessed by «enlighte-
ned experts» without the help of for example bioethical experts or lay opinions.
Regulatory and strategic measures for 
biotechnology
Regulation and control of biotechnology is attributed to a large number of dif-
ferent organs mainly functioning under various ministries and even though the
Parliament is the main legislative authority the politics of biotechnology are
played to a great degree inside the ministries and their boards and committees.
The Parliament has had to deal with the introduction of new laws concerning
gene technology, and along with expert opinions heard, various reports to aid
the decision-making have been commissioned and produced. These also inclu-
de aspects of public concern and opinions (for example Salo et al. 1998). Issues
in gene technology have been dealt in various standing committees and in open
discussion in the Parliament. However, there has been a political consensus
about the importance of investing in biotechnology, and gene technology has
not become a sensitive or controversial political issue. Only some members of
the Green party have been active in promoting discussion about the risks and
benefits of gene technology.
Regulation and legislation mediated from the EU
Finnish biotechnology regulation is very EU-dependent and the EU is the origin
of most activities in regulation. All major laws and regulating boards are the re-
sult of EU directives. The most important law concerning biotechnology in Fin-
land is the Law on Gene Technology (377/95) which is based on the first two di-
rectives (90/219 and 90/220) about gene technology. The law is applied in use,
production and sales of genetically modified organisms. Issues concerning hu-
man genetics are embedded in laws that concern medicine in more general. One
of the most recent laws dealing with medical biotechnology is the law concer-
ning the usage of human and animal tissues (101/2001). Another important law
related to biotechnology is the Act on Medical Research (488/1999) and the re-
spective statute (986/1999). When becoming a member of the EU in 1995 Fin-
land had to incorporate these directives into its own legislation and this resulted
in the new law. In the beginning of 1995, Finland was the only EU country to-
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gether with Greece that had not legislation about gene technology (von Troil
1995: 44).
The preparation of the law on gene technology, however, did not start from
scratch when the membership to EU was confirmed. Finnish researchers and
authorities started to discuss regulation of gene technology much earlier. Alrea-
dy in 1979 the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health established an expert group
to discuss DNA technology and prepare statements about it. The ministry got
the idea for this from researchers in the field. So, before the mid 1990s, control-
ling and regulating gene technology was not yet institutionalised. Instead it
functioned on more or less volunteer basis inside the professions who were
using the technology. The established expert group was transformed into the
more permanent and institutionalised Advisory Committee on Biotechnology
in 1991. It aided the preparation of the law on gene technology that had started
in 1989.
The process of introducing new regulations and legislation has not changed
much from this. Most of the new additions and needs for renewal emanate from
the EU. Researchers and other experts are however very aware of the develop-
ments in their field and are involved in many international committees and
boards, but the final push for implementing changes comes from the EU and
other international organisations not from national activities.
Researchers and decision-makers interviewed recognised that Finland by it-
self is a small player and does not really have any possibilities of changing the
direction of development in biotechnology. However, they still had somewhat
nationalistic views about technology and its control. National authorities and
researchers are regarded to be trustworthy and competent while the same can-
not be said about all the other countries. Biotechnology is seen as a national pro-
ject (see Väliverronen 2002) that «we» have to participate in, and we are good at
it despite the field being mostly controlled by international legislation and mar-
ket forces. Transnational frameworks and national factors are constantly and
simultaneously being introduced as competing and supplementing sides in bio-
technology.
A common view among state officials and members of different boards is
that legislation of gene technology and biotechnology has gone almost too far.
The laws include flaws that are seen to hinder research and development and
they are regarded to impose unnecessary changes on activities that have been re-
gulated successfully previously by for example the medical community.
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«This has been in my opinion a little contradictory. In for example the Euro-
pean Union it has been very clear that the Commission has, when drawing
up these directives, aimed at diminishing regulation. Because today we know
better than twenty years ago what the consequences can be. The end result,
it is different. The regulation has, in spite of this, increased because the peo-
ple have been worried about the fact that one can do so many things, and
what are all of their consequences» (Member of the Advisory Committee on
Biotechnology).
Also the process of regulation in Finland and Europe is seen among the infor-
mants to be complicated and bureaucratic. On the other hand clearer rules of
conduct are being asked for especially from the side of university researchers ai-
ming at commercialising their research and from the side of the private sector.
There is uncertainty about the limits and possibilities of the existing regulatory
framework.
State regulation and official bodies
Biotechnology belongs as a field under the control of number of ministries. The
general division of labour and responsibilities in the issues of biotechnology be-
tween different ministries is as follows: The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
directs and controls generally, and especially in health issues, the compliment
with law on genetics. The Ministry of Environment controls and advises in legis-
lation concerning the environmental effects of genetically modified organisms.
When it comes to bringing new products to the market, the Ministry of Trade
and Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry are in charge of the is-
sues. This structure of control has resulted in a set of dispersed strategies and
visions. Since the beginning of 2002 the ministries have been working together
to construct a common ground in biotechnology issues and to enhance co-op-
eration between different bodies. Currently however, there is no common bio-
technology policy in Finland that would overlap the division of labour between
the different ministries and this co-operation of the ministries is not aiming at
creating one. The goal of the co-operation group is to share information be-
tween the ministries and ensuring that statements (for example to EU) are con-
gruent.
Instead of one policy, there are a number of different strategies and memos
from the various ministries and their working groups that deal with specific as-
pects of the technology. However, only the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
has been actively developing a coherent strategy for gene and biotechnology for
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the whole ministry (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2003). As a pilot pro-
ject, a strategy was first developed just for the department of agriculture (Mi-
nistry of Agriculture and Forestry 2000). The strategy development also in-
cluded separate reports on ethics, legislation, research, environmental effects
and economic effects on the food chain. The ethics report (Launis 2000) was
made by a philosopher from the University of Turku. He is also member of the
Board for Gene Technology and the Advisory Committee on Biotechnology,
and seems to have the role of an official bioethical expert in Finland.
In addition to the ministries, two specific bodies have been set up that are
dedicated to gene and biotechnology: the Board for Gene Technology and the Ad-
visory Committee on Biotechnology. The establishment and institutionalisation
of both of these is largely the result of EU legislation and the Law on Gene Tech-
nology. The Board for Gene Technology functions under the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Health and its responsibilities include processing applications and
notifications of the use of genetic technologies; giving rules of procedure in
complying laws on genetics and making decisions for specific cases. It is the hig-
hest national authority in gene technology. The Board was founded to fulfil the
controlling functions defined in the Law on Gene Technology in 1995. Its mem-
bers are representatives of four ministries named above. In addition ethical ex-
pertise is required to be represented on the Board. The reputation of the Board
has suffered, because it was accused of not working openly enough. This issue
got as far as to the Finnish Supreme Court and the Board has had to open its files
to the public. This case shows that although number of new boards have been
established to work along with already existing ones, it cannot be said that they
would have created new and more open forms of functioning or mediating pub-
lic opinions. Characteristic for the Finnish model of governance is to incorpo-
rate new questions and their problem solving inside the existing system (see
Bergman 1998).
The biggest effort to incorporate public views into decision-making has been
made by the Advisory Committee on Biotechnology. The Committee became
statutory through the introduction of the Statute on Gene Technology (821/
1995). Its mission is to promote co-operation between officials, researchers and
others working in the field, to follow discussion on biotechnology and to de-
velop education and distribution of information in biotechnology. The Advis-
ory Committee publishes also an informative journal called «Geenitekniikka
tänään» (Gene technology today). Members of the Committee are composed of
state officials, as well as representatives of the academia and industry. There are
also representatives from the consumer organisation and environment and ani-
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mal rights organisations. Because of the relatively broad bases of representation
and the goals of the Advisory Committee, it functions as a mediating organisa-
tion more clearly than any other board or organ devoted to biotechnology.
Other organisations do not include lay members.
The Advisory Committee on Biotechnology concentrates on gene technol-
ogy that is not directly related to human health. Ethical issues concerning hu-
man genetics and health care are the responsibility of the National Advisory
Board on Health Care and Ethics (ETENE). It deals with ethical issues related to
health care and the status and rights of patients. It can also take initiatives and
make advisory opinions and recommendations on ethical health care issues and
foster discussion on them. ETENE has a Sub-Committee on Medical Research Et-
hics (TUKIJA). Research ethics are more generally discussed also in the National
Advisory Board on Research Ethics. Established in 1991, the council is nomina-
ted by the Ministry of Education. The task of the council is to promote discus-
sion and inform the public about research ethics. It also prepares statements
about research ethics in general and can comment on actual cases. In 2002 the
advisory board published its guidelines for good scientific practice (National
Advisory Board on Research Ethics 2002). The board is very active in raising
discussions about research ethics inside the academia and decision-makers, but
the discussions do not necessarily reach the public.
Working under the Ministry of Environment, the Finnish Environment Insti-
tute is one of the five expert authorities defined to have a special function in the
Law on gene technology. The task of the Institute is to evaluate the environmen-
tal risks of GMOs. The National Food Agency processes applications for novel
foods and controls, together with the communal authorities, the marketing of
food products. The Board for Novel Foods, was established (as a result of the di-
rective on novel foods in 1997) to evaluate the safety of proposed novel foods,
including products made with the help of gene technology. There are also other
institutions that have activities in relation to biotechnology for example the Na-
tional Agency for Medicines and the National Veterinary and Food Research Insti-
tute.
NGOs and public participation
When the policies, strategies and memos of Finnish officials concerning bio-
technology’s different aspects are compared to those of the European Union a
strong difference in how the publics are being framed is detectable. In the docu-
ments of the European Union there is a great emphasis on citizen participation
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while Finnish documents contain a more passive idea of citizens. Instead of be-
ing active and participating citizens, they are perceived more as a population-
like object of action, that can be studied and controlled, or as human beings that
are worthy as such and thus need to be cherished and respected (Snell 2002).
The lack of the citizen aspect in the biotechnology documents has to be put
however in a wider context. There has been active discussion about civil society
and citizen participation in Finland in more general environmental issues. In-
deed, there are many NGOs and citizens movements, but they seem to be targe-
ted towards other areas like environmental protection and animal rights. Bio-
technology has not become a big issue among the public.
There have been some attempts both from the side of NGOs and the state to
create forums for discussion about gene technology. However the meetings and
hearings arranged have been sporadic events with little results. Public attitudes
are therefore more often mediated to the decision-makers through surveys and
consultations of NGOs. Citizen and consumer barometers are used in con-
structing a public opinion that is then used as bases for policies (Rask 2002).
Another shift that is detectable is the trend to replace citizens by consumers.
Actually, consumers are given more active roles than citizens, even though they
have clear limits for their action. Consumers make decisions concerning only
themselves by buying or choosing not to consume and act in the market, not in
the society. From their choices, the industry and decision-makers can make
their conclusions. Public concern is therefore mediated through markets and
consuming habits instead of public forums of discussion (Snell 2002).
Another reason for lack of open resistance towards gene technology can be
explained by the positive attitude of Finns when it comes to technological deve-
lopment. According to various surveys science and technology are highly va-
lued among the public (Tiedebarometri 2001, Eurobarometer 1997, 2000). Pub-
lic attitudes towards science and technology are in general more positive in Fin-
land than in many other European countries (Miettinen & Väliverronen 1999,
Salo et al. 1998). This can be seen in the results of surveys that have been con-
ducted about public attitudes and knowledge about biotechnology in the coun-
tries of the European Union. In the first Eurobarometer survey on biotechnol-
ogy (Eurobarometer 1997) Finnish citizens were the most optimistic about bio-
technology.
Even in Finland, however, concern about research and the applications of
biotechnology are growing. The follow-up survey showed that the Finns were
no longer the most optimistic, but still were the ones who believed the most, that
biotechnology’s applications are not risky (Eurobarometer 2000, 31). When as-
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ked, who do people trust in the issues of biotechnology the most common ans-
wer in Europe were consumer organisations. Finns on the other hand trusted
most the medical profession. Also universities were trusted and they received
much higher scores from Finns than from the average European (Ibid. 76–77).
Thus scientists and experts were regarded to be trustworthy. Finns see that Fin-
nish science and scientists are reliable, because science is not commercialised.
Commercialisation is regarded to be a problem that is occurring elsewhere in
the world (Snell & Laurén 2002). Another important aspect to note is that even
though Finns are generally optimistic about genetic technologies it does not
mean that they are not critical (Jallinoja & Aro 2000). Options are pondered, but
the conclusions reached are often positive towards new technology and pro-
ducts.
The NGOs representing the public
The NGO sector in Finland has long been very active for example in the issues
of environmental protection (Järvikoski 1991). Genetic technologies, however,
have not caused wide activism. There is currently only one NGO that is dedi-
cated solely to resisting gene technology. The association is called Kansalaisten
bioturvayhdistys (Citizens Biosafety Association). An examination of the main
environmental and consumer associations in Finland in spring 2002 revealed
that Kansalaisten bioturvayhdistys actually is the only NGO that has ongoing
activity around genetic technologies. Other NGOs have had campaigns dealing
with gene technology previously but do not have permanent information medi-
ation or campaigns about it. In 2000 there was a joint campaign involving a
number of associations dealing with GMO foods, which included actions in su-
permarkets, handing leaflets etc. This was not a national effort, however, but
part of an international action campaign. Patient organisations have also been
rather silent in public discussion about genetics.
According to all of the experts interviewed public discussion about genetics
and biotechnology is generally weak. It was also thought that the discussion
from the citizen side is mainly conducted by Kansalaisten bioturvayhdistys,
which is often regarded to be more of a nuisance than a constructive party of
discussion. Kansalaisten bioturvayhdistys is a small group whose two leading
figures write actively to Finland’s leading newspaper Helsingin Sanomat’s opi-
nion pages. The statements of the group are strongly negative towards genetic
manipulation, including food products, plant manipulation and vaccinations.
This gives the public discussion a narrow and one-sided label and the experts
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feel that public discussion does not bring any constructive points of view to
their own knowledge.
Despite lacking an active and public role, the NGOs play an important role
as the mediators of public opinion in the issues of biotechnology. A small num-
ber of NGOs are involved in the Advisory Committee on Biotechnology. The
Advisory Committee has currently 30 members (15 members and their deputy
members). From these 30 two are from Suomen Luonnonsuojeluliitto ry. (The
Finnish Association for Nature Conservation), one from Animalia ry. (Federa-
tion for the protection of animals), one from Juliana von Wendtin säätiö (a foun-
dation promoting scientific progress without animal testing), and two from Su-
omen Kuluttajaliitto ry. (Finnish Consumer Association). Even though this kind
of NGO involvement as representatives of the public in advisory organs is not
new, it is taken perhaps more seriously than before. The chairman of the Advis-
ory Committee on Biotechnology stated that these groups have been very active
and constructive parties in discussions. These NGOs work in a corporatist man-
ner that is a well-established working model in Finnish governance. Kansalais-
ten bioturvayhdistys on the other hand is an antagonistic movement that is
grouped together with «fox girls», activists who released animals from fox farms
in the late 1990s.
When the law on genetics was revised in 2000, one new addition to the law
was a passage concerning the hearing of the public (36a §). It is stated, that if the
Board of Gene Technology sees it appropriate, in certain cases, the Board can
make a decision to hear the opinions of some groups or the public. This passage
concerned the usage of GMOs in closed spaces. There is no mention about ta-
king public opinion into consideration in any other form in the law. This pas-
sage is very descriptive of the Finnish situation despite the fact there have been
a couple of attempts to start «public discussion». One of the most notable efforts
was the seminar on genetic technologies in the beginning of 2002 hosted by the
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. The seminar was not regarded as a
success, because of relatively weak participation. It is questionable, however, to
judge people for a lack of interest because the seminar was arranged by invitati-
on only.
Another public hearing was organised by Kansalaisten bioturvayhdistys in
2001. The impetus for the event was the case of «Transgenic cattle in Lapinlahti»
(more of this case later). The representatives of company Pharming and the re-
searchers from the University of Kuopio, who were the major players in the
transgenic cattle -project, were invited, but they boycotted the event. The hea-
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ring received also rather negative publicity as Helsingin Sanomat (14.1.2001)
wrote about «an atmosphere of brain washing» in the discussion.
The law on genetics is currently undergoing yet another revision. The direc-
tive (2001/18) that has caused the revision emphasises public hearing in the de-
cision-making. When asked about the influence of current trend in EU to invol-
ve citizens more in the decision-making and evaluation process, and whether
this will bring changes to Finnish procedures, a Member of the Board of Gene
Technology answered:
«Well, it [citizen participation] is clearly emphasised more in these new di-
rectives, so in some way it has to be followed through. Yes, it has to be in-
creased for sure, but in what form? These public hearings, if there is no public
it will not succeed very far. But maybe it will increase a little now. We have
to act on it as far as it will be in the law.».
How statutory public hearings would take place was still unsure during the in-
terview. As organised public events were seen unsuccessful, the chairman of
Advisory Committee on Biotechnology felt that consulting NGOs might be the
only possible way to proceed. Seeing the NGOs as representatives of the public
is regarded not only to be an easy and economic means but it is also seen to offer
more structured opinions and views than consulting citizens some other way.
Other viable alternatives have not been presented. Whether the NGOs repre-
sent the people accurately, however, is often questioned.
Researchers and biotechnology authorities systematically say that public
discussion is needed. Many are, however, sceptical about the willingness of pe-
ople to participate in discussion and the «blame» is put on citizens. There seem
to be some expectations of a bottom-up model emerging in public discussion
about biotechnology. Top-down models like consultation and surveys still pre-
vail in practise. The biotechnology experts also think that discussion is not al-
ways worthy as such, if there are no proper reasons for the discussion. Discus-
sions have also a bad reputation among some of the interviewed. Participating
in a discussion or being an active promoter of discussion is thus not tempting.
This means that it is not necessarily the lay people but the experts who are not
interested in changing opinions.
Even though the engagement-side is relatively weak, there have been nu-
merous occasions and forums for informing the public about biotechnology
and its research. The Academy of Finland hosted a series of events in 1999 whe-
re biotechnology research was presented to the public. The Days of Science
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gather people biannually to public presentations about developments in sci-
ence. In 2003 the area of emphasis was biotechnology. Also Studia generalia lec-
ture series have been arranged dealing with biotechnology at the University of
Helsinki. The latest platform for informing the public was launched in Septem-
ber 2002. The site www.bioteknologia.info has been established as part of the
NeoBio research programme funded by Tekes. Originally, there was supposed
to be notable resources also for ethical, legal and social research in the program-
me, but that diminished to financing a consulting company to do a survey con-
cerning information needs of the public. On the basis of that work the internet
site was constructed. Though very little can be said about the success and impact
of the site, it is clear that Tekes has taken the more progressive steps in infor-
ming the public compared to the Academy of Finland.
The media and issues of discussion
Helsingin Sanomat is the biggest daily newspaper in Finland. The opinion pages
of Helsingin Sanomat are widely read and are a kind of a national institution.
Many nationally and locally (the capital area) important discussions are started
in these opinion pages. The topics and viewpoints of the writings vary, as does
their capacity to create a discussion. The most active discussions have been abo-
ut GMO-products and their safety, but there have been also discussions about
GMOs and developing countries, human cloning and stem cell research. A con-
cerned member of a NGO or a researcher in the field often starts the discussio-
ns.
Helsingin Sanomat has also weekly environment and science pages. New de-
velopments in gene technology and possible controversies are covered in these
pages. Bigger articles are written by science journalists but most little news art-
icles are quotations from science journals or from other international sources.
News about gene technology are also now and then published in the inter-
national news and economic pages. International issues like GMOs and the de-
veloping countries also penetrate the discussions of national branches of inter-
national NGOs. In the media these issues are labelled «external», and not really
affecting Finland. For example the claims that human embryos have been
successfully cloned and are waiting to be born were widely published. Many of
the news articles or stories in television include the line «This can not happen in
Finland because…». Even though these issues can create discussion in a na-
tional level, they are mostly treated as news from the outside world. New fin-
dings by Finnish scientists are also reported (Laurén 1998). These findings have
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also the status of news. They differ from the international news in the sense that
findings of Finnish scientists are reported in a very nationalistic tone. One could
conclude from the news articles that in Finland, researchers are doing good
work and are in the international front-line. The foreign scientists on the other
hand do questionable research and together with the politicians from their
countries let bad things happen.
A research about the news on human genetics on the pages of Helsingin Sa-
nomat between 1994–1997 shows that the articles have mostly covered findings
of new links between genes and diseases or other scientific discoveries. The art-
icles were mostly neutral or positively oriented towards gene technology (Lau-
rén 1998). During the last few years the more critical articles have gained
ground, but in general Helsingin Sanomat is still neutral or optimistic (Väliver-
ronen 2002). Along with a positive tendency towards technology, Helsingin Sa-
nomat reflects the attitudes of the Finns in the respect that the sources used in
the articles were mostly researchers and experts from universities or represen-
tatives of the medical profession (Laurén 1998). In the economy section and
other financial newspapers, attention has been directed to the new and promi-
sing biotechnology companies and the stories follow the innovation storyline
and lately also ruptures in it.
Television coverage of biotechnology on the national TV-channels happens
mostly through the news and through science programmes. The national chan-
nel YLE1 broadcasts a science programme every week and there have been se-
veral episodes focusing on gene and biotechnology. The material is usually in-
ternationally produced. YLE hosted also an evening of interactive discussion
about gene technology in 1998 where the audience could send e-mails and SMS
to experts in the studio. The two commercial channels MTV3 and Nelonen have
a more scandal-seeking approach to biotechnology. Especially Nelonen has ai-
red documents that deal with gene technology and the possible future horror
scenarios. These programmes are, however, made without exception abroad.
The science magazines Tiede and Tieteen kuvalehti have covered gene and bio-
technology extensively. But like TV programmes much of the material is writ-
ten by international journalists and edited by international publication houses.
Controversial issues
A variety of issues have been covered in different forms of public discussion and
the media. Here are listed some of the most visible national controversies of the
last few years. These are controversial issues in the sense that they have received
a great deal of attention in various forms of media and the coverage has had im-
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plications on the underlying issues or the issues in themselves have caused
changes in practises.
1. Conflict of interest. A conflict of interest was reported and discussed in the
case of one the members of the Board for Gene Technology (Tuula Pehu).
Her validity to work as an unbiased state official was challenged because of
her being involved in a patent application for a virus resistant potato together
with her sister (Eija Pehu). As a result Tuula Pehu resigned from the Board.
The case was covered regularly for example in Helsingin Sanomat. This case
demonstrates the two interrelated aspects that are important to both the Fin-
nish public, as well as to the experts: trust and financial profit. As described,
experts and the public generally trust the researchers as well as regulatory
and controlling authorities. The trust is, however, weakened in the eyes of
the public if search for financial profit becomes integrated in the issue. The
decision-makers and policies on the other hand emphasise the role of bio-
technology in creating profit and ensuring national competitiveness, which
is seen to create dilemmas for both public and private organisations.
2. Openness of the Board of Gene Technology. Representative of the Green Party
and MEP, Heidi Hautala asked for information from the Board of Gene
Technology in 1997 about a GMO-product, but was refused any
information. She took the issue to Supreme Administrative Court where she
accused the Board of violating the openness principle of public institutions.
The court ruled the case in her favour. Since then the documents and
applications to the Board have been made more easily available to the
public, but the reputation of the Board has suffered. This was not, however,
a case of creating new more open ways of functioning, but ensuring that the
Board follows already established practices. There are still opposing views
about what information should be made available to the public. There are
fears that providing too much information can be a hindrance to companies
and their business operations, as well as a security risk for experimental
crops.
3. Misuses of research funding and unethical research conduct in medicine and
biotechnology. There have been two very thoroughly followed cases of
misconduct in research. Even though they are not directly linked to gene
technology, these cases are relevant, because very often when biotechnology
research and its financing is discussed the potential for misuse and
misconduct is brought up. These suspicions are presented largely because of
the two cases. This also prompted the development of ethical rules for
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research (National Advisory Board on Research Ethics 2002). One of the
cases was the embezzlement of research funds by a professor of neurology,
Paavo Riekkinen, from the University of Kuopio. After using grants from
medical companies and other research funds to his and his family’s personal
expenses, Riekkinen received a two-year sentence. Also his son, a neurology
researcher himself, was accused of embezzling funds. The other case
concerns the financial, ethical and professional misconduct by a Parkinson’s
disease researcher, professor Urpo Rinne at the University of Turku. The
investigations about Rinne not informing his patients enough and even
neglecting their care are still going on.
4. Transgenic cattle in Lapinlahti. Dutch company Pharming started to
produce hLF (human Lactoferrin) with transgenic cattle in a farm in
Lapinlahti, in eastern Finland. The project started with about 50 cows, but
there were plans to increase the number as high as 2000. The hLF-high milk
produced was used only for testing purposes for the company’s laboratories.
Two potential applications of the milk were researched. The first
application planned was a medicine used to help blood clotting in
operations. The other target was to create a novel food preparation for
people with diseases such as cancer and AIDS. The transgenic cattle project
received much attention in the media and also activated public discussion.
The hearing arranged by the NGO, Kansalaisten bioturvayhdistys, was held
around this issue. In 2001, the Dutch mother company Pharming filed for
legal moratorium and the Finnish part of Pharming filed for bankruptcy.
The cows were slaughtered except for a few that were left for laboratory
purposes. The ending of the hLF-production in Lapinlahti was due to the
financial problems of the Dutch company.
5. Transgenic «golden calf» Huomen. The case above is closely connected to this
fifth one, the case of one transgenic cow called Huomen («Morrow»).
Huomen was born in 1993 at a research farm of the University of Kuopio. It
was the first transgenic calf in the world. It had a human gene that produced
erythropoietin (EPO), a hormone that increases growth of red blood cells.
The birth of Huomen got Pharming interested in Finnish research and
enabled the project in Lapinlahti. The life of Huomen did not go as planned.
The goal was that Huomen would produce 60–80 kg of EPO in her milk.
The annual demand of EPO for medical purposes globally was estimated
however to be only 20 kg. During the 1990s the demand of EPO grew, but
this was because it was used among athletes as a performance enhancer.
This created an ethical dilemma. Huomen was slaughtered in 2001 because
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it was overweight and had joint disease and the EPO-cow project ended (see
Väliverronen 2002).
In addition to the concerns about searching for financial profit at the cost of
public good present in the cases, the last three issues deal also with animal rights
and ethical aspects. The issues presented here have been brought to public
discussion and kept there by relatively few actors. The association Kansalaisten
bioturvayhdistys was involved in the both cases of transgenic cattle and some
members of the green party have been actively promoting discussion about gen-
etic manipulation and the openness of decision making. The National Advisory
Board on Research Ethics has been an active and critical voice in the cases of re-
search misconduct and prompted by situations like in the conflict of interest
case it has also published a memo concerning the relationship between re-
searchers and the private sector and problems arising from it (National Advis-
ory Board on Research Ethics 2001).
Conclusions
In Finland the growth of biotechnology research and development has been ra-
pid during the last decade. There have also been growing politico-economic ex-
pectations of the capability of the biotechnology cluster to transform the struc-
ture of the industry. The advancements in biotechnology are related to a variety
of major changes reflecting a radical change in the political ideology from the
welfare state to the neo-liberal state. New international market openings for
new technologies, emphasis on commercial ethos instead of community ethos,
as well as a general trust of the Finns on the benefits of new technologies all have
contributed to the issue. It is characteristic of the country that the political sy-
stem has been able to agree both on the welfare state programme and thereafter
on the goals of the neo-liberal state. Lately, however, citizens have been demon-
strating against the competitive model.
Even though the legitimate basis of ICT has been shaken in the beginning of
the new millennium, the political pressure on new technologies has not lessened
in Finland. On the contrary expectations of biotechnology to be the next global
market winner after ICT are high. Concomitantly a multilevel programme ai-
ming at securing the development of biotechnology has been accomplished by
the government. The measures comprise a generous public funding to biotech-
nology research, attempts to change the infrastructure of university research by
establishing biocentres and other centres of competence, an integration of doc-
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toral schools to centres of excellence in research, financing of research and tech-
nology programmes between universities and industries as well as subsidies to
biotech industry. Aside from the attempts to promote biotechnology for its own
sake all these efforts indicate a tendency to strengthen market orientation in the
biotechnology sector. Still there are more evidences of the high quality of Fin-
nish biotechnology research than of the high market competitiveness of its in-
dustrial applications.
As in the other European countries there is an increasing international/EU
pressure to control the development of biotechnology in Finland. All necessary
laws have been passed by the Parliament and new official bodies have been
established to fulfil the controlling and regulating functions. The interest repre-
sentation is, however, traditional. The respective ministries function in a discre-
tionary way having only few efforts to develop more horizontal ways of action
and information change. Therefore attempts to develop a coherent biotechnol-
ogy policy have been rare. Sector-based responsibilities make it also difficult to
solve the growing tension between the common and private good.
Traditional forms of action also predominate in regarding the public con-
cern and action. The government has launched the national innovation system
as a modern model of societal cooperation and responsibility. The primary goal
in this frame is to advance the coherence between the activities of universities
and industries. The citizens are invisible actors in the national innovation sy-
stem. When they come to the scene, they are customers who are needed to sta-
bilise the markets, and through their choices to make estimations of the appeal
of the products. It seems that here are the roots for new citizen mistrust. A
strongly market oriented political system has not managed to advance the com-
ponents of the common good.
As regards public concern, there is a national peculiarity to see a difference
between international and national ways of scientific action. The citizens and
the academic researchers in the biosciences tend to have a strong trust on the
neutrality and purity of Finnish science. Ethical and moral problems come from
abroad. At the same time both the decision-makers and the public are increas-
ingly concerned of ethical issues and of the role and responsibilities of various
actors in solving these issues. Still they are not sure how ethical and moral prob-
lems can be solved. They wonder what kinds of forums should be favoured to
promote the discussion of shared responsibilities and who are the relevant part-
ners. The Finnish system for tackling emerging problems and risks is still very
expert-led. As the authorities are trusted to do a good job, it seems to many that
it is not necessary to construct new forms of action because the old system still
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functions well. Therefore the pressures from the EU to integrate the public into
the decision-making system pose difficulties. These kinds of uncertainties also
become visible in the role of the media in biotechnology issues. Even though
there are attempts to mediate neutral information, the publicity is mostly on et-
hically or morally suspect issues and the attempts by the public to influence bio-
technology issues are downplayed.
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The Ambiguity of Progress – 
Biotechnology in Norway
Egil Kallerud
Prehistory
There was little public awareness and no controversy concerning biotechnology
In Norway during the 1970s. The risk issues that were intensely debated in the
US and most European countries following the Berg letter and the Asilomar
Conference did not become an issue of public controversy in Norway (Høvis-
keland, 1995) in contrast to Sweden, for example (Olofsson, 2002). At this time
there were few research projects within the field in Norway, and the minimal
policy debate concerning these issues was largely delimited to one of the five re-
search councils at the time, the Norwegian Research Council for Science and the
Humanities (NAVF), which was largely concerned with university research.
The debate, took place mainly in response to initiatives of the European Science
Foundation. NAVF put into place a minimal regulatory framework, establish-
ing a temporary DNA committee in 1976 which was to follow the international
debate about the issue, and consider the future extent of Norwegian research in
the field. The mandate of the committee was later extended by the government
to include an assessment of the need for regulation and control of research. As
such, a regulatory model based on self-control by the research community was
established. In 1979, Norway was held up in international debate as a model
country in its success in evading the establishment of separate laws for the regu-
lation of DNA research, and keeping control within the research community it-
self (Høviskeland, 1995: 162).
This remained the general regulatory model also after the NAVF committee
was superseded in 1981 by the permanent Committee for the Control of Re-
combinant DNA Research under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. This
committee remained in office for two three-year periods. The option to estab-
lish a separate legal and regulatory framework for the field was at this time fir-
mly – and successfully – rejected on the grounds that a strict control could easily
be enforced through these minimal measures, given the small scale and the low
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level of relevant activity in the Norwegian research community. A hiatus of two
years followed the demise of the committee in 1987 before a new control com-
mittee was established in 1989. By then, however, biotechnology had become an
important issue in the Storting, the Norwegian Parliament, initiating the process
that was eventually to lead to the adoption of two separate acts on gene technol-
ogy (1993) and medical applications of biotechnology (1994). Unlike the case of
its predecessor, members of the new control committee of 1989 were not purely
professional, partly reflecting the shift of focus of the biotechnology policy
agenda from contained to deliberate release of genetically modified organisms
(GMOs). The control committee of 1989 was abolished in 1991 when the Nor-
wegian Biotechnology Advisory Board (Bioteknologinemnda)was founded.
The absence of a general public debate and political awareness about the new
biotechnology explains why this became one of five ‘main target areas’ in the
1985 White Paper on research policy with little or no attention paid to any other
aspect than the immense economic and research potential of the new technol-
ogy. That biotechnology became a main research policy priority area was the re-
sult of initiative and lobbying by the research community through four of the
five research councils 44, all of which were involved in basic and (to a lesser ex-
tent) applied microbiological research. This was a researcher-led initiative, sin-
ce little or no industrial activity existed that could be mobilized for its support.
The priority area was organized as a joint effort of the four research councils,
largely through the coordination and re-labelling of existing activities and bud-
get items within the research councils. Later, key persons behind the initiative
complained about the lukewarm financial support by government of this area
in particular (Hatling, 1992).
The public scepticism towards biotechnology, which had been latent hither-
to, surfaced when a break-through in a research project on salmon breeding was
announced at a press conference in May 1985 (Hunsager et al, 1988: 91–93).
Here, the news was released that an experiment to integrate the growth hormo-
ne from ‘a mammal’ into the genome of the salmon had been successfully per-
formed, speeding up the growth of salmon. Despite the researchers’ reluctance
to answer a direct question by a journalist present at the conference, it emerged
that the ‘mammal’ hormone in question was actually human. The news trigge-
red and cemented Frankenstein connotations in the public’s perception of the
44 In addition to NAVF, the research councils involved in the biotechnology priority were the councils for
industrial research (NTNF), agricultural research (NLVF) and fisheries research (NFFR). In 1993 these
councils were, together with the fifth council for applied social research (NORAS) merged into one sin-
gle research council, the Research Council of Norway (Norges forskningsråd).
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new biotechnology. All projects related to the injection of growth hormones in
salmos were terminated a few years later. It is still strongly emphasized, particu-
larly by the salmon aquaculture industry, that the genetic modification of sal-
mon itself is a non-issue in Norwegian policy for salmon aquaculture. This
event signalled the emergence of the highly sceptical Norwegian public opinion
on the new biotechnology. It was ultimately to lead to the establishment of a re-
gulatory policy for biotechnology in the early 1990s that was distinctively re-
strictive by international standards.
Government, parliament, political parties
The Norwegian politics of biotechnology have been strongly influenced by the
political situation in the Storting since the mid-1980s. Biotechnology emerged
then as a salient issue in Norwegian politics at this time, as a consequence of the
strong links that were then forged between biotechnology and the issues of
abortion and ‘selection society’. These links were initially established within a
debate in the Storting on in vitrio fertilization (IVF) which led to the passing of
a separate Act of Artificial Procreation in 1986.
A pattern of party political alliances that still pervades Norwegian politics on
biotechnology crystallized within this debate. On one side is the Christian De-
mocrat party (Kristelig Folkeparti) for which abortion and controversial aspects
of IVF and artificial procreation are key issues for asserting a political profile as
strongly concerned with ethical issues in general, and abortion/eugenics in par-
ticular. In its political manifestos, references to biotechnology are invariably on
the problematic aspects, raising issues of eugenics and the dystopia of a future
selection society. At the other end of the political spectrum is the Labour Party
(Arbeiderpartiet), whose overriding interest is that the industrial potential of
biotechnology should be exploited. In biotechnology policy issues the Christian
Democrats are often supported by the other two centre parties – the Centre Par-
ty (Senterpartiet), with its anti-EU, even anti-capitalistic stance, and the small
Liberal Party (Venstre) – to form the core of a ‘technology-sceptical’ political al-
liance. The Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) is an additional and in-
creasingly influential partner in this ‘sceptics’ faction.
The position of the Conservative Party (Høyre) is more ambiguous, uneasily
combining and balancing its concern with industrial potential with a commit-
ment to Christian values. Its alignment with the Labour party on the first con-
cern is, however, often troubled by the emphasis by the Labour party on state
initiative and pro-active leadership. The Conservatives prefer to emphasize the
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role of private industry at the cost of state initiative and active governmental
agencies. Despite its name, the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) is a right-
wing populist party whose position in biotechnology issues is more ambiguous
and unpredictable, although frequently supporting the pro-technology policies
of the Labour and Conservative parties. Its nationalist inclinations have provi-
ded a political basis for establishing unexpected alliances with the Labour Party
in certain science and technology policy issues concerning state support to pri-
vate industrial R&D.
The salience of ethics in Norwegian science and technology policy in general,
and biotechnology policy in particular, may partly be seen as a consequence of
the political influence of the sceptical faction, and in particular by the key pol-
itical role of the Christian Democrats. For a period of three decades nearly all
Norwegian governments have been minority governments, and during the
1990s in particular it has become increasingly difficult for them to establish a
stable parliamentary basis. A recurrent feature of this situation has been that
most minority governments have come to depend on the support, participation
or leadership of the Christian Democrats in order to survive. Thus, through
shifting configurations of party alliances, this party has been able to ensure that
its core issues remain at the centre of the political agenda.
The highly contentious issue of Norway’s relationship to the EU is generally
a core part of most biotechnology issues, through the many EU regulations
which Norway has to adopt under the Economic Area Agreement (EEA). This
agreement between the EU and EFTA countries which came into effect in 1994
forms the mainstay of Norway’s relationship to the EU after full Norwegian
membership was rejected in the referendum of that year. The Centre and Left
Socialist parties strongly oppose Norwegian membership in the EU, while the
Conservative and Labour parties are generally in favour (although some in-
ternal opposition does exist within the Labour Party). The Christian Democrats
have been opposed to Norwegian EU membership and, similarly to the Liberal
party, and strongly supported the EEA agreement as a viable alternative in the
longer term to full membership, ensuring – allegedly – both access to vital mar-
kets and retaining more national independence than the full membership opti-
on.
The outcome of a number of issues affecting biotechnology policy has thus
depended on which (minority) government has been in power at the time of any
resolution. This applies, for example, to the establishment and reorganisation of
the Technology Board (Teknologirådet), issues concerning organizational struc-
ture and nomination of members to the Biotechnology Advisory Board, and the
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controversy over the implementation in national law of the EU directive on bio-
technology patents.
Legal and regulatory framework
Two separate Acts – one essentially concerned with environmental aspects of
gene technology (The Gene Technology Act, passed in 1994), the other with
medical applications of Biotechnology (the Biotechnology Act, passed in 1993)
– form the main pillars of the regulatory framework for biotechnology in Nor-
way. As indicated above, the minimal regulatory framework in operation
throughout the 1980s was largely based upon internal control by the research
community itself. Neither risk nor R&D issues triggered a more extensive pub-
lic debate or more extensive political awareness of potentially adverse aspects
and effects of the new technology. It was in the Parliamentary debate on bio-
technology and IVF, rather than a response to more general public concern and
debate, that biotechnology became an important parliamentary and party pol-
itical issue towards the end of the decade. Media coverage and public debate was
scant at this time, and did not increase until the time when the two acts in qu-
estion were coming up for final consent by the Storting (Høviskeland, 1995).
The new possibilities that had been created for medical-genetic services
within this context, prenatal diagnostics in particular, provided the background
for a request by the Storting that the Labour Government present a report to the
Storting on the state and challenges of modern biotechnological research (Hø-
viskeland, 1995: 115–118). As an extension of the IVF issue, the Government
should ‘present a White Paper on the ethical guidelines for research and deve-
lopment in biotechnology and gene technology’ (Innst. O. nr. 60: 1986–87).
Thus, ‘ethics and morality became code and arena for the debate on IVF and
medical uses of biotechnology’ (Hviid-Nielsen, 2000: 269). The early and strong
focus in Norwegian debate on ethical aspects of biotechnology, rather than on
risk and R&D, reflects, then, the fact that a broader public debate originated in
the process of the IVF Act, where issues of prenatal diagnostics, eugenics and
abortion predominated.
Two commissions were appointed by the Government to prepare the polit-
ical process for establishing a general regulatory framework for biotechnology.
The first, ‘the Biotechnology Commission’, was established in June 1987, pri-
marily to address ‘environmental and health issues’, while ‘the Ethics Commis-
sion’, appointed in 1988, would address medical applications and human as-
pects of biotechnology. This bifurcation of the process was later built into the
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regulatory framework in the passing of two separate acts, the Gene Technology
Act of April 1993 regulating health, safety and environmental aspects of bio-
technology, and the Biotechnology Act of June 1994 which addressed human/
medical applications. Ethical issues were salient in the debate that led to both
acts and a set of principles is stated for each. The Gene Technology Act stipula-
tes that the approval of manufacture and commercialization of GMOs must be
contingent on their social utility and ethical acceptability; they must meet the
requirement of sustainability, and be without detrimental health and environ-
mental effects. The Biotechnology Act stipulates that the application of biotech-
nology in medicine must be in the interests of human beings in a society where
everyone is valued, in accordance with the principles of respect for human dig-
nity, human rights and personal integrity, and without genetic discrimination.
The Norwegian laws are considered to be highly restrictive, for example
through their provisions that applications must meet with the requirements of
not only of the avoidance of risk, but also of social utility and sustainability.45
While the precautionary principle is not explicitly part of the act, it is used in its
application due to its centrality in the preparatory documents to the act (Biotek-
nologinemnda, 1999).
The Norwegian Biotechnology Advisory Board
A key institution in the Norwegian government structure for biotechnology is
the Norwegian Biotechnology Advisory Board. This board was established in
1991 as part of the regulatory structure of genetic technology following a pro-
position by four members of the Christian Democrat Party to the Storting in
June 1989. One of these later became the Prime Minister in two minority go-
vernments, including the present government. The existence and general func-
tions of the Board were subsequently formalized in both acts passed in 1993 and
1994 (in § 26 and § 8–4, respectively).
The Board extends and supports the normal regulatory functions of the two
ministries that are formally responsible within government for managing the
two acts, i.e. the Ministry of Environment (Gene Technology Act) and the Mi-
45  § 10 of the Gene Technology Act states that approval of deliberate release of GMOs is contingent on
social utility and sustainable development: 
‘Utsetting av genmodifiserte organismer kan bare godkjennes når det ikke foreligger fare for miljø- og
helsemessige skadevirkninger. Ved avgjørelsen skal det dessuten legges vesentlig vekt på om utsettingen
har samfunnsmessig nytteverdi og er egnet til å fremme en bærekraftig utvikling.’ [‘The release of GMOs
may be approved only when no danger of health or environmental damage exists. In deciding, consid-
erable importance should be attached to whether the release is socially useful and contributes to sustain-
able development. ’]
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nistry of Health (the Biotechnology Act), which determine applications for the
approval of GM projects involving deliberate release of GMOs and commerci-
alization of GM products. The Board provides advice to the two ministries both
on issues of general policy and on individual projects. The unique, hybrid na-
ture of the Board as regulatory body lies in its role as a formally independent
collegial body, operating at arm’s length from government and the two mini-
stries it serves. In addition, a key component of its mission is to ‘promote infor-
med public debate’, and in this connection has produced a large number of re-
ports addressed to the general public and to schools. It has organized numerous
public conferences on most topical issues in biotechnology, and it has suppor-
ted and co-organized all three lay conferences on gene technology issues in Nor-
way (two on GM food, and one on stem cell research) – in partnership with the
research ethics committees and the Norwegian Board of Technology.
The Biotechnology Advisory Board is basically a regulatory, and hence an ex-
pert body. Included among its current 24 members are 16 nominated on the ba-
sis of their technical expertise on aspects and fields of research and application
of biotechnology. These also include experts associated with NGOs as well as
experts on ethical, legal and social aspects, including ‘critical’ social scientists.
The remaining eight are nominated as representatives of organized stakeholder
groups, such as the Research Council of Norway (RCN), the fish farming in-
dustry, farmers’ organizations, the national employers’ organization, the largest
employees’ organization, as well as environmental NGOs (Naturvernforbundet,
member of Friends of the Earth), the Norwegian Association of the Disabled
(Norges Handicapforbund) and the Norwegian Consumer Council (Forbruker-
rådet). Thus, in a unique way the Board combines both educational (informing
the public) and deliberative (stimulus to public debate) functions with expert
(regulatory) and corporatist functions. It is explicitly stipulated in the para-
graphs of both the acts which define the status and functions of Board, that its
records and decisions shall be public, even when discussing single applications
for approval of GM projects/products (with a few exemption clauses). Its nego-
tiations and statements are regularly covered in the media and extensively quo-
ted in political documents and debate. It recognizes and emphasizes the contro-
versial and value-laden character of the issues with which it deals, and does not
attempt to reach consensus at all costs. The message is thereby given that such
issues as it handles cannot be decided by science and expertise alone, but en-
compass a range of values and viewpoints that need to given a voice in the de-
bate. Voting takes place regularly, frequently with a majority decision. The
Board is perceived as a successful institution in terms of political impact and le-
90    NIFU Rapport 2/2004
gitimacy. To some extent it may thus be seen as the institutionalised arena for
an on-going quasi-public debate (by proxy) on biotechnology issues, ensuring
that major concerns are taken into account and most voices will be heard, as
new contentious issues and developments have to be addressed by political and
regulatory authorities.
In this capacity, the independent status of the Board is seen as essential. But
this status is somewhat ambiguous as indicated by several formal links to and
dependence on Government (appointment of members, request for advice, civil
servants as members/observers). The independence of the Board has been an
object of contention and adjustment throughout its history. For example, this
issue was addressed in an evaluation in 1998 in which proposals were put for-
ward to enhance the (perceived) independence of the Board (Statskonsult,
1998). The outcome of that process was that those members representing mini-
stries were deprived of their right to vote while retaining a role as observers with
a right to attend meetings and take part in discussions. The independence of the
Board also became an issue in 2000 and 2001 following a proposal by the Labour
Government that as part of a more general reorganization of all agencies and in-
stitutions linked to the Health Ministry the Board should be made an integral
part of the new organization. This was strongly opposed by the Board itself. The
proposal was repealed, and its independent status outside the normal chain of
command re-confirmed after a new Centre-Right Government took over after
the general election in autumn 2001. There is, however, mounting concern that
the independence of the Board is becoming increasingly compromised and jeo-
pardized by what is seen as unabashedly political appointments of members of
the Board by the Labour Government in 2000 as well as by the centre-right go-
vernment in 2002 (Sirnes, 2002). During the short period when the Labour go-
vernment was in office following the resignation of the Centre Government in
April 2000, it appointed a majority of predominantly ‘pro-technology’ members
and a former Labour minister of health as chair; while the incoming Centre-
Right government appointed ‘sceptics’ to all the three positions which were va-
cant in 2002.
Biotechnology as R&D priority
Biotechnological industry
An evaluation of biological research in Norway from 1999 was highly critical of
the volume and quality of biological research, biotechnology included. While
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the quality of a number of basic research groups at universities was acknowled-
ged, the report was critical of applied activities (Norges forskningsråd, 2000b).
Commercial biotechnology in Norway is scant, in stark contrast to its neigh-
bouring Scandinavian countries. This is reflected in a survey and analysis of
Norwegian biotechnology by Cap Gemini Ernst & Young in 2000 (Norges
forskningsråd, 2000a). By applying the standard criteria used in the annual re-
ports by Ernst & Young on European Life Sciences, the report identified 31 bi-
otechnological companies. Half of these had just one employee, 6 had more
than 10 employees, and just one had more than 100 employees (Dynal ASA, the
biotechnological activities of which has later been established as a much smaller,
separate company, Dynal Biotech). In the marine sector, however, many com-
panies mainly working with more traditional biotechnological and biochemical
technologies, are increasingly taking up genetic technologies. Although the cri-
teria applied may be fuzzy, the overall picture of commercial Norwegian bio-
technology is the same as that given in a special issue of Nature Jobs on Norwe-
gian biotechnology in 2002. Of the 15 companies highlighted by Nature Jobs, 12
are on the Cap Gemini list, and 35 companies which develop biotechnological
products are reported as being included among those members of the newly
established Forum for Biotechnology within the national employers’ organiza-
tion. Some of the characteristics of the Norwegian biotech industry are its
strong focus on diagnostic medical products, and on marine applications. Com-
pared to the other Scandinavian countries, there are few pharmaceutical com-
panies in Norway, and only a fraction of these are engaged in the development
of new pharmaceuticals. The lack of venture capital and of large, industrial lo-
comotives is often noted as a key characteristic of Norwegian biotechnological
sector and a serious barrier to the development of a successful strategy for the
nascent Norwegian biotechnology industry.
While Norway is ranked on the European average on aggregate indicators of
innovation in biotechnology, its single major relative strength is on the indica-
tor ‘Dedicated Biotechnological Firms’ (DBFs), that is, firms that are often
founded on results from university research (European Commission, 2003: 19).
PhotoCure is one such company that is often held up as model on how to exploit
industrial opportunities in biotechnology research.46 It is among the larger
Norwegian modern biotechnology companies, although with no more than 35
employees (2002). Many of these were recruited when a large part of the R&D
46 See, for example, ‘PhotoCure – et lysende norsk eksempel til etterfølgelse’ [‘PhotoCure – a shining Nor-
wegian example for others to follow’], GenIalt, 2/2001, pp 11-13. In 2003 Photocure was awarded the ‘in-
novation prize’ of the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO) 
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activities of Nycomed, the former Norwegian pharmaceutical company, was
transferred abroad after its merger with Amersham Ltd. After a successful emis-
sion in 2000, PhotoCure had a capital base of 300 million Nkr in 2001. In 2002
its equity capital was 185 mill Nkr, sales revenues were 29 mill Nkr, and an ope-
rating loss of 128 mill Nkr. It is a spin-off of research at the Norwegian Radium
Hospital (Radiumhospitalet), and manufactures cancer-related therapeutic and
diagnostic products based on its proprietary photodynamic therapy tech-
nologies.
The low level of Norwegian commercial activity in biotechnology is indi-
cated by the low proportion of biotechnology patent applications by Norwegian
firms to the Norwegian Patent Office (Patentstyret). From 1993 to 2000, 72 of a
total of 992 patent applications in biotechnology were made by Norwegian in-
dividuals or companies. While Norwegian patent applications account for 21
percent in all branches, it is only 7 percent in biotechnology. The marginal role
of biotechnology in Norwegian patenting is seen by the ‘specialization index’ for
biotechnology patents of 0.4 (Research Council of Norway, 2003).47 In only
three industrial branches is the specialization index for patents of Norway as
low as this, among them polymer chemistry and pharmaceuticals.
In April 2001, a ‘Forum for Biotechnology’ was established under the aegis
of the NHO, as an organization for promoting the interests of the developing
Norwegian biotechnology industry. A Bio-marine Forum was also established
early in 2002 on the initiative of Investorforum, a group counting among its
members the largest Norwegian venture capitalists. During the last few years In-
vestorforum has established itself as a powerful lobby for industrial and venture
capital interests. It proved its political influence by succeeding in securing pol-
itical support for an earlier ‘new economy’ initiative to convert the site of the
former Oslo Fornebu Airport into a world-class ICT-cluster. Their strategy is to
encourage the Norwegian state to undertake an active role as venture capitalist
based on the large Norwegian Petroleum Fund (Oljefondet) 48, and to form alli-
ances between private and public venture capital for investing in the new,
knowledge-intensive industries.49 Having now turned to the emerging Norwe-
gian biotechnology industry, in particular within the strong marine sector in
Norway, this group adds political momentum to the efforts to coordinate R&D
and industrial interests within the biotechnology domain.
47 This means that the Norwegian share of applications for biotechnology patents is far below the Norwe-
gian share of patent applications in all technologies.  
48 The Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund was established in 1990 with income from the net cash
flow from petroleum activities plus the return on the Fund’s assets. Expenditures from the Funds are
mainly transfers to the Fiscal budget to finance the non-oil budget deficits. 
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Biotechnology research
As indicated earlier, biotechnology was established as a main science policy pri-
ority area in 1985, based on coordinated initiatives by researchers and with little
industrial backing or results. The science policy strategy of channelling research
funds through a number of main target areas was effectively dismantled at the
beginning of the 1990s. By then the number of areas had increased from the ini-
tial 6 to 9, disillusionment with the effectiveness of the target area organization
had become general, and the growth of public research appropriations first le-
velled off and then decreased. This particularly affected that part of public re-
search funds which was channelled through the research council organization.
Along with the other main target areas biotechnology ceased to be a priority
area on the political agenda. In the White Paper from 1993, the target area pri-
orities idea was replaced with other, more general priorities. Biotechnology had
no salient place in any of these new priorities. The remnants of the earlier prio-
rity areas receded in importance as they became redefined as no more than parts
of the general programme portfolio of the Research Council. At the time, the
new Research Council of Norway was experiencing decreasing funds and a ser-
ious managerial crisis following its reorganization, leading to a paralysis that
took several years to overcome.
In November 1994, the Ministry of Trade and Industry asked the Research
Council to undertake an analysis on the state and potential of Norwegian bio-
technology. This resulted in an action plan published in 1996 (Norges forsk-
ningsråd 1996). Based upon this, the Research Council adopted an action plan
for biotechnology, ‘Strategi for bioteknologi’ (Norges forskningsråd, 1997). In
June 1998, the Ministry of Trade and Industry published a ‘National strategy for
commercial (næringsrettet) biotechnology’ developed by an interdepartmental
working group (with members from the ministries of Fisheries, Research, En-
vironment, Health, and Agriculture as well from the Ministry of Trade and In-
dustry), and based upon the fore-mentioned documents. Throughout the 1990s
the Research Council funded several research programmes for biotechnology.
The Research Council estimate that its current appropriations for biotechnol-
ogy amount to about 250 million Nkr (2002), that is 7 percent of its total budget.
49 Its ICT Fornebu proposal created an interesting political alliance when it gained support of the Labour
Party and the populist right-wing Progressive Party: But there was also strong opposition among other
political parties and the IT research community. Nevertheless, the proposal met with (partial) success as
IT activities have been established at Fornebu following a protracted and tumultuous process in Parlia-
ment, although at a lower level of support and activity than envisaged. The ‘vision’ was later to become
a casualty of the dispute between the state and the local authorities on the development of the site, and
the burst of the ICT financial bubble in 2001. 
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Despite this, biotechnology did not re-emerge among the main priority areas
of Norwegian research policy as given in the last White Paper on research from
1999. Genetic technology was counted among the fields to be supported under
medical/health research, one of the designated thematic priorities – the other
three being ICT, marine research and energy/environment-related research.
While the Research Council had now overcome its managerial crisis and had
exerted considerable influence on the White Paper, it did not propose that bio-
technology should be a priority of its own. The Council had, however, been in-
strumental in establishing both marine, including aquaculture, research and
medical/health research as priority areas of high relevance to biotechnology.
By 2002 biotechnology had achieved a status similar to that of the main pri-
ority areas when the government allocated 100 million Nkr to functional geno-
mics research. This was the successful result of an unusually consensual and
broad initiative taken in 2000 by the national biology community –comprising
all universities, a number of public research institutes and some regional colle-
ges, and strongly supported by key players such as industry and the Biotechnol-
ogy Advisory Board. This initiative took its inspiration from the Swedish geno-
mics priority, and capitalized on the announcement in June 2000 that the hu-
man genome had been sequenced and the limitless opportunities that its
availability was seen to create for functional genomics and proteomics research.
The national plan for a new FUGE (‘Funksjonell GEnomforskning’) programme
was developed as a joint effort by all major research institutions, and coordina-
ted by the Research Council. The plan proposed an annual appropriation of 300
million Nkr in new resources. Despite its unusual scale within a Norwegian re-
search policy context, it was seen as realistic due to the establishment in 1998 of
a new source of research funds from the proceeds of the Government Petroleum
Fund. The emergence of biotechnology as a political priority was seen as com-
patible with, and as an extension of, existing science policy priorities by the fact
that the main priority areas within FUGE are basic biotechnology research and
applied research in medical and marine fields. Although FUGE was ‘only’ allo-
cated 100 mill Nkr in 2002, it was a major political success. It was not only one
of the largest Norwegian research programme ever but had also been establis-
hed within less than one year after originally proposed.
The FUGE initiative triggered several other initiatives. A conference on ‘The
Biotechnology Society’ was held on 6 June 2001, where the Prime Minister was
a keynote speaker. His speech was published that same day as a feature article in
Aftenposten, one of Norway´s largest newspapers.
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The FUGE programme, and the biotechnology priority of which it forms the
nucleus, may then be seen as marking a watershed for Norwegian biotechno-
logical R&D. Biotechnology regained the political prominence it lost with the
disbanding of the main target research areas in the early 90s. FUGE represents
a major injection of new funds for genetic research, and provided a basis and a
framework for the coordination and consolidation of key research, industrial
and financial interests for promoting the new technology and its commercial
opportunities. However, as in the 1980s, the events of the last couple of years
echo key characteristics of earlier biotechnology policy. There is still a depen-
dence on initiatives from the research community rather than industry, indica-
ting the low level of commercial activity in Norwegian biotechnology. Hence
support and initiative from public, governmental players such as the Research
Council remain as crucial as was the case in the 1980s.
ELSA research
As a formal requirement of the Government, research on ethical, legal and so-
cial aspects (ELSA) of biotechnology became an integral part of the FUGE pro-
gramme which commenced in 2002. ELSA research had been emphasized in the
1998 governmental action plan on biotechnology, and a separate ‘Biotechnol-
ogy, ethics and society’-programme was already under way in 2001 as part of the
biotechnology programme of the Council. As a consequence of the FUGE ap-
propriation in 2002 and its ELSA requirement, this programme was postponed
to allow for the two programmes/sources of funds for ELSA research to be co-
ordinated.
GM salmon
Genetic modification of salmon still remains a sensitive issue in Norwegian de-
bate concerning the role of biotechnology in R&D and industry. It is established
Norwegian policy that Norwegian aquaculture will not take up genetic modifi-
cation of salmon as such, a basic realisation of the aquaculture industry being
that consumers do not want GM salmon. This policy is partly a result of the
events in the mid-1980s, referred to earlier, when the news about the experi-
ments with injecting the gene for the human growth hormone into the genome
of the salmon triggered a public uproar. However, concerns have been raised
that less cautious players in countries such as Canada, Chile and Cuba may be
overtaking what is seen as the competitive advantage of Norwegian salmon aqu-
aculture, being less hesitant to experiment with genetic modification of the sal-
mon genome. In the event that consumer attitudes may change in the future, a
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market for commercial GM salmon could arise for which the Norwegian sal-
mon aquaculture industry will be unprepared. As the Norwegian salmon pro-
duction based on more traditional breeding techniques will emerge as less cost-
effective than GM salmon, one of the most important Norwegian export indus-
tries may become jeopardized. Although the policy that GM salmon will not be
developed by Norway is not directly challenged, there are concerns that a re-
strictive policy even in research may make Norway unprepared for the possible,
even probable, consumer acceptance of GM salmon in the future. In addition,
there are many uses of genome research and GM techniques in aquaculture for
optimizing traditional breeding techniques, and for producing fodder and
medicines. Other than the genetic modifycation of the fish itself these options
provide the justification and basis for a major research project funded by the
Research Council to the tune of 45 million Nkr for mapping the genome of the
salmon. The project thus performs a careful balancing act, expressly respecting,
but implicitly challenging established restrictive policy. On the one hand it
denies that modification of the commercial product is an option – ‘at the pre-
sent moment’, while at the same time a preparedness is being built up for the
possible scenario that GM salmon may be accepted by consumers in the not too
distant future.
The Research Council of Norway
While the Research Council of Norway cannot lay claim to all credit for biotech-
nology having re-emerged as a high-level science policy priority, it played an es-
sential role as coordinator of initiatives and provider of a policy frame that has
been successful in mobilizing political support. The single research council that
emerged in 1993 from the merger of the five earlier councils is more than a re-
search council as conventionally defined. Its role in market-near, commercial
R&D activities is considerable.
The 1993 White Paper on research policy indicated a fundamental re-assess-
ment of prevailing science policy approaches, advocating a shift towards inno-
vation policy in line with conceptions that were being developed at that time
within the OECD (Miettinen, 2002). Coinciding with the research council re-
organization, these shifts in policy could be seen as spelling out a template for
the Research Council to assume a vanguard role in developing and promoting
the new policy framework. However, the first years of the Council as a united
organization were troubled: strong conflicts arose on issues of internal gover-
nance, and budgets declined considerably during the first few years of its exis-
tence as a unified organization.
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Following a change of leadership in 1995, the mission of the Council as car-
rier and promoter of the new innovation policy crystallized towards the end of
the decade. By way of a successful political resuscitation of the classical ‘GERD
indicator’ of R&D policy, 50 the Council helped to establish increased funding
of R&D as the overarching goal of R&D policy, emphasizing Norway’s position
as a laggard in the developing ‘knowledge economy’. Within a five-year period
the gap between Norway and the OECD average in terms of the GDP indicator
was to be closed, – an extremely ambitious goal given the low average R&D in-
tensity of the strongly resource-based Norwegian economy (petroleum, fish).
The framework envisages a transition towards the knowledge-based economy
to replace the still prosperous, but waning, ’oil economy’. The Research Council
has been instrumental in establishing ‘the knowledge economy’ (OECD, 1995)
as a framework for Norwegian science and technology policy. Here, biotechnol-
ogy is framed as the new technology – after ICT – that will bring another wave
of radical technological innovation, and help us take a new leap towards the
knowledge-based economy. Initially, biotechnology played a somewhat sub-
dued role in these initiatives by the Council, but particularly through the FUGE
programme it regained its prominence as a science policy priority area in its
own right. Following repeated failures, efforts to become a vanguard ICT coun-
try have become increasingly half-hearted, the centrality of biotechnology has
increased, in particular as a consequence of the Council’s successful initiative to
establish marine R&D and industry as a main priority, and its promotion of bio-
technology as means to develop this traditionally strong Norwegian sector into
a knowledge-intensive industry.
The Research Council has consolidated its role as the embodiment and por-
trayer of the visions and strategies of the emergent knowledge-based economy.
It has done so by eliciting a self-representation of Norwegian science, and sci-
ence policy, as highly stagnant and laggard. Representations of the much stron-
ger performance of its Nordic neighbouring countries play a prominent role in
the articulation of these self-depreciatory discourses. These have been reflected,
amplified and cemented in the context of an evaluation in 2001 of the single, po-
werful Research Council of Norway by an international panel of renowned ex-
perts. Here, the key ingredients of the framework of the ‘new economy’ (includ-
ing the GERD indicator, the R&D intensity of industry, the role of large compa-
nies, the standard setting significance of Finland and Sweden, the resource-
based Norwegian industrial structure) was articulated into a coherent policy
50 I.e., R&D expenditure as percentage of total national Gross Domestic Product 
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narrative within which the Research Council should define its operational role
51. Thus, momentum was added to the frames, analyses and proposals that had
already been initiated and promoted by the Council itself for some years.
In recent years, however, the Council has been the victim of reductions in go-
vernment funding for industrial research, particularly since the advent of the
centre-right Government in October 2001. The Council was re-organized in
2003, after which its role as main, formal agency for providing science and tech-
nology policy advice to Government will be discontinued. Its promotion of an
active industrial role for the state in industrial policy and for targeted funding
of key technologies/applications does not sit comfortably with the present go-
vernment, dominated by the Conservatives, who prefer more indirect and gen-
eral policy measures in industry and in R&D policy.
Public opinion and civic society
From Eurobarometer surveys on public perception of biotechnology, Norway
has consistently emerged as a country in which expectations of biotechnology
are among the lowest in Europe. In 1999, for example, 32 percent of the respon-
dents were ‘optimists’ (i.e., supporting the claim that: ‘Biotechnology will im-
prove our way of life’), compared to the EU average of 41 percent. Further, 37
percent were pessimists, far higher than the EU average of 23 percent. The ‘ne-
gative majority’ (5 percent) in Norway of pessimists over optimists (omitting
the ‘undecided’- and ‘do not know’-responses) may be compared to the 1 per-
cent majority of pessimists in Denmark, and the majority of 11 percent of opti-
mists in Finland, for example (Hviid Nielsen et al., 2001: 246). The strongly
sceptical profile of Norwegian attitudes to biotechnology that has emerged from
these recent surveys, coincides with results from surveys undertaken in the early
1990s when the political process of passing the bio-/gene technology acts was
51 ‘[…] Norwegian GERD/GDP has stagnated since the mid-1980s, while that of the other major Nordic
countries has continued to rise, leaving the Norwegian economy as the least research-intensive by the
mid-1990s. The most striking feature […] is perhaps the way Finnish expenditure began to pull away
from the Norwegian at the end of the 1980s, pulling further ahead through the economic crisis [caused
by the collapse of the Soviet Union]. ….. Based on the other [Nordic] countries’ experience and national
development needs, the required trajectory for Norway could involve tracing out a Nordic development
path in R&D expenditures […] The first stage is to raise large companies’ investments in R&D towards
the Danish level. Given the Norwegian industrial structure, this will mean increasing the R&D intensity
of existing large companies but also building new ones. As industry becomes more research-intensive, it
makes sense to expand R&D expenditure in the higher education sector, as has been done in Finland, to
a level above the EU and OECD averages. We might think of the Swedish R&D investment as an ‘end-
game’, but one which will take a very long time to reach’ (Arnold et al., 2001).
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under way. These results have been interpreted as evidence of a strong match
between public opinion and the restrictive policy that has been adopted in Nor-
way. At the same time Norway has consistently scored above the European
average on knowledge. Thus, the Norwegian public perception of biotechnol-
ogy has been held forth as a case that belies the ‘deficit model’ assumption that
ignorance is the main predictor of scepticism.
As indicated above, ethical issues, and in particular those related to IVF, pre-
natal diagnostics and selective abortion, play a prominent role in Norwegian
biotechnology politics, indicating a central role for church organizations and
individuals associated with religious movements. The controversial issues re-
lated to the reproductive technologies that brought genetic technology onto the
agenda of the Storting in 1985–86 had primarily been debated between theolo-
gians and medical researchers during the early 1980s (Brekke, 1995). Hence,
theologians are active in public debate on biotechnology and many are mem-
bers of relevant committees such as the research ethics committees of medicine
and science, and the Biotechnology Advisory Board. Key members of relevant
committees may be selected for their combination of expert qualifications and
religious leanings. This applies, for example, to one former chairman of the Bio-
technology Advisory Board, re-nominated as expert representative of the Board
in 2000, and to the first chair of the Norwegian Board of Technology, who is
both a nuclear physicist and an active member of a lay religious movement.
We have already seen that The Biotechnology Advisory Board comprises re-
presentatives from the Norwegian Consumer Council, the Norwegian Associ-
ation of the Disabled, and Friends of the Earth. Environmental NGOs have been
intermittently engaged in biotechnology issues, mostly GM food and patent is-
sues. An important role has been played by ForUM (Forum for utvikling og miljø
– Forum for Development and Environment), an umbrella organization for
about 60 different NGOs ranging from all major environmental organizations
such as Friends of the Earth and anti-war and nuclear organizations, to Attac,
and aid, religious, and animals’ rights organizations. ForUM was established in
1992 as a continuation of the organization established in 1987 as a framework
for collaboration between the Government (Ministry of Environment and Mi-
nistry of Foreign Affairs, including Foreign Aid) and environmental NGOs, in
large part for preparing Norwegian participation in the 1992 Rio Conference.
ForUM is funded by the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. At one time ForUM had a working group on biotechnology patents
(now disbanded). Its statement during the public hearing on the first Bondevik
government’s proposal to veto the adoption of the EU directive on biotech pa-
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tents in Norwegian law was a major reference for several organizations, expres-
sing their general support to the statement by ForUM.
The Norwegian Board of Technology
A ‘Danish model’ Norwegian Board of Technology was established in 1998 at
the initiative of the Storting. The issue came up during a parliamentary debate
in 1996 on the government’s IT policy which was seen by many members of the
committee to be overly concerned only with industrial opportunities and pro-
gress at the expense of social and ethical aspects of IT. While the proposal met
with general support in the Storting, a convoluted birth history of the new insti-
tution ensued, initially due to a controversy over the institutional location of the
Board. Should the Board be an institution directly linked to the Storting, which
would amount to a structural innovation – and anomaly – in the political orga-
nization of Norway. Or was it to be an ‘independent’ governmental institution
on a par with several other governmental institutions performing their activities
at arm’s length from government? A conflict emerged as the Labour Govern-
ment sought to apply a generalized concept of technology assessment that
would be less committed to the Danish model and thus open for a solution un-
der the aegis of the Research Council of Norway. But a majority in the Storting
specifically emphasized aspects of lay participation and enhancing public deba-
te they saw as inherent in the ‘Danish model’. The controversy was temporarily
settled when the Centre Government took over in 1997 and a ‘Danish type’
agency was established in 1998 as an independent institution under the Mi-
nistry of Church, Education and Research. However, as a consequence of an in-
ternal discussion in the incoming Labour Government (2000–2001) about the
governmental organization of R&D policy and budgets, ministerial responsibil-
ity for preparing the decision to establish the Board was transferred from the
Ministry of Research to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The latter announ-
ced its intention to change the mandate, composition and geographical location
of the Board so that it would be redefined as a ‘forward looking’ and technology-
support agency rather than the stronghold for technology scepticism as the Mi-
nister of Trade and Industry regarded it. The ensuing conflict in which the
Board protested against what it saw as a ‘change of mission’ was not settled until
a new change of government took place late in 2001. A White Paper by the new
centre-right Government in March 2002 supported the Board, in particular in
its opposition to the proposal to relocate the institution from Oslo to the
Technical University of Trondheim. But the changes introduced by Labour Go-
vernment to the Board’s mandate (with an emphasis on opportunities and a for-
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ward looking approach, epitomized in a new role for the Board in ‘foresight’),
and the composition (more technologists) remained. These were now seen by
the Board as compatible with its basic mission, as restated in the 2002 White Pa-
per.
While the initial impetus for the establishment of the Board was a parliamen-
tary debate on IT policy, it established itself as an institutional stronghold for lay
or civic participation in Norwegian technology policy, despite the difficulties
caused by the controversies of 1997 and 2000. This was mainly achieved
through two lay technology conferences it co-organized together with the Bio-
technology Advisory Board on gene technology. These were the 2000 follow-up
conference on GM food, and the 2001 conference on stem cell research. Its sub-
sequent efforts to establish itself as a voice to be reckoned with in other techno-
logical domains (ICT, energy) seem to have met with less success, as have efforts
to establish regular links to the Storting. Thus, the long-term viability of the
Board does not yet seem to be ascertained.
Selected issues
All established issues in international debate about biotechnology are also pre-
sent in Norwegian debate, and phrased in much the same terms. However, the
revisions and modifications that take place regularly do not seem to depart sub-
stantially from the overall restrictive policy, the broad outline of which was put
in place more than a decade ago.
A process of review and revision of the Biotechnology Act is presently in its
final stages following a two-stage evaluation of the law by the Biotechnology
Advisory Board in 1998 and 2000. Although the law will be amended, following
the resolution in the Storting in 2003, no major changes in general policy can be
said to have taken place. There is a disagreement between the parties, reflecting
the general configuration of parties’ positions on biotechnology issues as well as
between members of the Biotechnology Advisory Board on research on fertili-
zed human uvula and on therapeutic cloning. The lay technology conference on
stem cell research in November 2001 supported research on fertilized eggs left
over from IV fertilization, but not therapeutic cloning. There have been split vo-
tes on both of these issues within the Biotechnology Advisory Board on several
occasions. The prohibition of both research on fertilized eggs and therapeutic
cloning is upheld in the new act. As a consequence of its opposition to stem cell
research on fertilized eggs, the Government has increased funding for adult
stem cell research in its budget.
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The provisional prohibition on xenotransplantation which came into force
in 2000 and applicable until 31.12.2002 was extended in May 2002 up to 2005.
This followed the more cautious position advocated by the minority faction of
a public commission which published a report on the issue in June 2001, and wi-
dely supported in the subsequent hearing process.
A new law on biobanks was passed by the Storting in October 2002. Yet again,
the main players were split on the emphasis on regulation and industrial opp-
ortunity. In the proposal submitted by the Government to the Storting, support
for industrial activity had been excluded as an explicit overall goal of the law,
leaving diagnosis, therapy, education and research. While it was acknowledged
that the law, as proposed and subsequently passed, will not necessarily hamper
industrial interests, the minority in the Storting, consisting of the members from
the Labour Party and the progressive party, saw the deletion of industrial activ-
ity from the overall goals of the regulation as part of a general restrictive bias of
the draft law. According to this minority, it exhibits ‘a strong regulation – al-
most an overregulation – of the relationship between biobanks and the indi-
vidual, while the relationship between biobanks and societal interests [elsewhe-
re explicated as ‘societal interests, including industrial activities [(næringsutvik-
ling)] is weakly regulated – amounting almost to an under-regulation’ (Innst.O.
nr 52 (2002–2003)).
Norwegian restrictive policy on issues such as the release of GMOs remains
in place. Revisions of EU directives have gradually moved closer to already well-
established Norwegian policy. The EU directive 98/81/EF on contained use of
GMOs was passed as a routine issue, since the new, more restrictive regulative
was seen to approach that of existing Norwegian Law, while – being a minimum
directive – still allowing for more strict national regulation. The new regulative
2001/18/EF on the deliberate release of GMO, the implementation of which is
still pending, raises more serious concerns. While continuing the trend that EU
policy approaches that of Norway by incorporating the precautionary principle,
and emphasizing openness and public participation, the new regulative requires
total harmonization of policies in EU and EEA countries, and may not allow the
application of the additional criteria of social utility, sustainability and ethics in
regulatory practice.
GM food
The restrictive Norwegian regulatory policy concerning the approval of com-
mercial GMOs, is partly based upon the stipulations in the Gene Technology
Act that products shall meet with the requirements of social utility, ethics and
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sustainability. No GM food products are approved in Norway, and no applica-
tion is presently pending, all submitted applications having been withdrawn.
The GM food issue was amplified as an issue of public debate through its se-
lection as the topic of the first experiment in 1996 with lay technology assess-
ment conferences on the Danish model. Pre-dating the establishment of the
Board of Technology in 1998, it was organized as a joint effort by the three re-
search ethics committees and the Norwegian Biotechnology Advisory Board.
The statement by the lay panel fully supported established Norwegian regulato-
ry policy emphasizing the importance and the need to specify social utility and
sustainable development as additional criteria for the approval of GM products.
A follow-up technology assessment conference on the same issue was held in
2000 with the same panel as in 1996. The organizers of this conference were the
Board of Technology and the Biotechnology Advisory Board. One of the issues
that was strongly focused was whether Norway should adopt a formal morato-
rium on the approval of GM products, a position that had recently been suppor-
ted by a majority of the Central Committee of the Labour Party. The support by
the lay panel to the moratorium was a major part of its statement. Another core
issue of the conference was GM food safety. A committee appointed by the Mi-
nistry of Health had discussed this issue extensively in a recently published re-
port, addressing in particular the applicability of the precautionary principle as
defined by EU communication on the principle that had recently been publis-
hed. The restrictive criteria for applying the principle that the committee advo-
cated, and strongly opposed by one of its members, met with scepticism by the
lay panel which also emphasized that assessment of risk must be combined with
assessment of utility. The Norwegian stakes of the GM food issue were spelled
out by the Minister of Health, namely that the restrictive Norwegian policy
must not be perceived as a trade barrier which might result in other countries
introducing countermeasures to Norwegian fish exports.
The EU directive on biotechnological patents
The biotech patent issue, i.e. the adoption in the EEA agreement involving the
EU and EFTA countries of EU directive 98/44/EF on ‘the legal protection of bi-
otechnological inventions’, stands out as the biotechnology issue on which the
survival of two minority Governments has been at stake within the last 4 or 5
years. The issue has been a latent, contentious issue since the late 1980s, retur-
ning from time to time on the Norwegian political agenda, largely due to its rai-
sing fundamental issues about Norway´s relationship to the EU. A national
consensus on a – predictably – restrictive biotechnological patents policy, rejec-
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ting the patenting of plants and animals, had been established in 1989–1990 on
the basis of assessments and proposals presented in a separate report from 1989
by the Biotechnology Commission specifically on this issue (NOU 1989).
However, under the EEA agreement which came into effect in 1994, the EFTA
countries would have to adopt a large number of EU directives. While there is a
formal right under the agreement to veto the adoption of directives in national
law, the actual use of that right is at the risk of triggering penalizing counterme-
asures by the EU Commission. The biotechnology patent directive issue soon
became a symbol of the consequences of such an agreement in terms of loss of
national independence. Here, a policy on what for several political parties is a
highly important issue would have to be adopted on formal grounds, although
it was expected to go starkly against national, consensual policy. The biotech-
nology patent directive has eventually become the single issue which most
strongly puts to the test the reality of the veto option under the EEA agreement,
and hence the EEA agreement as such as a viable alternative to full membership
of the EU.
Following the agreement in the EU Parliament and the Council of Ministers
in June 1998 on the final text of the directive, the first Bondevik centre Govern-
ment signalled in 1999 that it would propose that the veto option should (final-
ly) be used in this case, and that the government would resign should the Stor-
ting reject its proposal to do so. The formal proposal on the issue was not,
however, presented to the Storting until January 2003. In the meantime, the
centre Government had been replaced, first by a Labour Government (March
2000 – October 2001), and a new centre-right Government (October 2001 –
currently in office), a minority coalition between the Conservative, the Liberal
(Venstre) and Christian Democratic parties. The Conservatives are in a domi-
nant position, holding 10 of 19 ministerial positions. These parties strongly dis-
agree both on EU policy in general and on the biotechnology directive issue in
particular. In negotiating the platform for collaboration, the coalition parties
merely ‘agreed to disagree’ on the issue.
When the new minority Government finalized its proposal to the Storting to
approve the adoption of the directive in national law, the nine Ministers from
Liberal (Venstre) and Christian Democratic parties – the Prime Minister in-
cluded, made it publicly known that they had opposed the proposal, and lost, in
the internal vote within the government on the issue. In support of their mino-
rity vote the minority faction within the government protocolled, its emphasis
on ‘the ethical counterarguments against the extensive access granted by the di-
rective to patent living material, plants and animals, on concerns for biodiver-
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sity and for the developing countries and their exploitation of their own genetic
resources’ (St.prp. 43 (2003–2004): 90). When the issue was put to the vote in
the Storting in January 2003, the parliamentary members of these two parties
voted against the proposition, as did the members of the Centre and Socialist
Left parties.
While the Storting approved that the directive be adopted in to national pa-
tent law, the decision is far more than a simple ‘yes’ decision. The formal decis-
ion to include the directive in the EEA agreement is embedded in an extensive
and complex set of modifying and follow-up measures, introduced to ensure a
‘restrictive’ practice within the discretion allowed by the directive for its imple-
mentation in national law. This includes guidelines to ensure a restrictive prac-
tice concerning where to draw the line between discovery and invention, to pre-
vent extensively broad patents, and to ensure a strict application of the criterion
of inventiveness. A key concern is to ensure that Norway may remain in a posi-
tion where it can credibly support the interests of developing countries in inter-
national negotiations on these issues. It also strongly supports the resolution of
November 2002 by the European Parliament, suggesting that the Commission
changes the wording of the directive to exclude the patentability of isolated ge-
nes and gene sequences of the human body.
Summary and conclusion
In summary, we can retrace some of the key features that may be seen to define
key aspects of the socio-political appropriation in Norway of the new biotech-
nology.
Comparatively speaking the history of biotechnology in Norway is one struc-
tured by paradoxes. It was initially characterised by the hegemony of R&D in-
terests, and the quasi-absence of any form of broader public debate and political
awareness of the controversial aspects of biotechnology. The issues raised were
dealt with within a minimal regulatory framework, based on self-governance by
the research community and as part of R&D policy only. Until the latter part of
the 1980s, risk and ethics issues attracted little general political attention. Bio-
technology emerged at that time as a R&D policy priority without debate on any
aspects other than its research and commercial opportunities, and with relati-
vely little political attention or support outside the research policy community.
When biotechnology became a public issue, it was through the parliamentary
process rather than through general public concern and debate, as the potenti-
ally controversial uses of biotechnology were drawn into parliamentary debates
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on abortion and IVF issues in the mid-1980s. Issues of ethics rather than risk
became the initial predominant frame for phrasing the political stakes of the
new biotechnology. Risk and IPR issues became grafted onto this process as the
international agenda, in the EU in particular, for the creation of a regulatory
framework for gene technology had to be taken up in the national political pro-
cess.
However, the incident in 1985 and the public outcry over the news of the
growth hormone-enhanced salmon indicated a strong, latent public scepticism
towards the new genetic techniques. Henceforth, the rejection by consumers of
GM salmon in particular, a key Norwegian export industry, and GM food in
general, became a dogma of Norwegian policy for aquaculture/food produc-
tion, confirmed by subsequent periodic surveys of public opinion on the issue.
Several characteristics of ‘Norwegian style’ mediation of all the different, and
conflictual, concerns and expectations aroused by modern biotechnology may
be related to the conditions defined by the structure and present performance
of the Norwegian economy. These mediation processes may thus be seen to take
place under conditions of comparatively lower economic stakes and weaker
R&D and commercial pressure than in most other countries. The prosperous
Norwegian economy based upon abundant income from oil and gas production
takes the edge off the sense of economic urgency of seeking competitive advan-
tage in the core areas of the ‘new economy’. At the same time, given the general
industrial structure of Norwegian economy, the voice of the industrial interests
is relatively weak. In Nordic terms, the private biotechnology sector in Norway
is very small, essentially due to the absence of research-intensive pharmaceuti-
cal industry in Norway.
This relative weakness of R&D interests became evident as the virtually all-
dominant R&D frames in discourse on biotechnology of the first half of the
1980s were politically overshadowed and marginalised with increasing con-
cerns in the political process in the late 1980s in Parliament, first with ethical,
and later with environmental issues. This led to the establishment and instituti-
onalization of a highly restrictive regulatory policy for biotechnology during the
first half of the 1990s. Here, ethics played a central role in framing the acts. Cri-
teria of human rights, social utility and sustainability were more or less explicit-
ly written into the act, and also as part of the criteria for case-by-case approval
of biotechnological research projects, services and products.
Party politics and the political process in the the Storting have played a strong
role in making biotechnology issues politically salient due to party configura-
tions in which the Christian Democrat party is in a key strategic role for estab-
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lishing viable government coalitions. The strong emphasis of this party on et-
hics in general, and on abortion, IVF, eugenics and other ethics issues pertai-
ning to biotechnology in particular, has been instrumental in raising the general
political stakes of biotechnology issues. The complex and unpredictable polit-
ical conditions, characterised by minority governments and unstable party pol-
itical alliances that have prevailed in Norwegian politics throughout the whole
period during which biotechnology politics have become a central policy do-
main, may thus be seen to have pervasively impregnated Norwegian politics of
biotechnology.
A strengthening of R&D interests in biotechnology took place in the latter
part of the 1990s, following the consolidation of the Research Council of Nor-
way as an increasingly influential voice for the promotion of innovation policy
and knowledge-intensive economy, and the emergence of coordinated industri-
al efforts to promote biotechnology (Biomarine Forum, Forum for Biotechnol-
ogy). These and other R&D interests capitalized on the opportunity presented
by the announcement of the mapping of the human genome, and succeeded in
securing– in Norwegian terms – a huge government appropriation for a new
genomics research programme. The FUGE programme was the result of a
successful exploitation of the publicity attracted by the announcement in 2001
of the mapping of the human genome, having crystallized an alliance between
the RCN and research institutions as well as industry and investor interests.
The conjunction of marine research and biotechnology since 2000 as de facto
priorities of R&D policy, and the definition of aquaculture as a future key in-
dustry for Norway, has made the issue of how to deal with gene technology in
salmon aquaculture a major policy issue. It has been a virtually uncontested
dogma of Norwegian policy within this domain that the public does not want
GM salmon, the genetic modification of the salmon itself has in official terms
been a non-issue. This position has become challenged by policies for GM re-
search phrased in terms of developing other uses of GMOs in aquaculture, but
also of competence building for modifying the genome of the salmon itself, in
case consumers may eventually change their opposition to GM food, and for
seeking patents on genes of the salmon bred in Norwegian aquaculture.
The RCN emerged in the late 1990s as an increasingly coherent and influen-
tial policy voice for R&D, and hence as a key site for promoting R&D and in-
dustrial interests in biotechnology. Its political impact seems, however, to have
decreased in recent years, as indicated by reductions in government funding for
industrial research, particularly since the advent of the centre-right Govern-
ment in October 2001, and a major re-organizing of the Council in 2003, after
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which its role as main, formal agency for providing science and technology po-
licy advice to Government will be discontinued.
Beside these R&D policy institutions and processes is another institutional
cluster, mainly based in regulatory and/or advisory functions. It comprises the
research ethics committees, the Technology Board and above all, when talking
about biotechnology, The Norwegian Biotechnology Advisory Board. Except
for the recently established Board of Technology, which performs no regulatory
tasks, they operate within a regulatory framework which has remained largely
stable for more than a decade, both in terms of policy and institutional structu-
re. The Biotechnology Advisory Board plays in particular holds in particular a
key position in Norwegian politics of biotechnology. Within the framework of
established regulatory policy, it is the major player for producing publicly and
politically credible ethics and policy discourses. Its debates, negotiations and
votes are extensively covered in the media, and their statements are extensively
used in the political process. It has established and retained its unique instituti-
onal identity as a hybrid, independent institution, operating at arm’s length to
any one party in the debate. It is extensively engaged in activities to enhance
public understanding and debate about biotechnology. Thus, educational (in-
forming the public) and deliberative (stimulating public debate) functions are
grafted onto its regular role as expert, regulatory body. At the same time its cor-
poratist structure ensures that key stakeholders’ concerns are taken into acco-
unt in the policy process. In view of the broad range of stakeholder groups that
are represented in the Board, it may be seen to operate on the basis of a kind of
‘inclusive corporatism’, seen as a distinctive feature of consultative procedures
in the Norwegian political culture (Dryzek, 2000). In addition, as the procee-
dings of the Board are public, it may be seen as an arena for public debate in it-
self, providing a sufficiently broad framework and credible standards for deba-
ting biotechnology issues to secure a key role for its input to public debate and
to the political process
Thus, the Board embraces to a considerable extent deliberative and partici-
patory forms of governance, although these are embedded in a corporatist insti-
tutional structure, and closely associated with an educational approach to pub-
lic understanding and debate. These components are sufficiently extensive to le-
ave restricted scope for the Board of Technology, whose main or sole purpose is
to facilitate and enhance inputs from broader publics to technology assessment,
to assume an active role on its own in biotechnology. After some initial success-
ful projects, some of which were in biotechnology and then in cooperation with
the Advisory Board of Technology, the Technology Board remains a compara-
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tively marginal player, and its role in the longer term in the structure of technol-
ogy policy still unsettled.
The three committees for research ethics that were established in 1989 may
also be seen as part of this institutional cluster, on the basis of their obligation
to stimulate public debate on research ethics issues. The committee for science
and technology became very early a strong supporter of new forms of technol-
ogy assessment, and played a key role in the process that led to the establish-
ment of the Board of Technology.
Contemporary Norwegian biotechnology politics may thus be seen as in a
process of (moderate) polarization, taking place within a bifurcated institutio-
nal structure of science and technology policy. There is, on the one hand, a well-
established regulatory framework, set up to implement and develop an overall
restrictive regulatory policy that has remained stable for more than a decade.
Within this domain, lay participation, public debate and deliberative practices
are integral and increasingly more extensive parts of normal procedure. On the
other hand, a process of coordination and consolidation of pro-biotechnology
interests has taken place, leading not only to the revitalisation of policies for bio-
technology R&D and innovation, but also to new offensives that challenge parts
of established regulatory policy.
The political process by which the Board of Technology was established is
one indication of the increasingly polarized and bifurcated character of the po-
litics of (bio)technology on the contemporary Norwegian scene. The outcome
that was negotiated within a protracted and conflictual process that spanned al-
most six years, may be seen as a relative ‘victory’ for the critical voices over the
promotional, and thus as another indication of the hegemony of this voice in
Norwegian biotechnology, and science and technology, policy.
The recent adoption of the European directive on the protection of biotech-
nological inventions on the other hand, is a relative ‘victory’ for promoters of
R&D and the ‘new economy’. Nevertheless, traces of entrenched restrictive bio-
technology policy remain in this decision as well, as the foreseen negative con-
sequences of the adoption of the regulative, as argued by its opponents, were ta-
ken into account by incorporating a large number of counteracting and modi-
fying measures into the decision. Thus, government adopts the directive,
mainly in terms of complying with the request of national industry for equal
competitive terms, while – in apparent contradiction to this – simultaneously
taking the arguments of the critics on board by laying down rules for ‘the most
restrictive practice in Europe’ for granting biotechnology patents.
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Contrary to appearance, the decision may not only be an effect of stronger
influence of R&D interests. Equally as important may be the fact that this issue
is firmly embedded in the more general and highly politicized issue of Norway’s
difficult relationship to the European Union, as mainly defined by the EEA
agreement. The patent directive issue became the ultimate test issue, as EU po-
licy here was seen to diverge from Norwegian to such a high degree that a veto
would finally be justified. The final positions of the parties reflect primarily their
positions in the membership issue, rather than their views on the substantive is-
sues raised by the directive as such. So the decision may as much be seen as a
victory of the ‘pro-membership’ majority in Parliament, and not necessarily as
a result of stronger influence from R&D and industrial interests on biotechnol-
ogy policy.
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Actors, Issues and Tendencies in 
Swedish Biotechnology
Thomas Achen
A short politico-legal history of Swedish gene 
technology
Gene technology and environment
As early as 1981, the Swedish Committee on Gene Ethics started its work on
biotechnology and humans, and in 1990, the Committee on Gene Technology,
Environment and Safety began its work. The final legal acts resulting from these
committees were promulgated in 1992 and 1994, respectively.
In 1992, the Committee on Gene Technology, Environment and Safety
(Genteknikberedningen) published a report entitled ‘Gene Technology – a
Challenge’ (Genteknik – en utmaning). The committee was commissioned to
focus, first of all, on the level and quality of knowledge in Swedish society regar-
ding assessment of ecological risks related to gene technology. Second, the com-
mittee should assess the ethical principles required to create normative regula-
tion of gene technology in relation to the environment. Third, the committee
should consider the structure and organization of the control system required
for authorization of various uses of, for instance, GMO in field trials. The com-
mittee should also address questions of intellectual property rights. The scope
of this report does not allow discussion of the latter issue.
Characteristic of this particular committee is that its focus was on the prob-
lem of knowledge in relation to gene technology. The report dealt with questions
such as: what do we know and what should we know more about? These ques-
tions, in turn, were linked to the principles one should apply in assessing extant
and future knowledge in this field. This strong emphasis on knowledge renders
this committee report unique in a Nordic context, above all because ethical con-
cerns are perceived as epistemological problems. Thus, the Swedish committee
on gene technology and the environment has framed the analysis of genetic
technologies differently than have similar committees in Norway and Denmark.
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Another significant feature of the report should be mentioned. The commit-
tee argued that risk assessments regarding GMO are always influenced by vari-
ous normative references. The committee stressed that it constitutes a major de-
mocratic problem if such sets of norms are not made explicit. In other words,
the report wants citizens to know about the interests at stake. It is unusual in a
Nordic context to encounter a piece of law-drafting that explicitly emphasizes
the relation between power and knowledge as regards risk assessment of new
gene technologies.
However, even Denmark and Norway consider it pertinent to address the
collection, systematization, and application of new knowledge concerning the
consequences of introducing, for instance, GMO in different eco-systems.
What is unique to the Swedish context, however, is that the relation between the
generation of knowledge and the fundamental state of uncertainty as well as the
normative framing of scientific knowledge is presupposed to be a necessary
point of departure for future legal work.
On March 24 1994, the Swedish government presented a bill on gene tech-
nology and environment to the parliament52. The government emphasized the
importance of biotechnology with respect to the general development of the
Swedish economy. Furthermore, the government stressed the need for advan-
ced knowledge on gene technology as a basis for qualitative assessment of the
environmental and ethical problems associated with such technology. It is stri-
king that the government explicitly contradicted the committee’s suggestion
that various aspects of gene technology application should be included in extant
legislation, for instance, within the fields of forestry and agriculture. However,
the government argued that because the committee on environmental protecti-
on was simultaneously drafting new environmental legislation (i.e., miljöbal-
ken), based on the principle that environmental issues should not be included
in extant legislation, it would be more consistent to employ the same principles
also with respect to genetic technologies. Hence the government ignored the co-
unsel of the biotechnology committee on this important point. The legislation
on genetic technology was eventually included in the new environmental
protection act (miljöbalken). It should be noted that the government was in
agreement with the committee on the notion that a new gene technology advis-
ory board should be founded.
By the end of May 1994, the bill was handed over to the Parliamentary Com-
mittee on Agriculture (jordbruksutskottet). No major changes were undertaken
52 Riksdagens snabbprotokoll 1993/94:116 Torsdagen den 2 juni 1994, p.4 column 1.
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and the agriculture committee generally approved of the government's tighte-
ning of the legislation (i.e., relative to suggestions from the preparatory com-
mittee). Finally, on June 2, 1994, the bill was debated in and subsequently ap-
proved by the parliament53. Many of the discussants criticized the fact that the
government had chosen to ‘design’ the bill as a frame-law. The risk of incohe-
rent legal interpretations and the right of the government and the authorities to
issue regulations based on a general authorization as stipulated in the bill were
criticized. The government at that time was a Conservative – Moderate Party
and Centre Party– coalition government, and the Social Democratic Party was
particularly critical of the bill. This criticism was tied to the fact that it was a So-
cial Democratic government that, in 1990, appointed the committee on gene
technology, environment and safety. Later this change of government proved to
be an obstacle even to the new environmental legislation (miljöbalken), which
the Environmental Protection Committee (miljöskyddskommitén) was draf-
ting at that time54.
In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the political and
legislative history of Swedish biotechnology, I shall address the legislative work
on gene technology applied to humans.
Gene technology and genetic integrity
Within the past 20 years, Sweden has produced a number of experts' and go-
vernment reports dealing with the use of biotechnology in medicine. The Gene
Ethics Committee produced its first report entitled ‘Genetic Integrity’ in 1984.
A year later, the Committee on Insemination published a report entitled ‘Child-
ren through artificial procreation’. And in 1989, the final report on the unborn
child entitled ‘The Pregnant Women and the Foetus – Two Individuals’ was
published. Until October 25, 1990, when the government proposed a bill on the
use of gene technology on humans, the 1984 report provided the normative
guidelines for biotechnology and pregnancy55. As regards the political and le-
gislative history of Swedish biotechnology, the 1984 report is significant because
it shaped Swedish politics and legal regulation within the entire field of biotech-
nology in medicine. Therefore, let me address more explicitly this report and
the process of legislation it led to.
The Swedish government decided to appoint the gene ethics committee at its
meeting on February 19, 1981. The instructions to the committee stipulated that
53 The first draft was published in SOU 1993:27.
54 Regeringens proposition 1990/91:52 Om använding av genteknik på människan m.m.
55 SOU 1984:88 Appendix 1 p.226.
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the committee’s work should be complete by the end of 1982. However, the in-
structions regarding the committee's mission were so comprehensive that the
time limit proved to be unrealistic. The committee was supposed to examine the
ethical, humanitarian, and social issues related to the implementation and use
of genetic technology in medicine. It was required that the committee’s investi-
gations should result in a proposal for new legislation on genetic technology and
medicine56. Yet another reason for the delay was related to the fact that the
committee initiated an evaluation of not only Hybrid-DNA techniques (genetic
engineering would be the term used today), but also of diagnostic techniques.
The normative point of departure for the gene ethics committee was derived
from a number of documents such as the UN declaration on human rights, the
Helsinki declaration, statements made by the Vatican and the world council of
churches, UNESCO, as well as documents on ethical issues from various coun-
tries. The committee concluded that there was a profound consensus in all the
examined declarations and documents concerning what it means to be human
and, thus, what the concepts of human dignity and integrity entail. However,
the gene ethics committee argued that concrete norm formation is not solely a
question of assessing and considering facts. Norm formation, the committee ar-
gued, is constituted by normative concepts such as ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’, which
must be evaluated in the context of norms inherent in local worldviews, ideolo-
gies, and experiences57.
The committee eventually formulated 11 ethical norms, which, they argued,
should serve as the normative framework for future regulation of genetic tech-
nology in medicine. The committee developed this argument further by stating
that it might even be necessary to include a paragraph in the constitution regar-
ding protection of the human genome58. In the context of policy- and law-ma-
king in the field of genetic technology in the Nordic countries, this is the only
example of a constitutional proposal concerning protection of the human ge-
nome59. However, the gene- ethics committee eventually concluded that ethical
norms should not form part of the actual legislation in terms of positive law.
The main reason for the exclusion of ethical norms from the law as such was
56 Op.cit. Achen 1997 p.213.
57 Ibid. p.218. Op.cit. SOU 1984:88 p.193. The term constitution means ‘The instrument of government’
(regeringsformen).
58 There is, however, a source of inspiration in the corresponding French legislation. See Peter Kemp,
Mette Lebech and Jacob Rendtorff (1997): Den bioetiske vending. Spektrum, p.136-155.
59 These bills where: ‘Lag om användandet av genetik vid allmänna häloundersökningar’, ‘lag om forskning
på på och behandling av befruktade männskliga ägg’ samt lagen om ‘förändrat tillsyn med personalen
inom sjukvården’. 
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that if ethical norms such as vulnerability or integrity were introduced into the
legislation, those norms would no longer be adjustable. An alternative solution
was suggested in which these norms should be included in the ethical guidelines
already in operation for those persons and organizations involved in medical
applications of genetic technologies. It was suggested that the National Board of
Health and Welfare (socialstyrelsen) create these guidelines.
In 1990, the Swedish government proposed three bills based on the commit-
tee report60. The government accepted without hesitation the ethical norms
proposed by the committee. However, at the same time the government clearly
announced that it wanted some of the guiding norms, suggested by the commit-
tee, included in the legislation itself. The National Board of Health and Welfare
should be in charge of other normative matters, ensuring that they are incorpo-
rated into the board’s ethical guidance to hospitals, physicians, and other rele-
vant groups.
With respect to the use of germ-line therapy the government considered
such therapy ethically unacceptable. The government was less liberal than the
committee, which had actually suggested that germ-line therapy have potential
for use in the future61. Another area in which the government had a more re-
strictive attitude than did the gene ethics committee was with respect to re-
search on fertilized human eggs. The committee suggested that limitations in
this area should only be expressed by means of the above-mentioned ethical
norms and not by positive law. The government, however, wanted restrictions
regarding research on fertilized human eggs to be stated in and regulated by
positive law. On February 5, 1991, a bill was handed over from the government
to the Parliamentary Committee on Social Affairs62.
The Parliamentary Committee on Social Affairs had requested, on a number
of occasions, comprehensive legislation on genetic technology (including the
environment and genetic technology in medicine). The government agreed
with the committee as to the need for such comprehensive legislation. However,
the government argued that, because technological development in the area of
genetics is so rapid, any further delay of legislation in this field would be un-
acceptable. Hence, despite the fact that most political parties, including the go-
vernment, would prefer comprehensive legislation, the pressure to produce a
regulatory framework forced the government to refrain from a prolonged pro-
60 The issue at stake is the discussion of therapy that aims at enhancement vis-à-vis therapy intended to
cure diseases.  
61 Op.cit. Achen 1997 p.222-223.
62 Stefan Rubenson (2000) Miljöbalken – Den nya miljörätten. Nordstedts Juridik. p.17.
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cess of law-drafting work. The majority of the parliamentary committee even-
tually agreed with the government’s reasoning regarding the need for a swift le-
gislation process. However, the opposition represented by the Centre Party, the
Left Party, and the Christian Democratic Party all expressed firm criticism con-
cerning what they saw as the compartmentalization or disintegration of genetic
legislation.
As mentioned above, a comprehensive legal framework on the environment
was promulgated in Sweden in 1998. This new environmental protection act
(miljöbalk) is important to address here, as it contains an important chapter on
GMO. I shall address this act in the following section by accounting for the pol-
itical process that led to the completion of this new legal framework.
The 1999 Environmental Protection Act
In 1993, the Committee on Environmental Protection appointed by the conser-
vative government in 1991 published its report. The main part of this work was
a suggestion for comprehensive environmental legislation. Technically speak-
ing, the new legislation suggested by the committee aimed at integrating 15 pre-
viously autonomous laws on various aspects of environmental protection63. Be-
sides this integration of extant laws, the new environmental law introduced the
precautionary principle as the guiding norm for all regulation of the environ-
ment. Second, the law introduced a number of goals regarding the quality of wa-
ter, soil, air, and so on.
Based on the committee recommendations, the government proposed a bill
on a new environmental protection act to the parliament in 1993. However, the
conservative-led coalition government resigned after the general election in
1994, and Sweden again had a Social Democratic government. This was import-
ant for the legislative work, as the new government did not approve of the bill
presented to the parliament by the former conservative government. Therefore,
on November 24, 1994, the new Social Democratic government re-started the
process of creating a proposal concerning new and comprehensive legislation
on environmental protection64. On July 4, 1996, the environmental protection
committee presented a report on what was called «strengthened and co-ordina-
ted environmental legislation for sustainable development«65. Eventually, on
63 Dir. 1994:134 Tilläggsdirektiv om nytt förslag till miljöbalk. 
64 SOU 1996:103 Miljöbalken – en skärpt och samordnad miljölagstiftning för en hållbar utveckling. 
Del 1 & 2.
65 SFS 1998:808 Miljöbalken. 13 kap. §§ 1 & 10.
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December 4, 1997, the government turned over a bill to the parliament. This bill
was accepted by the parliament and came into effect on January 1, 1999.
In the context of the present survey report, Chapters 2 and 13 of the environ-
mental protection act are of special interest.
Chapter 13 is on gene technology, and the paragraphs are more or less direct-
ly copied from the 1994 legislation on biotechnology and environment, which I
discussed above. One significant feature of the environmental protection act on
GMO is that §1 clearly states that ethical considerations should be applied both
in the case of confined use of GMO and in the case of deliberate releases of
GMO into the environment. This provision is elaborated somewhat in §10,
which states that ethical considerations should be applied also when GMO is re-
leased onto the marked66. The provision regarding ethical considerations in the
environmental protection act is applied even with respect to obtaining authori-
zation and in relation to the duty of notification whenever someone wishes to
release GMO into the environment or introduce GMO products onto the mar-
ket67. The Gene Technology Advisory Board (GTAB) is briefly mentioned in
§19. This paragraph defines the right of the government to regulate the mission,
organization, and procedures of the GTAB68.
Chapter 2 § 2 of the environmental protection act stipulates that anyone in-
tending to undertake any kind of business or activity that affects the environ-
ment must obtain the knowledge needed to enable application of relevant pre-
cautions for health and the environment69. Similarly, § 3 stipulates that the best
available technology should always be applied. As regards the field of gene tech-
nology, this means that violation of the legal regulation of the use and trade of
GMO or an insufficient risk assessment cannot be excused with reference to
lack of knowledge.
The importance of obtaining and making use of appropriate knowledge is
one of the significant points in the Swedish environmental protection act. This
requirement is highly pertinent in relation to Chapter 13 on gene technology.
Even the requirements regarding the ethical considerations expressed in Chap-
ter 13 are among the most celebrated characteristics of this new legislation.
66 Ibid. §12.
67 To a certain degree also Chapter 14 on chemical products and biotechnical organisms regulates the de-
velopment and application of GMO. 
68 Op.cit. SFS 1998:808. Chapter 2 deals with the general precautionary rules. 
69 It is interesting to note that the constitutional board (lagrådet) was very doubtful regarding the ethical
provisions in the environmental protection act. Prop. 1997/98:45 vol.2, p.480-482. The act is currently
being revised. However, there is no indication thus far that these issues have been dealt with. See SOU
2000:116 Uppföljning av miljöbalken - v–ssa lagtekniska frågor and SOU 2002:50 Miljöbalken under
utveckling – ett principbetänkande.  
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However, the implementation and legal status of these provisions are very inse-
cure. I have on several occasions discussed these issues with legal experts at the
Court of Appeal for the Environment (miljööverdomstolen) concerning the
ways in which they would interpret these ethical provisions. Their answers have
thus far been evasive70.
Potentials and Risks in Biotechnology
On October 16, 1997, the Swedish government sanctioned appointment by the
minister of education of a committee that should examine the potentials and
risks related to biotechnology. The committee was established on February 16,
1998, and called The Biotechnology Committee.
The reason for appointing this committee, I would argue, was that the go-
vernment had realized the significance of a new mode of knowledge production
conceptualized by Gibbons et al. as mode 2, which, as Gibbons et al. argued:
«…calls into question the adequacy of familiar knowledge producing institu-
tion»71.
According to Gibbons, the production of knowledge in mode 2 occurs when sci-
entific knowledge reaches the phase of application. Since the 1970s, the Swedish
biotech industry has moved with surprising speed from basic to applied re-
search. This development is well documented, e.g., in the report The Swedish
Biotechnology Innovation System published by Vinnova in 200172.
This is precisely what the biotechnology committee was aiming at in its re-
port73. The report’s emphasis on two interrelated major problems in Swedish
biotechnology policy, which are usually not highlighted, is most conspicuous:
70 Michael Gibbons et al. (1994) The New Production of Knowledge. Sage Publications, p.2.
71 Vinnova Innovation in Focus VF 2001/02.
72 The instructions to the committee are very comprehensive and complex. See Dir.1997:120.
73 SOU 2000:103 Att spränga gränser – bioteknikens möjligheter oh risker. P.13 & 14. Biopolitics denotes
a new area of politics and policymaking with the objective of defining, e.g., the social, legal, cultural, eco-
nomic, political, institutional and ethical dimensions of the governance of human and non-human genes
or products containing modified genes.
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1. The democratic problem: Citizens have insufficient opportunities to influence
the direction of technological development in society. The need for a dia-
logue among researchers, experts, politicians, and citizens is urgent.
2. The political problem: The ways in which Sweden handles biotechnology
administratively and in terms of legislation are characterized by
fragmentation. Sweden lacks a coherent overall and long-term biopolitics74.
These points are interesting, as they clarify a possible change in how science and
technology, according to the committee, should be governed in Sweden. This
report was the first in the politico-legal history of Swedish biotechnology to an-
nounce an urgent need for socio-political change in the governance of biotech-
nology in Sweden. The changes anticipated in the report could be interpreted as
a move towards a new kind of scientific citizenship75. Hence, the report may be
seen as the first sign of a new emerging governmentality in the field of science
and technology in Sweden76. It is governmentality concerned with the complex
ways in which science, technology, and society intersect.
The biotechnology committee provided a new framework for the entire field
of biotechnology by defining 21 issues that should be integrated into a novel
Swedish politics of biotechnology. However, the content of the majority of these
21 issues is not new. They deal with developing countries, the risk of a monopo-
ly situation on the market, the importance of patenting and commercialization
of university-based research, and so on. The novelty of these 21 suggestions is
related to the overall ambition to integrate these issues into a new and compre-
hensive biopolitics. Below, I shall give an account of issues one and two. In ad-
dition, I shall conclude this section by briefly discussing the prospects of apply-
ing the notion of national ‘styles’ of governance of biotechnology.
Issue 1: A New Biotechnology Authority
This issue deals with the organization of the Swedish authorities on gene tech-
nology. The committee argued that the present organization of the administra-
tive and institutional framework regarding gene technology is not transparent
and that a much higher degree of co-ordination between various issues, author-
ities, procedures, etc. is necessary. The committee suggested that in order to
74 Mark Elam and Margareta Bertilsson: Consuming, Engaging and Confronting Science – The Emerging
Dimensions of Scientific Citizenship. In Margareta Bertilsson (ed.): Science Governance: Problems and
Prospects. Sociologisk rapportserie no.6 2002, Köbenhavns Universitet.
75 I use the term governmentality in accordance with the theoretical framework developed in Mitchell
Dean (1999): Governmentality – Power and Rule in Modern Society. Sage Publications.
76 Op.cit. SOU 2000:103, p.31.
122    NIFU Rapport 2/2004
achieve such co-ordination, the GTAB should be transformed into a Gene
Technology Inspectorate (genteknikinspektion) 77. The committee is critical to
the fact that the present responsibility for biotechnology is divided between 14
different authorities. The new biotechnology inspectorate, however, should be
established on the basis of today’s biotechnology advisory board. Hence, the ob-
jectives and tasks of the board should be drastically expanded in order to fulfil
the need for stronger integration of the governance of gene technology78. The
committee argues:
The consequences of the present division of the control of biotechnology ap-
plications is that there are inconsistencies in risk assessment and in ethical
judgement depending on which authorities are carrying out these assess-
ments79.
According to the committee, this situation makes it difficult for politicians and
citizens to gain an overview of the field of biotechnology. The transformation of
the GTAB into a biotechnology inspectorate should focus, therefore, on new and
controversial applications of biotechnology. The old and established applicati-
ons of gene technology should be left explicitly to authorities in the respective
areas, such as agriculture, environment, fishery, and forestry. The committee
emphasized that the areas of responsibility of the new biotechnology inspecto-
rate should include:
Monitoring the application of advanced biotechnology. Consequently the
new authority will have the overarching responsibility for, e.g., xeno-trans-
plantations, gene therapy and cloning. Also, the inspectorate should be given
responsibility for all issues inherent in Chapter 13 (the regulation of release
of GMO into the environment, my italics) of the environmental act (miljö-
balken) as well as biotechnological organisms and biological pesticides…/../
…also illegal genetic tests, handling of information obtained from genetic
testing, artificial procreation, pre-implantation genetic diagnostics, bio-
banks80.
77 An increase of the budget from under 3 million SEK to 15-20 million SEK. Ibid. p.327.
78 Ibid. p.323-24.
79 Ibid. p.324.
80 Ibid. p.331.
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As can be seen from this quotation, the range of tasks assigned to the new bio-
technology inspectorate is broad and includes both human and non-human ap-
plications of genetic technologies. The all-inclusive tasks of the new gene tech-
nology inspectorate are likely to raise concern within the regulatory system re-
garding the line of demarcation between the new authority and extant
authorities charged with various regulatory tasks in the field.
Issue 2: A new Technology Assessment Board
By addressing the issue of technology assessment, the biotechnology committee
explicitly criticized the ‘democratic deficit’ in the Swedish governance of science
and technology. The biotechnology committee argued that:
The citizens have no opportunity to influence a development that can cer-
tainly have consequences for them as individuals as well as for society as a
whole; indeed it is a development that is potentially a question of life or de-
ath. This is a democratic problem81.
The committee stressed that it is of pivotal importance to remedy the democra-
tic deficit in the governance of science and technology, not only in the field of
biotechnology, but also within areas such as traffic, energy, and education. The
committee brought to the fore the fact that there is no institution or organizati-
on devoted to the assessment of technology in Sweden. Each authority is suppo-
sed to monitor and assess technological development in its own area of compe-
tence. Consequently, the committee argued in favour of adopting a similar mo-
del for technology assessment as that in operation in Denmark and Norway 82.
The committee seemed to implicitly criticize expert- and authority-based
technology assessment, which have been the predominant approaches in Swe-
den thus far. One example of this is the Technological Foresight processes in the
field of biology, in which gene technology plays a crucial part83. It is a significant
feature of technological foresight that the project group on biology and bio-
81 Ibid. p.335-336. It is interesting to note that the European technology assessment institutions are co-op-
erating within the European Parliament Technology Assessment in which Sweden does not have repre-
sentation at present. See Simon Joss and John Durant (eds.) (1995): Public Participation in Science.
Science Museum and European Commission Directorate General XLL. P.17-49.
82 The initiative to launch a process of technological foresight came from IVA and NUTEK/VINNOVA in
1997. The process was concluded by the end of the year 2000. See www.tekniskframsyn.nu
83 For a discussion of the significance of civil organizations, e.g. environmental organisations, see Andrew
Jamison (2001): The Making of Green Knowledge. Cambridge University Press. Also Andrew Jamison
& Brian Wynne: Sustainable Development and the Problem of Public Participation. In Andrew Jamison
(ed.) (1998): Technology Policy Meets the Public. Pesto Papers 2. Aalborg University Press. p.7-17.
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logical resources consists only of representatives of various biotech companies
as well as those of a number of specialized private and university-based research
institutions. This may create a particular and restricted science and technology
community due to the absence of citizens or civil organizations84. The formati-
on of such an expert community contradicts the argument of the biotechnology
committee that citizens must be given a decisive role in the governance of sci-
ence and technology.
These observations suggest an ambiguity in the Swedish case. This ambigui-
ty, I will suggest, is concerned with the co-existence of two tendencies regarding
the governance of biotechnology in Sweden. One kind of governmentality deri-
ves from ideas in which societal progress is considered identical to technological
innovation. The rationality inherent in this type of governmentality constitutes
innovation as a virtue in its own right85. The other kind of governmentality is sti-
mulated by a rationality that foregrounds the importance of Public Understand-
ing of Science and Technology86. The co-existence of these two tendencies, which
I shall call governmentalities, constitutes a troublesome ambiguity in the overall
Swedish governance of science and technology, which needs to be explored
further.
In concluding this section I would like to stress that the report published by
The Biotechnology Committee has not yet had any substantial impact on the
discussions and priorities in Swedish bio-politics. What we have seen thus far is
that a number of politicians have proposed motions in the Standing Parliamen-
tary Committee on Agriculture and Environment regarding regulation of food
and foodstuff. These propositions as well as the rejection of them by the majo-
rity have been accomplished with more or less explicit reference to the report
from The Biotechnology Committee. How should one account for this situ-
ation? It seems plausible that the environment-friendly part of the opposition,
e.g. the Centre Party, the Green Party and the Liberal Party, has tried to benefit
from the environment-friendly and consumer-oriented approach in the com-
mittee report, whereas the Government, on the other hand, has strived to find
ways to handle the radical suggestions and analyses concerning Swedish and
84 Op.cit. Elam & Bertilsson (2002), p.18-22.
85 Ibid. p.28-42. Elam and Bertilsson discuss the deliberative democratic transformation of the public un-
derstanding of science into a public engagement with science. See also Alan Irwin (1995) Citizen Science.
Routledge. p. 26-31. 
86 Andrew Jamison: Sweden: The Dilemmas of Polarization. In Andrew Jamison & Per Östby (eds.) (1997):
Public Participation and Sustainable Development – Comparing European Experiences. Pesto Papers 1.
Aalborg Universitetsforlag. p.15-43. And Andrew Jamison (1982): National Components of Scientific
Knowledge – A Contribution to the Social Theory of Science. Research Policy Institute. University of
Lund. p.165-195.
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international biopolitics presented in the report. Hence, we are still waiting for
a governmental answer to the report – an answer that might bring about an in-
teresting new approach to the overall Swedish governance of biotechnology.
Obviously, the controversial suggestions contained in the committee report
may also result in political silence on the part of the government.
National style of governance of biotechnology
The co-existence of different governmentalities in Sweden led us to ask whether
one could conceptualize this co-existence in terms of a national style of gover-
nance? In order to answer this question one would need a definition of the no-
tion of ‘national style’. Without pretending to conduct a full-scale analysis, I
would like to suggest, at this point, in what way the notion of ‘national style’ co-
uld be applied in this case. Andrew Jamison provided a definition that I think
could be utilized87. According to Jamison, the notion of ‘style’ contains four in-
terrelated levels: 1) metaphysical bias 2) national scientific interest 3) instituti-
onal structures and 4) scientific leadership88. The first level:
«…would be a reflection of certain metaphysical streams of thought that are
dominant in a particular country»89.
The questions raised at the first level are directed towards the fundamental «fig-
ures of thoughts», as Jamison puts it. On the second level the idea is that:
«…the metaphysical bias encourages certain areas of study rather than
others»90.
This in turn leads to an «identification of national scientific interests»91. Accor-
ding to Jamison, the third level, focusing on institutional structures, is actually
intermediate to ‘metaphysical bias’ and ‘national scientific interests’. This mid-
level can be identified when the first and the second level are «…brought toget-
87 Op.cit. Jamison (1982) p.187ff. Jamison´s model is developed from categories provided by Henry Brook-
man (1979): The Making of a Science Policy. Diss. Amsterdam.
88 Ibid Jamison (1982). p.189-190.
89 Ibid. p.190.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid. p.191.
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her into scientific knowledge»92. Finally, Jamison argued that, with regard to
scientific leadership on the fourth level, it:
«…is not so much leadership as relative prominence that will concern us;
what becomes interesting is the degree to which Sweden and Denmark, in
our case, can be said to be «successful» in the international arena, the degree
to which their «national styles» converge (my italics) with an internationally
dominant style»93.
What I would call the co-existence of two modes of governance in the field of
biotechnology in Sweden does qualify, to a certain extent, as a national style of
governance. On the level of metaphysical bias, the ambivalence of governance in
Swedish biotechnology can be traced back to a tension between ideas of ratio-
nalism, technocracy and centralism, on the one hand, and a democratic model
based on the ideal of deliberations and citizens' engagement, on the other. Re-
search in Swedish political history of ideas has shown that the rationalistic side
of this dualism has long been dominant94. Hence, the development of certain
areas of research has been shaped in accordance with these «figures of
thoughts». Large-scale, technically and scientifically advanced projects have
been the predominant model. The tension between this science-based rationa-
lism and the deliberative democratic idea of citizens' engagement has been pre-
sent in Swedish political life for decades. The initiation of huge scientific and
technically advanced projects is seen as a means by which democratic ideals can
be realized, thus enabling formation of the good life. In Sweden, the term ‘the art
of social engineering’ (social ingenjörskonst) captures this interdependence be-
tween political democracy and scientific/technological progress. As argued abo-
ve, the biotechnology committee has challenged this association of science,
technology and politics by arguing that contemporary governance of biotech-
nology lacks democratic involvement.
In terms of national scientific interest, Sweden has followed a path of de-
veloping large-scale research programmes in areas such as nuclear energy, bio-
92 Ibid. p.193.
93 See e.g. Yvonne Hirdman (1990): Att lägga livet till rätta – studier i svensk folkhemspolitik. Carlssons.
Sten O Karlsson (1993): Arbetarfamiljen och det nya hemmet. Symposion Graduale. One of the publi-
cations from the Committee on Swedish Democracy (Demokratiutredningen) is of interest here Le-
kmannastyre i experternas tid. SOU 1998:102. Demokratiutredningen, skrift nr.6. 
94 Within the framework of the Compass Project, I will conduct an in-depth study of the GTAB. This study
will include interviews with all members of the board as well as examinations and analysis of documents
produced by the GTAB. The objectives of this study were presented to the GTAB at its December meet-
ing 2002 in Stockholm, Sweden. 
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medicine, nanotechnology, information technology and biotechnology, all of
which have been identified as pertinent areas. This rationale has contributed to
the establishment of technological innovation as a virtue in its own right, while
at the same time evoking a democratic problem concerning the legitimacy of
these programmes in terms of public understanding and public involvement in
science and technology. When the metaphysical bias and the national scientific
interests are brought together into scientific knowledge, certain institutional
structures are called for. The process of structural formation should be compre-
hended in terms of a struggle between the actors who have scientific interests,
e.g. scientists, state agencies, politicians, universities, companies and interests
organisations. One such actor is the Swedish Gene Technology Advisory Board.
Finally, on the level of scientific leadership, the above-mentioned ambivalen-
ce could be taken as an indication that there is some degree of bewilderment as
to what ‘style’ of scientific leadership would be the most appropriate. The prob-
lem may be framed as follows. Swedish biotechnology has, through legislation
and through the political mandate given to various authorities, devoted itself to
striking a balance between two aims: a) Sweden should belong to the group of
nations most advanced in terms of science and technology and b) achieving this
should ideally involve a radical democratic approach. Now, the policies needed
to manoeuvre between these two considerations are notoriously difficult to
create. Hence, the categories used by Jamison to bring out the meaning of a ‘na-
tional style’ can help us to pinpoint various epistemological, structural and ide-
ological aspects that contribute to the ambiguity that characterizes the Swedish
appropriation of biotechnology.
In order to develop this suggestion further, I will examine this ambiguity
from yet another angle by discussing the Swedish Gene Technology Advisory
Board. The focus is here on the tasks assigned to GTAB and the way in which
GTAB has conceived of these assignments.
The Swedish Gene Technology Advisory 
Board95
In 1978, the Swedish minister of education appointed a special one-man inves-
tigation that should examine «…whether, and to what extent, the present legis-
lation is sufficient to control the research on hybrid-DNA»96. The conclusion of
95 DsU 1978:11 Hybrid-DNA tekniken under kontroll. p.3.
96 Ibid. p.157.
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the work of this investigator was twofold. First, it was concluded that new legis-
lation was needed and that it would have to be more rigorously than «…the or-
dinary control of laboratory techniques»97. Second, the investigator stated that
in order to carry out this rigorous legislation, there was an urgent need for for-
mation of a new authority, which should be responsible for the overall control
in the field of DNA technology98. Already in 1980, a committee on hybrid-DNA
issues was established. Until 1994, the committee on hybrid-DNA was the cen-
tral advisory body to the Swedish government; its mission included monitoring
technological development and informing the public as well as issuing licenses
for DNA-related research and production99.
As I mentioned above, a crucial point in the history of Swedish gene technol-
ogy politics was the establishment of the Committee on Gene Technology, En-
vironment and Safety (genteknikberedningen) in 1990. One of the conclusions
published in 1992 by that committee was that a new board on gene technology
should replace the former committee on hybrid-DNA. This suggestion eventu-
ally led to the inauguration of the GTAB on July 1, 1994.
With respect to the mandate of the new board, it is striking how very broad
it was, and that ethical issues were pinpointed as its main objectives. However, at
the same time it was expected that the new board should continue the work of
its predecessor, the hybrid-DNA committee. GTAB should consist of 16 mem-
bers of whom 5 members should be researchers, 5 should represent various au-
thorities, and 5 should be representatives of political parties represented in the
parliament. Finally, the committee suggested that the board should also include
one expert in the field of ethics. The committee explicitly pointed out that it is
not necessary to include members of social movements and non-governmental
organizations on the board.
Today the GTAB consists of 16 members of which 7 are members of political
parties represented in the parliament. Seven members are affiliated with re-
search units. Of the 7 researchers, 2 members work in the social sciences and the
humanities. Six members have been appointed by two of the major research
councils in Sweden100. It is mandatory that the chairman and the vice-chairman
97 Ibid. p.163. The wording control and DNA technology, etc., was the terminology used in the late 1970s. 
98 Op.cit. Achen 1997, p.182.
99 The Swedish Research Council (VR, Vetenskapsrådet) appoints 4 members of which 1 must be an ecol-
ogist and the Swedish Research Council for Environment, Agricultural Science and Spatial Planning
(FORMAS) appoints 2 members of which one must have experience in animal welfare. One member
must be an expert in ethical matters and is appointed by the government. For more details, see the mis-
sion of GTAB in SFS 1994:902.  
100 Op.cit. Elam and Bertilsson (2002), p.48.
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both be lawyers who have practised professionally as judges. Each term lasts for
3 years.
The construction of the public, in terms of ‘the citizen’, contains «all sections
of the national population at large /which should/ be directly represented in de-
liberations over major technological issues». Mark Elam and Margareta Bertils-
son elaborated on this argument by saying that the scientific citizen:
Participate[s] in the task of deciding what constitutes opportunities and ac-
ceptable risks in the carrying out of science-based new combinations. They
are members of collectivities that define and delimit themselves more com-
pletely by their capacity for producing and disseminating new types of useful
knowledge…/../…For citizens to identify themselves as ‘scientific citizens’
they will need to be persuaded to prize new rights and freedoms and to ac-
cept new duties and obligations101.
Citizens, according to this account, do not become scientific citizens all by
themselves. A strategy, or rather an interaction between the science-producing
bodies and the public, is needed. However, the outcome of this interaction is not
easy to anticipate, as the rights, freedoms, duties and obligations could all be in-
terpreted in ways contrary to what is desirable to or anticipated by the scientific
institutions. Hence, engaging in the creation of the scientific citizen involves a
certain risk of displaying the very problem of legitimacy that lies at the heart of
the concept of scientific citizenship.
Gustaf Brunius102 argued that the traditionally optimistic view on science
and technology in Sweden entered a new phase after the consultative referen-
dum on nuclear energy in 1980103. According to Brunius, the scepticism that in-
creasingly pervaded the Swedish science and technology discourse is detectable
in the current scepticism and anxiety regarding gene technology. When asked
about the prospects of using consensus conferences in order to remedy this
scepticism, Brunius pointed out that consensus conferences are not part of the
Swedish tradition, and that there is not much interest in introducing this type
101 Interview with head of GTAB secretariat Gustaf Brunius, May 30, 2002.
102 For a comprehensive discussion on political history on nuclear energy in Sweden see Jonas Anshelm
(2000): Mellan frälsning och domedag: om kärnkraftens politiska idéhistoria i Sverige 1945-1999. Sym-
posion. See also Dick Kasperowski and Aant Elzinga: Public Understanding of Science for Democracy,
some notes on the «Swedish Model”. In Reijo Miettinen (ed.) (1999): Biotechnology and Public Under-
standing of Science. Academy of Finland.
103 The integration is done through Förordning 2002:1086 om utsättning av genetisk modifierade organis-
mer i miljön issued by the ministry of the Environment.
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of deliberation into the Swedish governance of science and technology.
However, the GTAB actually hosted a consensus conference on October 14–15,
2000 dealing with the issue of genetic testing.
Brunius emphasized that the new EU directive 2001/18/EG on genetically
modified organisms (GMO), which came into effect on October 17, 2002 (re-
placing directive 90/220), might change the status of the public, when the direc-
tive is integrated in Swedish legislation104. The reason for this prediction is that
the new directive presupposes that the public should be assigned a more promi-
nent role in the assessment of risks associated with GMO´s. Depending on the
political interpretation and institutional framing of the new directive, Sweden
might experience a growing interest in including the voice of the public in
discussions of Swedish gene politics.
The notion of the public seems to be somewhat problematic for GTAB, as
mentioned above. As Brunius rhetorically asked: what is the public anyway?
And how can one distinguish between momentary fluctuations in public senti-
ments and more politically significant concerns regarding gene technology?105
Bearing in mind that the 1994 committee argued in favour of not including in-
terest groups and lay-people in the GTAB, it is important to note that even Bru-
nius argued in favour of this model of representation.
Brunius standpoint is based on a report submitted to the government in 1999
in which the biotechnology committee examined the tasks and composition of
the gene technology advisory board106. The biotechnology committee argued,
on the one hand, that it is obvious that a number of groups have a special inte-
rest in the work of the advisory board. These include, for instance, organizations
representing persons suffering from diseases such as haemophilia and cystic fi-
brosis as well as interest organizations representing farmers, fishermen, the
pharmaceutical industry and the food industry. On the other hand:
Different interests [it could be argued] need not be represented in the execu-
tive bodies of different authorities in order to obtain information. Further-
more, it is by no means evident that increased confidence is an end in itself
for the public control…/../…It can be ascertained that none of the author-
ities handling gene technology issues has any interest representation in its
executive body…/../…Neither in the Amsterdam treaty nor in the Århus
declaration has the question concerning interest representation in authorities
104 Interview with G. Brunius May 30 2002.
105 SOU 1999:70 Gentekniknämnden. p. 5.
106 Ibid. p.51. My  translation.
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been addressed. According to this committee, there is no reason to grant any
exemptions from these principles by allowing interest representation in the
Swedish Gene Technology Advisory Board107 (My italics).
The argument put forward at this point is twofold. First, that the production of
public confidence should not be interpreted as an end for the public control car-
ried out regarding gene technology. Second, because the absence of interest re-
presentation is legio, there are no particular reasons to integrate such represen-
tation into the gene technology advisory board.
The authorities’ efforts to control gene technology are explicitly separated
from the production of public confidence. However, the mission of the GTAB
clearly states that the GTAB shall «…inform the public about the development
within GTAB’s field of responsibility so as to maintain the public interest in et-
hical and safety questions while at the same time stimulating the public deba-
te»108. This key objective actually has a status similar to that of the objectives
dealing with pure control and monitoring of gene technology. The argument on
the part of the biotechnology committee, that public confidence should not be
an end for authorities carrying out control, seems to be based on a quite narrow
interpretation of the GTAB's mandate.
In strict administrative terms, the GTAB is just another part of the admini-
strative structure in the state apparatus. On the other hand, however, the GTAB
has been given a mission, which presupposes that it constitutes a specific link
between the state apparatus and the public. However, the biotechnology com-
mittee conveyed a narrow interpretation of the role of the GTAB, in the sense
that it downplayed the importance of addressing the issue of public involve-
ment in science and technology and the confidence gap between science and the
public.
Let me once again return to the arguments made by of the head of the secre-
tariat at GTAB, Gustaf Brunius. Brunius considered that the issue of informa-
tion to the public is problematic. He argued that information seems only to be
necessary or possible in some specific situations, for instance, if there is what he
calls a «window» to the public. The crux of the matter, according to Brunius, is
whether it is possible to verify and make use of such windows. One problem is
that different techniques create different patterns of reactions in the public. For
107 Op.cit. SFS 1994:902 2§.
108 The notion of reflexivity applied here is inspired by the way in which this concept is elaborated in Ulrich
Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash (1994): Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aes-
thetics in the Modern Social Order. Polity Press.   
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instance, xenotransplantation, radiation from mobile phones, GMO in foods-
tuff, and so on, create non-predictable reactions in the public. Brunius stressed
that it is difficult to determine what sub-groups of the public should be taken
into account when assessing and providing information on the implications of
a new technology.
In the contemporary discussion on public anxiousness and critique regar-
ding GMO, it is often argued that these reactions have a strong resemblance to
religiosity. This is an argument with which Brunius agrees. Interpreting public
reactions as having a religious character is tantamount to differentiating be-
tween a rational and an irrational response to gene technology. This argument
conveys the general confusion regarding how authorities such as the GTAB
should make sense of the normative grounds upon which organizations and in-
dividuals act. Objective information, science-based assessments and expert
knowledge are in this respect much easier to interpret in a way that can be re-
lated to the functional logic of contemporary gene politics.
However, if the notion of public confidence in gene technology is to be taken
into account, one needs to improve the ability of administrative and political
bodies in the field of gene technology to handle the complexities and antinomies
inherent in various public responses. To increase their ability to handle this
complexity, the institutional framework needs to be endowed with a new kind
of reflexive capacity109. A pertinent component of such a reflexive capacity is
the ability to understand the ways in which citizens interpret nature. Empirical
studies conducted in Sweden suggest that conceptions of what are legitimate or
illegitimate interventions in nature by means of gene technology depend on the
various worldviews people hold110.
One of the most important resources for monitoring people’s opinions and
worldviews is the Eurobarometer survey. The Eurobarometer survey was carri-
ed out in 1993, 1996, 1999 and most recently in 2002. In the section below, I will
present some preliminary analyses from the 2002 survey concerning public opi-
nion on biotechnology carried out by Torben Hviid Nielsen and colleagues at
Oslo University.
109 Susanne Lundin and Malin Ideland (eds.) (1997): Gene Technology and the Public – An Interdiscipli-
nary Perspective. Nordic Academic Press.  See also Carl Reinhold Bråkenhielm and Katarina Wester-
lund: Worldviews and Genetics. In Ibid. p.29ff. For an elaboration of the notion of ‘thick’ moral
argument see Michael Walzer (1994): Thick and Thin – Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Univer-
sity of Notre Dame Press.
110 The numbers indicates an opinion-balance and not percentage. See Torben Hviid Nielsen, Örnulf Seip-
pel and Trond Haug: Hva mener og vet nordmenn om bioteknologi? Noen resultater fra Eurobarometer
58.0 (2002). Center for Technology, Innovation and Culture, University of Oslo. Arbeidsnotat nr.20
mars 2003. Section IV. The authors point out that the Swedish figures in this case are not entirely reliable. 
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Eurobarometer Survey 2002
When asked about their expectations for biotechnology, Swedes have by far the
most positive expectations, and these have risen from just above 30 in 1996 to
just above 50 in 2002111. A relative increase in the level of expectations can be
seen in Norway and Denmark, as well as in the EU as a whole. It should be noted
that the expectation rate has been rising throughout the period 1996–2002 in
Sweden, whereas it has been rising in Norway, Denmark and the EU only from
1999 onwards. What we see in Sweden is, thus, a long period of uninterrupted
high expectations concerning the impact and future perspectives of biotechnol-
ogy.
Eurobarometer 2002 reveals a very striking pattern in the EU as regards the
relationship between expectations for biotechnology in relation to knowledge
about biotechnology. The general conclusion to be drawn from the Eurobaro-
meter survey is that there is no straightforward relationship between expecta-
tions and knowledge. In France, Holland and Sweden, expectations and know-
ledge are above average. However, in Norway, Finland, Denmark and the Uni-
ted Kingdom, expectations are below average while knowledge is above the
average level in Europe. The tentative conclusion to be drawn from these fin-
dings is that the relationship between expectations and knowledge, which has
previously been comprehended as linear, has become much more complex and
unpredictable112.
The way in which people interpret and comprehend biotechnology is heavily
influenced by how actors in the field of biotechnology behave. In section one
and two I provided a sketch of the politico-legal actors and the political and legal
norms they have created. In section three I provided some findings on what
Swedes, in comparison with the other Nordic countries and EU, expect from
biotechnology and what they know about this technology. The number of actors
involved in producing, distributing and implementing knowledge on biotech-
nology is of course much larger than those dealt with thus far. Hence, the rem-
inder of this paper will concentrate on providing an account of a number of ac-
tors dealing with, e.g., the financing and commercialization of biotechnology.
111 Ibid. section X.
112 Personal communication with project manager Anna Sandström at IVA 31/1 2003.
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Research councils and academies
Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA)
The Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences was founded in 1917 and
is the oldest engineering academy in the world. It consists of 700 members. The
members of the academy are professors in various scientific disciplines and
technology as well as industrialists. More than 90 % of the funding comes from
private donors and from various research-funding bodies such as VINNOVA
(see section 3.2). The academy receives only a very limited grant from the state.
As mentioned earlier, IVA has been one of the driving forces behind the
Swedish Technological Foresight project. Just before Christmas 2002, the pro-
ject Technological Foresight II was initiated. The Foresight project is partly fi-
nanced by VINNOVA113.
VINNOVA and IVA are also co-operating on a project on the Swedish bio-
tech industry. In this project, the issue of the ability of Swedish industry to ob-
tain patents in the US is explored and evaluated. The overall objective is to find
ways to stimulate Swedish biotech industry on an international market114.
From December 2002 to the end of 2004, IVA is conducting a project called
Science Generation. The objectives of this project are to identify and map atti-
tudes towards biotechnology. The project will take a closer look at ethical issues
related especially to aspects such as GMO and medical applications of gene
technology.
IVA can be seen as one of the important proponents of biotechnology, in
general, as well as of genetic engineering, in particular. This is not to say that
IVA ignores the ethical and ecological impacts of these technologies, but the
overall approach is one of technological optimism and a firm belief in the ne-
cessity of promoting the establishment of applied research in the field of bio-
technology.
One way for IVA to fulfil its mission to promote and develop Swedish engi-
neering and science is by hosting the Internet website www.genteknik.nu. This
website is one result of an earlier IVA project funded by, e.g., The Knut and Ali-
ce Wallenberg Foundation. A book was published concurrently with the laun-
ching of the website. Both the book and the website are directed towards young
people, with the aim of piquing their interest in gene technology.
113 Ibid.
114 Vinnova, årsredovisning 2001, p.1. These objectives are expressed also in the instructions from the gov-
ernment. See Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2002 avseende Verket för innovationssystem, m.m.
Näringsdepartementet 2001-12-20.
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This website was designed to create a sort of interactive encounter with gene
technology itself. The design conveys to the user a fascination regarding what
the technique can do and the anticipated expansion of the scope of this technol-
ogy in the future. The information is closely linked to ongoing research concer-
ning cures for various hereditary diseases, stem cell research, cloning, and gen-
etic modification of bacteria, plants and animals. As mentioned, it is very much
the technique as such that is in focus on this website, as well as in the above-
mentioned technological foresight project. The ethical, social, political, or in-
deed democratic or philosophical aspects of developing and implementing
gene-technology are clearly regarded as secondary compared to promoting a
general positive attitude in society towards these technologies. However, as ar-
gued above, IVA is not sidestepping these issues, but certainly incorporating
them in a specific order of priority.
Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems (VINNOVA)
Vinnova is a new and potentially powerful actor on the Swedish biotechnology
scene. However, the objectives of Vinnova include a great deal more than just
biotechnology.
Vinnova came into operation on January 1, 2001. Vinnova is the product of
a merger of three R&D institutions: RALF, KFB and NUTEK. The funding that
these three institutions had at their disposal has been taken over by Vinnova.
Hence, Vinnova has an annual budget of 1 billion SEK115. Vinnova is a Swedish
authority. Besides financing, monitoring, evaluating and developing Swedish
innovation politics, Vinnova has other, more traditional duties usually associa-
ted with authorities, such as control and monitoring.
In the annual report from 2001, Vinnova's overall mission was defined as
promoting sustainable growth for Swedish industry, society and working life.
Development of effective systems of innovation was emphasized as yet another
crucial task, as was financing applied research and development. Vinnova's ac-
tivities should create a «measurable sustainable growth» and contribute to the
development of new areas of industrial growth116.
In the area of biotechnology, Vinnova distributed a total of 125.8 million
SEK in 2001; that is, before Vinnova was established in 2001, 68 million SEK
had been linked to projects approved by FAS, KFB and NUTEK, which was
transformed to the new Vinnova. These projects all lie within what Vinnova
calls the FUD initiative, which is a program for research, development and de-
115 Vinnova, årsredovisning 2001, p.4.
116 Ibid. p.14, 15 & 16.
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monstration (program för forskning, utveckling och demonstration). A num-
ber of new programs were initiated during 2001. The figures concerning the
program ‘biotechnology’ are as follows. In 2001, Vinnova received 43 applicati-
ons focussed on biomedicine, 31 on bioprocesses in industrial productions and
76 on innovative foodstuff. Vinnova approved 4, 9 and 17 applications from
these three categories, respectively. A total of 13.9 million SEK was granted117.
125.8 million SEK spent on biotechnology is a significant sum of money in
Swedish research and development. As Vinnova accelerates its funding activ-
ities in the future, without being limited by the obligations it inherited from
FAS, KFB and NUTEK, this amount is likely to increase.
In the context of the Compass project, it is interesting to note that Vinnova
is not financing only research and development in the area of biotechnology. In
order for a project to be of interest to Vinnova, it must have a clear industrial
potential. This potential is evaluated in the context of an overall theory about
the nature and scope of technological innovation118. It is argued that innova-
tions are basically a «transformation of knowledge to new products and ser-
vices, processes and work procedures. » Innovation systems, it is argued, consist
of networks of organizations, people and norms that constitute the necessary
framework for creating, distributing and exploring technology and know-
ledge119. Innovation, it is argued, is about reciprocal learning and the integrati-
on of a number of different areas of politics. This complexity, Vinnova argues,
can be taken into consideration by applying a «system perspective»120. In order
to bring together the overall theory of innovation and empirical studies, Vinno-
va has initiated a number of projects dealing with biotechnology and the dyna-
mics of innovation systems121. In the annual report for the year 2001, it is ar-
gued that the triple helix (as part of or as the expression of the system perspec-
tive) is now influencing all FUD programs122.
All in all it seems reasonable to conclude that Vinnova is potentially a very
influential actor on the Swedish biotechnology scene. The strength of Vinnova
as a leading actor in the field of biotechnology is emphasized in its ambition to
co-operate with other research funding institutions and authorities such as For-
117 www.vinnova.se/innovations/bakgrund.htm 24/5 2002.
118 Ibid. p.1.
119 Ibid.
120 www.vinnova.se/forskning/innsys/projekt/pågående%20projekt.htm 24/5 2002
121 Vinnova, årsredovisning 2001, p.2. Triple Helix means the integration of research, industry and politics/
authorities.
122 Ibid. p.5.
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mas and the Swedish Research Council123. I shall discuss these two in the sec-
tions below.
The Swedish Research Council (VR)
In 2000, the Swedish parliament promulgated a new act on the organization of
the Swedish financing system for basic research. By January 1, 2001, The Swed-
ish Research Council began its work. The Research Council replaced four pre-
vious research councils124. The new structure in Sweden resembles the structu-
re for financing basic research that Norway has had for a number of years. The
total amount distributed by the research council in 2002 was more than 2 billion
SEK; of this amount, 700 million SEK or approx. 35 % was distributed to the
natural and technological sciences. Life Science and biotechnology is one
among 8 areas in the field of natural and technological sciences. Biotechnology
could expect to receive approx. 80–90 million SEK per year.
As mentioned, the research council is entirely devoted to financing basic re-
search. The objectives of the research council are strictly to identify and pro-
mote the most outstanding research in Sweden. But the research council is also
obliged to identify possible ways to promote and finance cross-disciplinary re-
search.
The research council is potentially a very powerful actor in Swedish biotech-
nology. It is still too early to say what part that the council will play. Thus far we
have seen one example of the discursive power that the council can exercise in
the case of the ethical issues related to stem cell research. The council concluded
that research on stem cells derived from embryos created for IVF treatment that
proved not to be suitable, or for other reasons no longer necessary for the treat-
ment, should be allowed125. The council ruled out the possibility of deriving
stem cells from embryos created solely for research purposes and from embryos
created through therapeutic cloning. The reasons for not allowing the latter as
sources for obtaining stem cells are based on legal as well as ethical consider-
ations. It should be mentioned that the research council announced on March
21, 2002 that it intended to grant 75 million SEK to Swedish stem cell research.
Fifty million came from the American NGO, The Juvenile Diabetes Research
Foundation. Twenty million was contributed by the research council and 5 mil-
lion by the Swedish Diabetes Research Fund126. The action taken by VR when
123 www.vr.se 24/5 2002.
124 www.vr.se pressmeddelande 12/4 2001: Klart med etiska regler för svensk stamcellsforskning.
125 www.vr.se press release 21/3 2002: 75 million SEK for Swedish Stem cell research. 
126 These figures are based on my own assessment of figures found on www.vr.se. 
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ruling in favour of stem cell research as well as the granting of 20 million SEK
to this research is a clear indication of its ambition to promote Swedish bio-
medicine. It is interesting that in this case VR is both carrying out normative
judgements and funding the research in question. The research council distri-
buted a total of 1.7 billion SEK in 2002 to be used during the period 2003–2005.
Besides stem cell research, the council financed 28 projects in 2003 within gene
technology and biotechnology. The majority (27!) of these projects are in the
natural sciences. Approximately 60 million SEK was granted to these pro-
jects127.
The Swedish Research Council for Environment, Agricultural 
Sciences and Spatial Planning (FORMAS)
FORMAS is yet another new research council in Sweden, which has a certain
impact on the promotion and funding of biotechnological research and know-
ledge production in Sweden.
Like VR and VINNOVA, FORMAS began operations on January 1, 2001.
FORMAS is formally a part of the ministry of the environment. However, it is
regulated by both the ministry of the environment and the ministry of agricul-
ture128.
In 2002, FORMAS distributed a total of 254 million SEK for 200 projects for
the period 2003–2005129. In 2002, only 3 projects in biotechnology received
funding amounting to a total of 8.1 million SEK. However, in 2001, the Swedish
government decided to contribute 20 million SEK to interdisciplinary research
within the framework of FORMAS. FORMAS eventually decided to launch a
program on Risk and Risk assessment – The Development of Biological and
Agricultural Sciences. Twelve million SEK was distributed within this program
and divided among 4 projects. Two of these projects dealt with GM crops, one
with genetically modified trees, and the other with using micro-organisms to
control pathogen fungus130.
In the context of Swedish biotechnology, FORMAS is, and will increasingly
be, an important resource for the promotion of interdisciplinary research. Whe-
127 FORMAS receives two spending authorizations (regleringsbrev). The one from the ministry of agricul-
ture regulates only the use of approx. 5.7 million SEK for purposes directly under the jurisdiction of the
ministry of agriculture. 
128 www.formas.nu presmeddelande 26/11 2002: Formas delar ut 254 miljoner till frontforskning för hållbar
utveckling. 
129 www.formas.se pressmeddelande 7/5 2002: 12 miljoner till forskning om risker med GM-växter.
130 Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2002 avseende Forskningsrådet för miljö, areella näringar och samhälls-
byggande. 20/12 2001. P.2.
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reas VINNOVA is heavily oriented towards applied research and VR focuses
entirely on basic research, FORMAS occupies an intermediate position. The re-
search projects funded by FORMAS can be categorized as both applied and ba-
sic. In the spending authorization dated 20/12 2001 from the ministry for the
environment, it is explicitly stated that FORMAS should promote research that
could increase the role of research in Sweden’s overall competitiveness.
However, at the same time it is stated that the research funded by FORMAS
should be an expression of the highest scientific standard. A crucial task for
FORMAS in fulfilling these obligations is to assess and prioritize interdisciplin-
ary research and to help construct the necessary intellectual and structural
framework for such research131.
The Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research 
(MISTRA)
Mistra is one of the research foundations created in 1993 when the conservative
government led by the Moderate Party in coalition with the Liberal Party redis-
tributed the capital in the wage-earners’ investment funds into three new re-
search foundations. SSF, which I will discuss below, was one of the three foun-
dations. Mistra was granted 2.5 billion SEK, which by the year 2000 had grown
to 4.8 billion SEK due to developments on the stock market. MISTRA contribu-
te 250 million SEK per year to various research programmes132. The research
funded by MISTRA comprises large programs that run for 4–5 or more years
and include researchers from various disciplines. One crucial objective for
MISTRA is to contribute to concrete solutions to environmental problems.
As this report is being written (May 2003), MISTRA is in the process of eva-
luating a number of new programs dealing with «The New Biology». Some of
the programs that will eventually receive funding are likely to focus on various
applications of biotechnology including risk and ethical issues.
Mistra can, and will be I believe, a very significant actor in Swedish biotech-
nology research. The most interesting feature of the MISTRA program, but also
one of the most problematic in many ways, is its ambition to create interdiscip-
linary research groups. This has the potential to generate new and exciting
knowledge on, e.g., the discursive translation of scientific findings into a legal
and political context. However, MISTRA still has a long way to go before its in-
131 Mistra Annual Report 2000. P.3.
132 Malin Mobjörk at the department of Water and Environmental Studies, Linköping University is cur-
rently writing her Ph.D. thesis on Mistra.
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terdisciplinary ambition will result in new ways of conducting research. But the
potential is great133.
Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research (SSF)
As mentioned above, SSF was created in the process of transforming wage-ear-
ners’ investment funds into research funds. SSF was granted 6 billion SEK, or
60 % of the total sum redistributed for research purposes134.
Like MISTRA, SSF only funds large research programs, PhD programs or
gradate programs. SSF has thus funded, e.g., six research training programs at
the universities in Lund, Göteborg, Linköping, Stockholm, Umeå and Uppsala
in the field of biomedicine and bioscience. The list of projects and programs
funded by SSF in the life sciences is comprehensive, and the amount of money
distributed each year is approx. 1 billion SEK. The life sciences account for ap-
prox. a third of this. Like MISTRA, SSF is authorized by the government to
successively distribute the entire capital in the foundation to research purposes.
SSF has estimated that the capital at its disposal will last until at least 2020135. A
similar estimation has been made for MISTRA.
In the context of the Compass project, it is important to note that SSF has
been one of the main funding authorities behind the Swedish ELSA program.
ELSA deals with the ethical, legal and social aspects of genome and gene tech-
nology research and was formally established in 1999. ELSA has primarily focu-
sed on financing doctoral and post-doctoral research as well as seminars and
conferences. At least 10 research projects of a duration of 2–3 years each have
been funded by ELSA. Despite ELSA's relatively limited financial means, I be-
lieve it has been a very significant initiator of research activities as well as a broa-
der public debate on biotechnology in Sweden. Presently (May 2003) it is quite
unclear what role and what scope ELSA activities will have in the future.
133 www.stratresearch.se/fcreat.htm 
134 www.stratresearch.se/programblad  
135 These positions can be exemplified through the work of Maarten Hajer (1995): The politics of Environ-
mental Discourse. Oxford University Press. And Timothy W. Luke (1997): Ecocritique – Contesting the
Politics of Nature, Economy and Culture. University of Minnesota Press.
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Environmental organizations: Greenpeace, 
Swedish Society for Nature Conservation and 
Friends of the Earth Sweden
Greenpeace (GP), Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SNF) and Friends
of the Earth Sweden (MJV) represent three rather distinct organizational and
political cultures. One could argue that SNF is more an expression of ecological
modernization, whereas GP and MJV represent a tradition of radical ecology136.
Greenpeace, for instance, has for a number of years been engaged in a cam-
paign against GMO crops in Sweden. The criticism has been directed mainly to-
wards the risk of GMO contamination of crops and soil. Greenpeace has been
especially critical of the fact that no environmental impact analysis (EIA) is re-
quired for GMO field trails. The problem, according to Greenpeace, is that these
field trails correspond with the definition in the environmental protection act
(Miljöbalken kap.6) of activities requiring an EIA before approval. I have no in-
formation about whether this critique holds despite the new directive 2001/18/
EG.
SNF has run a similar campaign in Sweden for a number of years. SNF has
stressed not only the contamination issue, but also the problem of whether, e.g.,
genetically modified rice is a prudent solution to the lack of sufficient high qual-
ity food supplies. SNF has argued that GMO tends to consolidate the conven-
tional and pesticide-dependent agricultural system of production, instead of
promoting new and more ecologically sound modes of production. They also
point out that most of the GMO crops grown in developing countries are soy-
beans and maize, which are exported to be used, e.g., as animal feed in Western
countries. SNF has been important in voicing the opinion that GMO should not
be rejected all together, and that we need more research on contamination risks,
better risk assessment instruments as well as development of alternatives to
GMO solutions137.
On September 29, 1999, Friends of the Earth Sweden launched a campaign
demanding a five-year ban on genetically modified organisms and crops138.
The strategy adopted by MJV has been much more confrontational than that
adopted by SNF. The campaign for a five-year ban on GM was explicitly de-
signed to challenge senior politicians and industry at a number of public mee-
136 www.snf.mondosearch.com 
137 www.mjv.se/matt/stopp 
138 MJV remissvar på EU kommissionens förslag til ändrat direktiv om genmanipulerade organismer. 28/4
1999. P.4 (www.mjv.se/jordbruk/gmo.html) 
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tings. The campaign attracted some attention in Sweden and contributed to
bringing about a public debate on GM crops and food. It is obvious when one
reads through the material provided by MJV that their approach to GMO is not
only a question of risk and the need for further research. The critique goes bey-
ond this, and argues for a new economic system in which the production of food
is determined by a logic that is essentially non-capitalistic. MJV argues that the
socio-economic aspects of GM crops and food production must be included in
the scientific evaluation of risks – a standpoint that the EU commission could
not accept in the preparatory process of the new directive 2002/18/EG on deli-
berate release of GMO139. In a response to SOU 2000: 103, which I have discus-
sed elsewhere in this report, SNF argues that the notion of risk provided in this
committee report is too narrow to provide any clarity or guidance140. SNF re-
stricts itself to arguing that risk research must be improved both qualitatively
and quantitatively before large-scale use of GMO can be accepted.
It is fair to argue that both Greenpeace and MJV, but most of all SNF, have
been essential for stimulating a public debate in Sweden on biotechnology, es-
pecially in the area of GM food and the use of GMO in agriculture.
In the last section of this paper, I will concentrate on two very important ac-
tors in Swedish biotechnology: the pharmaceutical and the plant breeding in-
dustries.
Pharmaceuticals and agrobiotechnology
The biotech industries in Sweden can be categorized as follows: Pharmaceuti-
cals, Agriculture, Food, Chemistry, Environment and Forestry/Pulp & Pa-
per141. It is within these sectors than one can expect to find biotechnology ac-
tivities. Sweden has important biotech activities in all of these sectors. However,
the dominant sector in terms of turnover and number of employees is the phar-
maceutical sector. Hence, it is natural to concentrate on this sector. However, I
shall also comment on the plant-breeding sector (included in the agricultural
sector), as the introduction of GMO into agriculture and food production plays
a significant role in Sweden. At the same time, it is an application that has been
heavily debated, unlike the pharmaceutical applications of biotechnology,
139 SNF remissvar: Att spränga gränser – Bioteknikens möjligheter och risker. p.2. 25/10 2000. 
140 The Swedish Biotechnology Innovation System. VINNOVA innovation in focus VF 2001:2. p.2.
141 The special advertising section amounts to a total of 16 pages. Five pages are devoted to an article dealing
with the structure of collaborations in Swedish biotech.
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which seem to be imbedded in a widespread consensus on the necessity of that
kind of research and development.
Pharmaceutical Industry
Swedish biotech industry, in general, and the pharmaceutical industries (bio-
tech-pharma), in particular, are very concerned about showing the outside
world that Swedish biotech is at the forefront of research. Supported by IVA and
VINNOVA (see sections 4.1 & 4.2), the entire Swedish biotech industry produ-
ced a special advertising section in the journal Scientific American in 2002. He-
re, as elsewhere, IVA and VINNOVA emphasized that the main reason why
Sweden has become a «force in biotech» is «the science of collaboration,» as is
stated in the title of the introductory article142. Collaboration between acade-
mia, industry and authorities in combination with a strong public health sector
is repeatedly emphasized as being the main ingredients in the Swedish success
story.
One important aspect of the dynamics of the Swedish biotech-pharma sector
is the geographical clusters of biotech industry, universities, hospitals and ven-
ture capital in the Stockholm/Uppsala region and in the Lund/Malmö/Copen-
hagen region, the latter named Medicon Valley. The Medicon Valley concept
was established in 1993 and based «…on the observation that Öresund was
home to 60 % of all Nordic pharma companies, 11 universities and 26 hos-
pitals…/../..Now the region is home to about 101 biotech companies, more than
70 pharma companies and 32 venture firms»143. There is no doubt that Medi-
con Valley rests heavily on the assumption of the dynamic effects of collabor-
ation and co-location. It should be mentioned that Medicon Valley is the result
of a new kind of entrepreneurial initiative in which industry, universities, hos-
pitals and venture firms are connected in networks emerging around concrete
research and development projects. The role of the state is that of an actor
among other actors, that is, the state is not the primary force for integration of
these diverse actors. Rather, integration in this case should be comprehended as
the result of complex interactions between numerous independent decision-
making centres. The role of the state becomes that of the provider of fram-
eworks and procedures (legal, political etc.), not of terms, contents and outcome
142 Ludger Wess: Northern Lights. BioCentury. The Bernstein Report on Biobusiness. August 5, 2002. p.5.
143 This argument is inspired by Mats Benners concept of ‘post-academic research’ politics in Mats Benner
(2001): Kontrovers och konsensus – vetenskap och politik i svensk 1990-tal. SISTER rapport 1. This ar-
gument are based also on the analyses of the altered relationship between state-marked, public-private
in Ove K. Pedersen, Niels Å. Andersen, Peter Kjär & John Elberg (1992): Privat Politik. Samfundslitter-
atur.
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of collaborations between actors in this field. Naturally, this ‘situation’ has con-
sequences for the possibility of formulating research and technology politics in
the first place. However, within the framework of this report, I cannot elaborate
on this argument144.
In the Stockholm/Uppsala region, the Karolinska Institute (KI) is the major
biotech institution. KI is at the moment the largest biotech research and deve-
lopment facility in Scandinavia. Even in a European comparison, KI is one of
the major centres. These clusters are very important, as they support the cre-
ation of new forms of collaboration between companies and academia, etc.
However, it is evidence that:
«Geographic co-location does appear to be important for one cohort, namely
smaller biotech-pharma firms located in regions of strong medical re-
search»145.
McKelvey et al. argued that biotech-pharma is «exceedingly global in terms of
both knowledge and markets for R&D collaboration,» but at the same time de-
pendent on a local structure for knowledge development, that is, to create new
ideas «…and to reap the economic rewards through innovations»146. Research
carried out in Sweden suggests that the agreements between firms involving co-
development of technology are «…most likely to be between a Swedish firm and
a Swedish university, indicating the probable importance of having a strong na-
tional basic scientific community»147. The establishment of clusters of biotech-
pharma actors has been heavily promoted over the past decades in Sweden. The
quoted research suggests, however, that these clusters are of decisive import-
ance for a certain type of company and benefit a certain kind of collaboration.
The powerful clusters do not constitute the solution to all problems concerning
biotech-pharma, but rather an important solution to a certain set of problems
specific to small and medium-sized companies.
The Journal BioCentury published in its August 5, 2002 issue an article entit-
led ‘Northern Light’148. The overall argument in this article is that the Swedish
success story has been brought about not through huge state funding but
through «…the initiative of determined science managers in Scandinavia’s re-
144 Maureen McKelvey, Håkan Alm & Massimo Riccaboni: Does Co-location matter for Formal Knowledge
Collaboration in Swedish Biotechnology-Pharmaceutical Sector? 2003 Manuscript in press. p.21. 
145 Ibid. p.22.
146 Ibid. p.24.
147 Op.cit. BioCentury. August 5 2002. p.1.
148 Ibid.
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search institutions and the efforts of experienced pharmaceutical industry exe-
cutives»149. Again, it is the collaboration between various actors that is the key
to explaining the extraordinary growth in the Scandinavian biotech-pharma in-
dustry. The editor Ludger Wess enthusiastically described the Swedish situ-
ation, for which «Stockholm-based Karolinska Institutet is the paradigmatic ca-
se»150. In this case, much of the credit goes to one individual – Hans Wigzell.
Wigzell is quoted as saying that because the mission of KI is to improve human
health in general it would be «…unethical not to commercialize and apply the
basic research performed in the KI labs»151. The commercialization that Wig-
zell mentioned came about in 1995 when the government allowed universities
in Sweden to set up commercial enterprises. KI established KI Holding AB in
order to start this process. Under this umbrella, two centres were established.
One was the technology transfer unit Karolinska Innovations AB (KIAB), and
the other the Centre for Medical Innovations (CMI)152. Based on the invest-
ment of five venture investors, KI created a fund (Karolinska Fund) with a total
of $50 million in capital153. Besides allowing the universities to form commer-
cial enterprises, the 1990s also saw another very import development that af-
fected Sweden's ability to boost its biotech-pharma industry, namely the change
in rules concerning the pension funds, and the restructuring of the research fi-
nancing system in Sweden during the period 1994–1998154.
In the late 1990s, the rules for pension funds were eased in Sweden. The im-
mediate result was that a tremendous amount of money poured out onto the
market in a search for investment opportunities. The reform that started in 1998
and was finalized in 2001 included a «…significant liberalisation of the invest-
ment rules for the funds of the National Pension Insurance Fund so that about
70 % of the assets can be invested in equities»155. The result of this change was
that the amount of money available increased tremendously. At the same time
there was a ‘biotech hype’ in Sweden, which canalized a large amount of the
freed capital to the biotech-pharma sector. The political or rather ideological
change in the Swedish pension politics has played a decisive role in providing
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. p.2. See also Op.Cit. Mats Benner (2001). p.90-166.
154 Op.cit. BioCentury. p.3.
155 Ibid. p.3 The amount of venture capital increased in Sweden from approx. 20 billion SEK in 1990 to ap-
prox. 200 billion SEK in 2000, according to Swedish Venture Capital Association. 
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good financial circumstances for hundreds of new biotech-pharma and other
biotech companies in Sweden156.
It is safe to argue, however, that the single most important factor in the Swed-
ish biotech-pharma industry boom is the existence of the companies Astra and
Pharmacia. Pharmacia merged with Upjohn in 1995 and with Monsanto in
2000 and formed Pharmacia Corporation. Astra in turn started collaboration
with the US-based Merck & Co in 1996, and in 1999 Astra merged with British
Zeneca to form AstraZeneca157. Large portions of new Swedish companies in
the biotech-pharma sector can be traced back to these major companies in
terms of products, staff and management. One way of measuring the import-
ance of Astra and Pharmacia is to look at the number of papers in biotechnol-
ogy-related science co-published by Astra and Pharmacia with other Swedish
organizations. These figures reveal that there is very close collaboration be-
tween Astra, Pharmacia and the public research organizations. During the pe-
riod 1986 to 1997, Astra published a total of 498 papers with Swedish univer-
sities. During the same period, Pharmacia published a total of 580 papers, and
they both published 13 papers with other firms, five of which were published as
a result of collaboration between Astra and Pharmacia158.
The growth of the Swedish biotechnology industry including the biotech-
pharma sector has been 400–600 % over the past decades. In 1996, the industry
had a turnover of 120 billion SEK and employed 75,000 people worldwide159.
The growth has continued although, at a slightly slower pace.
In Sweden, 80 % of all biotechnology companies have between 1 and 50 em-
ployees. Only 2.1 % or 3 companies have more than 500 employees160. The total
number of companies in Sweden in 1999 was 144, of which 141 firms were ca-
tegorized as micro-sized (81), small-sized (58) or medium-sized (2)161. Still a
very large portion of the growth in turnover derives from the large companies.
Vinnova argued in their survey report that despite this fact, it is highly pertinent
to look after and support the many smaller companies, due to their potential in
terms of product and process innovations.
In many ways, the Swedish biotech-pharma industry is a success story in
terms of innovations, investments, increased turnover and the number of em-
ployees in this sector. Simultaneously, this development also poses a number of
156 Op.Cit. Vinnova Innovation in Focus VF 2001:2. p.13-14.
157 Ibid. p.132 Table B8.
158 Ibid. p.27.
159 Ibid. p.24.
160 Ibid. 23-24.
161 Ibid. p.38ff and p.113 Table A1.
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challenges for the future. In the Vinnova report quoted above, its is argued that
the interfaces between firms and universities are still muddled by bureaucratic
procedures and problems of creating linkages between certain industry interests
and appropriate academic research. Another critical issue mentioned in the
Vinnova report is the question of how to maintain a high educational level in
the technical and medical fields.
After this brief exposé of the Swedish biotech-pharma industry, I will provi-
de a short account of the agro-biotech sector in Sweden. This sector amounts to
only 8 companies, with a turnover of only 603 million SEK in 1999, which was
actually a decrease by 6.4 % since 1997162. However, it is still an important in-
dustry and has been in Sweden for quite some time. Above all, agrobiotechno-
logy is considered to have a great future potential. One obstacle to the develop-
ment of this group of firms has been the unclear legal situation in the EU area
concerning deliberate release of GMO into the environment. With the new di-
rective 2001/18/EG on deliberate release, this situation could change. However,
this remains to be seen.
Agrobiotechnology
A number of major players in the field of plant breeding are active in Sweden.
Just as in biomedicine, the application of gene technology in plant breeding is
regarded as an important area of research and development in Sweden.
However, whereas the application of gene technology in the development of
pharmaceuticals and new diagnostic methods is generally conceived of as posi-
tive, the introduction of genetically modified seeds and crops has caused a
tremendous critical debate on, e.g., the ecological, economic and social impact
of the application of genetic technology. In this regard, Sweden is not different
from many other countries. The significance of the situation in Sweden is that
Sweden has a comparatively large and advanced industry both in the field of
biomedicine and in the field of plant breeding. Hence, the ways in which the
conflicts regarding genetic technologies are handled internationally as well as
domestically do have an economic impact on Sweden.
The commercial activities concerning research and development of GMO
plants and crops in Sweden have been marked by a decrease over the past 3–4
years. According to the Swedish Board of Agriculture (jordbruksverket), in
1998 the total area used for field trials on various genetically modified potatoes
was 345.2 hectares. For sugar-beets the total area was 1.3 hectares, and for rape
162 Jordbruksverket. www.sjv.se/net/SJV/Startsida/Ämnesområden/ 24/5 2002.
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6.7 hectares. These figures increased during 1999, especially concerning field
trails on genetically modified potatoes with enhanced starch production, which
increased to a total area of 336.15 hectares. During the years 2000 and 2001, the
total area used for field trails diminished. By 2002, the area used for various field
trails in Sweden was 4.28 hectares for potatoes, 0.24 hectares for sugar-beets,
8.51 hectares for rape, and 140 square metres for other crops163. Field trails with
rape have been on a stable, but low, level during the period 1998–2002. These
figures indicate a somewhat reluctant attitude on the part of various companies
to engage in the development of genetically modified crops. One obvious reason
for this is the unclear situation regarding the future of GMO in Europe caused
by the de-facto moratorium on the approval of new genetically modified crops
and foodstuff in Europe164.
The field trails in Sweden have been carried out by the following companies:
Amylogene (a company owned by Svalöf Weibull and the Swedish producers of
starch in southern Sweden)
Svalöf Weibull, Plant Science Sweden.
Aventis, Plant Genetic Systems.
Syngenta, Novartis.
It is a significant feature of the biotech companies that there has been a strong
tendency to merge into larger units. One example of this is the company Hilles-
hög, which carried out field trails on sugar beets and rape from 1989–1997, and
which was bought by Novartis in 1998. Syngenta eventually bought Novartis in
2001. In the annual report from Syngenta 2001, it is stated that the company’s
merger «…is largely complete and the delivery of synergies on track»165.
Another example is Svalöf Weibull, which has merged with the German com-
pany BASF. Until 1998, Svalöf Weibull was owned by a cooperative of Swedish
farmers. In 1998, the Canadian market for rape seed, which was crucial to Svalöf
Weibull, was drastically diminished by the introduction of GMO rape from
competing companies. BASF took over 40 % of Svalöf Weibull and a joint com-
pany called Plant Science Sweden was established. A sum of 7 billion SEK will
163 The moratorium was a consequence of a meeting of the European ministers of the environment in Lux-
emburg in June 1999 regarding the revision of directive 90/220. Some countries (e.g., France, Greece and
Denmark) argued in favour of a moratorium, and six countries argued in favour of an extremely restric-
tive policy for approval of new GMO products. The consequence was that the de facto stop for approvals
of GMO products that had been practised in the EU since 1998 would continue until the new directive
(2002/18 which came into effect in October 2002) had passed the commission and the EU parliament.
See Nyhetsbrev från LRF om internationella frågor. No.22 2/7 1999. p.1-2.   
164 Syngenta Annual Report 2001. p.3.
165 Årsöversikt 2001 Svalöf Weibull p.24-28. 
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be invested in this company during the period 1998–2008. The goal is clearly to
become a major player on the global market for genetically modified seeds166.
From 1991 to 2002, a total of 31 field trails concerning potatoes have been
carried out in Sweden. The company Amylogene conducted 24 of these. Plant
Science Sweden and BASF plant science conducted 5 trails and The Swedish
Agricultural University and Lund University one trail each.
A total of 36 field trails have been conducted on rape in the period 1989–
2002. Aventis conducted 17 and Svalöf Weibull 12. The Swedish Agricultural
University carried out two. Various small companies and actors carried out the
rest.
As regard sugar-beets, a total of 17 field trails have been carried out from
1993 to 2002. Syngenta (former Hilleshög/Novartis) carried out all of these 17
trails167.
In an interview that I conducted with vice director and chief of the plant
breeding section at Svalöf Weibull, Anders Nilsson, in June 2002, he anticipated
a renewed growth in the development and introduction of new genetically mo-
dified seeds and plants when the European moratorium was lifted. The event
that Nilsson was waiting for was the new EU directive on deliberate release of
genetically modified organisms 2002/18/EG. The new directive came into effect
on October 17, 2002, and the moratorium has actually been lifted as a consequ-
ence of this168. However, in Sweden, as well as, e.g., in Denmark, the next hurdle
to overcome is the conflict between conventional and ecological agriculture
concerning the environmental and ecological prospects of using, e.g., genetical-
ly modified seeds169. The future of genetically modified seeds and plants in Swe-
den is by no means likely to be free from tensions and frictions between various
interest groups.
Continuity and dependency
As this report meets its deadline, VINNOVA published a new report on Swed-
ish Biotechnology as a follow up to the 2001 study quoted in the previous secti-
on170. I have not had the opportunity to study this report in detail. However,
166 Op.cit. www.sjv.se 24/5 2002.
167 The new directive regulates the labelling and tracing issue, which was the primary reason why a number
of European countries voluntarily introduced a moratorium in order to ease the harsh critique of the
handling of GMO expressed by a large number of consumer and environmental organizations.      
168 This conflict was evident in a hearing on genetic technology in food production, conducted by Danish
Radio on October 28, 2000 and initiated by a committee on genetic technology and society, of which I
was a member, within The Danish Academy of Technology and Science.
169 Anna Sandström & Lennart Norgren: Swedish Biotechnology. VINNOVA Analysis VA 2003:2.
170 Ibid. p.6.
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judging from the general conclusions and figures, the picture is similar to that
presented in the 2001 report. In this respect continuity seems to be the domi-
nant feature of Swedish biotechnology. However, some changes have occurred.
The total number of biotech companies with less than 500 employees has in-
creased by 35 % between 1997 and 2001 to a total of 183 companies. Likewise,
the numbers of employees has increased by 48 % to about 4000 employees. The
turnover also increased by more than 30 % between 1997 and 2000, amounting
to approx. 4.4 billion SEK in 2000171. Now, this seemingly positive tendency is
reported by VINNOVA to have a darker backside.
It is concluded that the growth in number of employees and turnover is not
financed by profits generated in the companies, but by an infusion of venture
capital172. In general, the growth of the biotech industry is hampered by the
very limited amount of venture capital and seed financing capital. This of course
increases the industry's dependency on venture capital firms, seed financing
companies and public authorities.
The regional concentration of Swedish biotechnology to Uppsala/Stock-
holm, Göteborg, Lund/Malmö continued between 1997 and 2000. The collab-
oration between industry and universities in these cities is increasingly import-
ant. Linköping is mentioned as an up-and-coming region for life science with
potential for establishing biotech companies.
Finally, the sector agrobiotechnology has shown less impressive growth
compared to biotech-pharma companies. However, despite stagnation in the
agrobiotech sector, this sector could report net profits each year. In other words,
there is no seed capital or venture capital dependency in this sector173. The stag-
nation in agrobiotechnology is due to consumer resistance and therefore a
problem of expanding the market for, e.g., GMO crops.
Despite this somewhat disturbing picture of the current situation in Swedish
biotech industries, according to VINNOVA, the future perspectives for Swedish
biotechnology remain very optimistic.
Concluding remarks
A struggle with four interrelated sets of problems has marked the politico-legal
governance of biotechnology in Sweden:
171 Ibid. p.75ff.
172 Ibid. p.50-51.
173
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1. There is a consensus in Sweden that ethics are needed in the legal regulation
of biotechnology. On the other hand, however, it has been unclear what sta-
tus ethical norms should enjoy and from what sources they should be deri-
ved.
2. There are conflicting political interpretations of how comprehensive and
all-encompassing the legal regulation should be.
3. Recently, the biotechnology committee argued that the political and
democratic implications of biotechnology have not been sufficiently
analysed and dealt with in Sweden. In order to remedy this, the committee
suggested that Sweden should form a new authority responsible for the
entire range of biotechnological applications. It was also suggested that
Sweden form a new technology assessment body to improve the
accountability and appropriation of biotechnology.
4. Swedish governance of biotechnology is characterized by the co-existence of
two modes of governmentality: a) one that celebrates innovation as a virtue
in its own right, and b) one that strives to improve the accountability of
biotechnology by improving the public understanding of science and
technology.
There is in Sweden today a huge number of research councils, biotech and ven-
ture capital firms, university departments, hospitals and authorities, all of which
are involved in developing the innovation capacity and commercialization of
biotechnology. Sweden has experienced a tremendous increase in venture capi-
tal, new biotech firms and new collaborative networks. Today, Sweden is among
the leading nations in the biotech-pharma sector. The expansion can be explai-
ned partly by the presence of Astra and Pharmacia, which have served as loco-
motives for the development of the biotech industry in Sweden. This
dependency can be considered an advantage in some respects, but it also con-
tributes a certain vulnerability to the entire biotech system in Sweden. Another
explanation for the growth in the Swedish biotech industry is the structural
changes in pension funds and wage-earners’ investment funds in 1990s. These
changes were important prerequisites for the increased availability of invest-
ment capital.
It is a characteristic feature of the situation in Sweden that the role of the state
throughout this process has been continuously redefined. The landscape of bio-
technology governance has changed. On the one hand, the state has lost influ-
ence, as the dynamic of the sector is based on networks, projects and negotia-
tions in which the state is only one actor among others. On the other hand, the
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new research councils described in section 4, in combination with the fact that
university-based research is crucial to the development of the entire sector, le-
ave the state a crucial role in the governance of biotechnology. The governance
of Swedish biotechnology is a good example of a broader tendency in Sweden
towards a research policy defined by what Benner (2001) called post-academic
ideals. These ideals imply that, e.g., commercial, macro-economic, social and
political ideals are introduced on par with more ‘traditional’ academic ideals in
the governance of biotechnology. The absence of an analysis of what this means
for democracy and scientific citizenship is striking in contemporary Sweden.
This ambiguity is probably one of the reasons why the biotechnology com-
mittee called for a coherent and comprehensive biotechnology politics.
The role of citizens in the Swedish ‘biotech hype’ is unclear. The biotechnol-
ogy committee attempted to bring the question of the citizens onto the political
agenda of biotechnology. However, we have not yet seen a political response.
Swedish biotechnology therefore remains captured in a field of tension between
conflicting modes of appropriations of biotechnology. This ‘situation’ calls for
further research on modes of appropriation through, e.g., detailed case studies.
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